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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In July 2010, the government of the United States of America passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as a reaction to the recent financial
crisis. Since insurance companies and banks unexpectedly had to be bailed out by the
government, confidence in the stability of the financial system had to be rebuild. The
reform contained changes in regulation of the financial system in the United States and
affected all federal financial regulatory agencies, banks, and the insurance industry.
Similar to the United States, the European Union created several programs to manage
and regulate the financial health such as the Basel III framework for the banking sector
as well as Solvency II in the insurance industry. The inclusion of the insurance sec-
tor into these regulatory requirements for financial stability underlines its increasing
importance for regulators and academics alike.
The core business of insurance companies involves underwriting risks of policy-
holders, which is usually assessed and managed via well-understood actuarial meth-
ods. Other business operations, however, might be prone to market and exogenous
risks that arise from the environment an insurer exists in. For example, insurers that
are more involved in financial markets and thus, may focus on non-traditional business
areas, are exposed to financial distress in those markets. Also, the more vital an insurer
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is for an entire market, the more it contributes to the well-being or distress of its par-
ticipants. Consequently, speaking in terms of possible government interventions, these
insurers have a higher probability to be bailed out. Before the recent financial crisis,
this appeared to be a phenomenon restricted to the banking sector only, but since the
near collapse of American International Group (AIG), discussions about systemic risk
are not limited to the banking sector anymore. Even the German finance supervision
Bundesanstalt fu¨r Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) actively seeks the dialogue
with the insurance industry, discussing new approaches for requirements preventing
default of insurance companies as well as a collapse of the whole insurance sector.
Theoretically, there are several channels through which insurance firms might be ex-
posed or even contribute to financial instability. Insurers have to deal with elementary
risks such as market risk, liquidity risk or default risk of financial institutions. While
these risks are of huge interest, it is vital to also understand the interplay of these vari-
ables when combining these risks. Therefore, risk managers in financial institutions
are interested in and require adequate tools for capturing dependence and interactions
between these risks. Measures like the Value-at-Risk, which only focus on a single
effect of each risk, neglecting the dependence structure, are included in regulatory
frameworks and are heavily used by a wide range of institutions to manage risks.
Further, the asset side of insurers’ balance-sheets corresponds to several parties that
destabilize the company’s system. The risk in using derivatives like futures, options,
and other financial instruments lies in the fact that the market value, instead of the
limited maturity, varies over time. Further, in case of over-the-counter transactions
especially swap constructions have to capture the rating of the corresponding trad-
ing partner and the counterparty risk has to be limited. Insurance companies are not
only faced with the respective individual event of default, but also, with the event of
a financial market collapse. The chief executive officer (CEO) and the corresponding
management group of each insurance company anticipate the consequence of the cor-
porate policy and the management decision for capturing and controlling the personal
default risk, the contribution to financial instability of the operating market as well as
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the avoidance of possible nomination as systemic important financial institution (SIFI).
“SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their
size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption
to the wider financial system and economic activity.”1 The Financial Stability Board
(FSB) published a list with Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) with
a methodology proposed by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS). The details of the implementation are higher requirements on loss absorbency
and are supposed to be implemented until 2019.
Economists, risk managers, and regulators around the world are longing for mea-
sures and methods to preserve financial stability in the future and detect possible finan-
cial risks before they lead to another near-collapsed financial sector. Regarding this,
it is questionable if the statement “Systemically important insurers have to hold more
capital reserves and are subject to tighter monitoring” is proved to be true. Therefore, it
is important to evaluate the actions that have been taken to restore financial stability as
well as to question common methodologies that are used by economists and regulators.
The dissertation contributes to the discussion on risk management, financial stability,
and the corresponding regulation of insurance companies in the form of five indepen-
dent articles that empirically assess different aspects of risk management and financial
default risk of insurers.
The first article, building the second chapter, studies extreme dependence structures
in equity markets as well as cross-dependences between credit derivatives and equities.
The dynamic linear and extreme dependence in equity, liquidity, and credit risk is
characterized by modeling the joint distribution of the stock returns, bid-ask spreads,
and default probabilities. More precisely, the respective stock liquidity is modeled by
the bid-ask spread and credit risk is measured by the default probability extracted from
the respective credit default swaps contracts.
This empirical study first documents the existence of significant time-varying tail
1IAIS (2013): Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 4 November
2011.
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dependence between the stock returns, stock liquidity, and the respective firm’s default
intensities and subsequently introduces a liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk
measure that enables risk managers to reliably forecast the total risk exposure of a
stock investment. The proposed dynamic vine copula model is found to capture time-
varying tail dependence significantly better than static copula or dynamic correlation-
based models. However, no study so far has investigated the dependence between
equity returns, credit risk, and stock liquidity of individual firms.
Further, this paper proposes a liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (LC-VaR)
does not only account for market price risk, but also for sudden peaks in illiquid-
ity and default probabilities. Using a portfolio of six companies listed in the S&P
500, the study illustrates with a forecast of the portfolio’s LC-VaR, employing the dy-
namic R-vine copula model, that not only LC-VaR forecasts capture downside risk
adequately. Additionally, the dynamic R-vine copula model significantly outperforms
than the static vine copula or dynamic correlation-based models. Although, the empir-
ical study primarily deals with risk forecasting which is not only limited to the field of
risk management.
The following two studies, chapter three and four, examine the issue of systemic
risk in the insurance sector. More precise, the empirical investigations explore the
methodology of regulators to identify systemically important insurers. Before the re-
cent financial crises and the near collapse of the insurer AIG, neither economists nor
regulators originating that insurance companies can be systemically relevant or even
contribute to it. Especially, this opinion is substantiated by the differences in the core
business actvities of banks and insurers. Fundamental differences are that insurers are
not as exposed to runs or liquidity shortages as banks are, and are also smaller in size
and less interconnected.
The third chapter is the first empirical study that empirically explores the con-
tribution and exposure to systemic risk for an international panel of insurers over
a long time horizon. The study uses the three most prominent systemic risk mea-
sures suggested in the literature, the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) proposed by
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Acharya et al. (2010), ∆CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015), and SRISK by
Brownlees and Engle (2015) as dependent variables in a panel regression approach
in order to measure systemic risk. The main variables in this study are the size and
the leverage of an insurer as well as a measure of interconnectedness introduced in
Billio et al. (2012).
The key finding of this study is that systemic risk in the international insurance sec-
tor is small in comparison to precious findings in the literature analyzing the banking
sector. Further, during the financial crisis, however, insurers did contribute signifi-
cantly to the instability of the financial sector. Moreover, systemic risk of insurers is
determined by various factors including an insurer’s interconnectedness and leverage,
the magnitudes and significances of these effects, however, differ depending on the
systemic risk measure used and the insurer line and geographic region analyzed.
The empirical study in chapter four explores the determinants of the systemic im-
portance of banks and insurers during the financial crisis. In more detail, the empirical
analysis investigates the methodology of regulators to identify global systemically im-
portant financial institutions.
The study uses the following empirical methodology in order to measure systemic
risk in the banking and insurance sector. The sample exists of the largest 148 banks
and 98 insurers in the world, combining a cross-sectional approach with two popular
measures of systemic risk, MES and ∆CoVaR.
One result of this analysis is that MES and ∆CoVaR as two common measures of
systemic risk produce inconclusive results of financial institutions during the crisis.
Furthermore, there is little to no evidence that higher leverage and interconnectedness
increase the exposure or contribution of individual institutions to systemic risk. Sur-
prisingly, despite the methodologies published by regulators themselves, global sys-
temically important institutions are clearly identifiable by a quick glance at the total
assets in their balance-sheets.
The fifth chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to the solvency regulation and its ef-
fect on the idiosyncratic risks of insurers. In the light of recent discussions, the study of
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idiosyncratic default risk and its determinants in the insurance sector is important and
of high relevance to regulators. Especially the interplay of required solvency capital
and the default risk of institutions is of great interest to both, regulators and managers.
Although higher capital requirements are the most favorite tools for regulators to
support financial stability, they are also viewed by managers as being counterproduc-
tive as they reduce profits, subsequently increasing financial instability. However, the
effects of higher solvency of insurers is also of great importance to policyholders since
they could be affected by increases in insurance premia or could demand more protec-
tion from the contract’s issuer. Based on an international sample of 308 non-life insur-
ers, this study finds that long-term solvency significantly reduces default risk across all
countries. Short-term solvency does not play a significant role in most of the regres-
sions.
Capital requirements related to an insurer’s long-term solvency are well suited for
increasing the financial soundness of insurers. Another important result is that the
regulatory environment of insurers is more important for reducing the default risk of
non-life insurers. The main result of this analysis is that long-term capital is signifi-
cantly negatively related to the default risk of insurers.
The final chapter of this dissertation empirically investigates the impact of deriva-
tives usage by U.S. insurers on the insurers’ respective default risk and its exposure to
systemic risk. More precisely, the insurers’ 10-K filings of U.S. insurance companies
are evaluated in order to obtain information on the firms’ disclosed derivative usage.
Further, this is the first study which analyzes the insurers’ intentions to use derivative
contracts and describes the variety of derivatives used in insurers’ risk management.
This analysis is based on a large panel of U.S. insurers for the period from 1999 to
2014 and employs panel regressions of insurers’ default risk estimates on proxies of
derivative use.
Financial and non-financial companies employ derivative instruments for a variety
of reasons. Obviously, companies use derivatives for hedging risky positions on their
balance sheet. In contrast, companies could also use financial derivatives for other rea-
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sons like lowering their expected costs of default, lowering tax payments, or reducing
the volatility of executive compensations (see, e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985, Froot et al.,
1993, DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). The allegedly adverse effect of derivatives usage on
an insurer’s firm risk, however, is not as obvious as regulators sometimes claim it to
be.
While derivatives trading for risk-taking should obviously increase firm risk, the use
of derivatives for hedging purposes should have a decreasing effect on an insurer’s
default risk. Insurers often employ derivatives to hedge various risks stemming from
both sides of the balance sheet.
The main result of the empirical study is that insurers employing financial deriva-
tives have a significantly lower probability of default than matched non-users. How-
ever, when insurers use derivatives for risk-taking and non-hedging purposes, deriva-
tives usage has an increasing effect on default risk. Another finding is that derivatives
usage is positively correlated with an insurer’s exposure to systemic market shocks.
The results corroborate current views by insurance regulators that derivatives usage
for trading negatively affects financial stability. However, the main findings also un-
derline the risk-reducing and thereby stabilizing effect of using derivatives for hedging
purposes.
This dissertation empirically discusses and investigates the impact of regulation,
monitoring, and supervision of insurance companies on financial stability and the re-
spective financial distress. Further, it investigates a new approach to capture the de-
pendence between price, liquidity and default risk.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Dependence in Equity
Returns, Liquidity, and Credit Risk
2.1 Introduction
The analysis and characterization of the extreme dependence between financial time
series has gained considerable attention in risk and portfolio management. With
the recent financial crisis marking a historic tail event, risk managers and financial
economists alike have become more and more interested in analyzing the (potentially
time-varying) non-linear nature of dependence between financial assets. In this respect,
several recent studies have found dependence in equity (see, e.g., Christoffersen et al.,
2012) and credit risk (see, e.g., Christoffersen et al., 2014) to be highly non-linear and
asymmetric with the level of asymmetry being time-varying. However, no study so far
has investigated the dependence between equity returns, credit risk, and stock liquidity
of individual firms.
In this paper, we characterize the dynamic linear and extreme dependence in equity,
liquidity, and credit risk by modeling the joint distribution of the stock returns, bid-ask
spreads, and default probabilities of a multivariate stock portfolio at the security-level.
We employ dynamic vine copulas and document the existence of significant time-
varying and persistent asymmetric tail dependence between the stock returns, stock
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liquidity, and the respective firms’ default intensities. To be precise, we model the
stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of firms in a multivariate port-
folio using dynamic regular vine (R-vine) copulas. We then propose and forecast a
liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (VaR) that is in the spirit of the liquidity-
adjusted VaR of Berkowitz (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), and Weiß and Supper (2013)
but that additionally incorporates information on the credit risk of the underlying se-
curities.2 Confirming several predictions from the financial economics literature (see,
e.g., Bekaert et al., 2007, Friewald et al., 2014, Boehmer et al., 2015), this paper is the
first to document the existence of significant tail dependence between the stock returns,
stock liquidity, and default intensities of companies. We then illustrate the usefulness
of our findings in a risk management setting in which we propose a liquidity- and
credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk that takes into account the documented extreme depen-
dence. We show that adjusting the standard Value-at-Risk for liquidity and credit risk
enables risk managers to reliably forecast the total risk exposure of a stock investment.
Finally, we show that our dynamic vine copula model captures time-varying tail de-
pendence significantly better than static copula or dynamic correlation-based models.
In our econometric framework, we aim to model the joint distribution of stock re-
turns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities (extracted from credit default swap pre-
mia) of a stock portfolio. We use a dynamic vine copula model to capture the time-
varying dependences in the portfolio and to reproduce the potentially intricate spillover
effects and interactions between stock markets, stock liquidity, and credit markets.
More precisely, in our model, we consider the dependence between (1) a stock’s return
and its liquidity, (2) a stock’s return and the default intensity of the underlying firm,
(3) stock liquidity and the default intensity of a given firm, and (4) all relevant cross-
dependences (e.g., between a stock’s return and the liquidity of another stock).3 Our
2One could question the idea to incorporate estimates of a firm’s default probability into a forecast of a
stock investment’s Value-at-Risk as a firm’s default risk should already be priced in its equity. However,
considerable empirical evidence on the so-called “distress puzzle” suggests that equity returns do not
fully reflect a firm’s default risk (see, e.g., Friewald et al., 2014).
3Note that as we use an R-vine copula for dependence modeling, we are also capable of specifying the
conditional dependence structure of the joint distribution. See Section 2.2 for details.
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state-of-the-art copula approach is motivated by a substantial body of literature on how
the concept of stock liquidity is related to stock returns and credit default swap premia
(CDS spreads hereafter) and how stock and credit markets are interconnected.
Starting with the relation between stock returns and liquidity, the seminal work by
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) finds that market-observed average returns are an in-
creasing function of the bid-ask spread. Further, stocks with higher sensitivities to mar-
ket liquidity exhibit higher expected returns (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), liquidity
predicts future returns (Bekaert et al., 2007), and expected stock excess returns reflect
compensation for expected market illiquidity (Amihud, 2002). Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) provide a theoretical asset pricing model with liquidity risk that helps explain
these empirical findings and in which required returns depend on expected liquid-
ity. Since liquidity exhibits commonalities and is characterized by strong temporal
variation (Watanabe and Watanabe, 2008, Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001, Chordia et al.,
2000), our dynamic modeling approach is especially appropriate for capturing the po-
tentially time-varying nature of the dependences in our multivariate portfolio.
Regarding the dependence between stock returns and default intensities (i.e., credit
risk), the theoretical basis is given by the structural model of Merton (1974). In his
model, equity can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike price
equal to the value of the firm’s debt, which suggests a precise pricing relationship
between equity- and debt-linked securities (Boehmer et al., 2015). Further, as stated in
Friewald et al. (2014), risk premia in equity and credit markets must be related because
Merton’s (1974) model implies that the market price of risk must be the same for all
contingent claims written on a firm’s assets. The empirical evidence on the relation
of stock returns and credit risk, however, is mixed. Some studies document a positive
relation (Vassalou and Xing, 2004, Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), whereas various
other papers find a negative relation between stock returns and credit risk (Dichev,
1998, Campbell et al., 2008). Moreover, an increasing branch of literature investigates
the interconnectedness of equity and CDS markets and provides empirical evidence on
the relation between CDS spreads and stock returns (see, e.g., Acharya and Johnson,
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2007, Han and Zhou, 2011).
Finally, modeling the dependence of stock liquidity and default intensities is eco-
nomically relevant due to the relation between CDS and stock markets.4 The theo-
retical and empirical motivation is given in Boehmer et al. (2015), who investigate the
effect of CDS markets on equity market quality, that is, liquidity and market efficiency.
From a theoretical point of view, the authors discuss two potential channels by which
CDS markets could affect liquidity in equity markets, risk sharing and trader-driven
information spillovers. Risk sharing might be based on dynamic delta hedging strate-
gies by informed traders and is expected to reduce market liquidity. Trader-driven
information spillovers, on the other hand, result from informed speculators’ trading
on private information which causes all securities to be priced more efficiently and in-
creases market liquidity. While the theoretical effect of CDS markets on equity market
liquidity is ambiguous, the empirical study in Boehmer et al. (2015) documents this
effect to be adverse. That is, empirically, CDS trading is associated with significant
declines in equity market liquidity. Although not giving any evidence on the particular
relation between stock liquidity and CDS spreads, the study of Boehmer et al. (2015)
indicates that bid-ask spreads and default intensities must somehow be related, thereby
providing further motivation for our multivariate modeling approach.5
Our paper is related to several studies in the literature but complements these stud-
ies by making several major contributions. First, this paper is the first to document
strong time-varying tail dependence at the individual security-level between stock re-
turns and default intensities, as well as between stock liquidity and default intensi-
ties. While previous studies have documented extreme dependence in stock returns
(see, e.g., Poon et al., 2004, Bollerslev and Todorov, 2011, Christoffersen et al., 2012),
credit risk (see, e.g., Christoffersen et al., 2014), and between stock returns and liquid-
ity (Ruenzi et al., 2013, Weiß and Supper, 2013), our study provides the first empirical
evidence of significant tail dependence across equity and CDS markets. The variant
4Note that we extract default intensities from CDS spreads.
5Note that we explore this relation in more detail in Section 2.4, where we provide anecdotal evidence
on both linear and non-linear dependences between bid-ask spreads and default intensities.
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of the standard VaR that we propose is closely related to the liquidity-adjusted VaR
of Berkowitz (2000) and Bangia et al. (2002). In contrast to their work, however, we
propose a VaR that together with market and liquidity risk additionally incorporates
credit risk. The idea to use copulas for modeling different risk factors of a single
security is closely related to the work of Nolte (2008) and Weiß and Supper (2013).
However, we do not consider a multivariate transaction process model like it is done in
the former study, but directly model the stock returns and bid-ask spreads of multiple
stocks in a portfolio. In comparison to the latter study, we additionally address the
question whether equity returns and liquidity also depend non-linearly on default risk.
Finally, our paper builds on several previous studies on the use of vine copulas (see,
e.g., Aas et al., 2009, Min and Czado, 2010, Dißmann et al., 2013) and dynamic cop-
ula models (see, e.g., Patton, 2006, Christoffersen et al., 2012, Oh and Patton, 2015)
in financial econometrics. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first empirical
study that employs dynamic R-vine copulas and show that a dynamic vine is indeed
significantly better suited to capture the time-varying dependence in the returns, liquid-
ity, and default intensities of our sample firms than competing linear or static models.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the marginal
and multivariate models we employ in our study. The data used in the empirical study
are presented and discussed in Section 2.3, while Section 2.4 contains a discussion of
our empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Econometric methodology
We now turn to the econometric models for the marginal distributions and the multi-
variate dependence structure. Our modeling strategy consists of two steps. In a first
step, we model the marginal densities of stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default in-
tensities. In a second step, we then employ a dynamic R-vine copula model to capture
6Note that Heinen et al. (2009) also propose a dynamization approach of vine copulas. The authors,
however, restrict their study to the specific case of canonical vines (C-vines) and use a dynamic condi-
tional correlation specification to account for time-varying dependence. In contrast, we make use of the
more general class of R-vines and follow Patton (2006) to incorporate dynamics into standard copulas.
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the time-varying dependences between the marginals.
2.2.1 Univariate models for returns, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities
To apply copula theory and consistently estimate the dependence structure between
returns, spreads, and intensities, our univariate modeling approach must be capable of
generating white-noise residuals. The univariate filtering techniques should therefore
be able to pick up most of the first- and second-moment dependence inherent in the
time-series data. To this purpose, we first model mean dynamics using autoregressive
(AR) processes and then capture variance dynamics by employing GARCH (General-
ized Autoregressive Heteroskedastic) processes as introduced by Bollerslev (1986).
2.2.1.1 Mean dynamics
In the financial econometrics literature, it has now become a stylized fact that stock
returns are characterized by significant autocorrelation (see, e.g., Summers, 1986,
Amihud and Mendelson, 1987, Fama and French, 1988, for early empirical evidence).
Furthermore, as found in Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch (2013), bid-ask spreads ex-
hibit strong long-range dependence.7 Regarding CDS spreads and default intensities,
Oh and Patton (2015) find that CDS spreads are characterized by strong autocorrelation
and, more precisely, that daily log-differences of CDS spreads exhibit more autocorre-
lation than is commonly found for stock returns. Christoffersen et al. (2014) provide
support for this finding and show that log-differences of CDS spreads and default in-
tensities are strongly autocorrelated.
In modeling mean dynamics, Christoffersen et al. (2012) use an AR model of order
two (denoted as AR(2)), whereas Oh and Patton (2015) use an AR(5) model and find
the first three lags to be strongly significant. We therefore include three lags in our AR
specification to capture first-moment dependence.
7Note that much of this long-range dependence is eliminated by log-differencing. The remaining short-
run dependence, however, needs to be filtered by appropriate AR processes.
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Formally, with Ri “ tRi,tuTt“1, i “ 1, 2, 3, denoting the log-differenced time series of
stock prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities, respectively, the AR(3) process is
estimated as
Ri,t “ µ` φ1,iRi,t´1 ` φ2,iRi,t´2 ` φ3,iRi,t´3 ` ei,t, (2.1)
where estimation is conducted via conditional least squares. The conditional mean,
µi,t, thus evolves according to the following dynamics
µi,t “ µ` φ1,iRi,t´1 ` φ2,iRi,t´2 ` φ3,iRi,t´3, (2.2)
leaving the residuals ei,t “ Ri,t ´ µi,t for GARCH-filtering in the next step.8
2.2.1.2 Variance dynamics
A critical issue in capturing second-moment dependence is time-varying and asym-
metric volatility. Asymmetry in volatility is commonly referred to as the leverage
effect and is well investigated in the econometrics literature (see, e.g., Christie, 1982,
Nelson, 1991). The leverage effect arises from asymmetric volatility responses to bad
and good news on a firm and is based on the finding that the upward revision of condi-
tional volatility due to bad news is more pronounced than the downward revision due
to good news. In case of stock returns, bad news comes in the form of a negative AR
residual (that is, ei,t ă 0). In case of bid-ask spreads and default intensities, on the
other hand, bad news is associated with a positive AR residual (i.e., ei,t ą 0).
Another critical issue is the specification of an adequate distributional model for the
margins. As stated in existing studies, skewness and fat tails might lead to misspecified
marginal distributions and, consequently, to biased estimates for the parameters of the
dependence model.9
Christoffersen et al. (2014) and Oh and Patton (2015) find that stock returns and
8In our empirical study in Section 2.4, we show that our AR(3) model for conditional mean dynamics
passes the standard specification tests.
9See McNeil et al. (2005) and Kim et al. (2007) for details.
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log-differences of CDS spreads and default intensities are characterized by asym-
metry in volatility as well as by skewness and fat tails. Therefore, we fol-
low Oh and Patton (2015) and employ the GJR-GARCH model as proposed by
Glosten et al. (1993) to capture asymmetric volatility, where we use the skewed t dis-
tribution of Fernandez and Steel (1998) to additionally account for skewness and fat
tails in the marginal distributions. More precisely, we fit a GJR-GARCH(1,1) model to
the AR residuals, ei,t, so that conditional volatility evolves according to the following
dynamics
ei,t “ σi,tεi,t, εi,t|Fi,t´1 „ iid sktpνi, γiq
σ2i,t “ ωi ` βiσ2i,t´1 ` αie2i,t´1 ` δie2i,t´11p´8,0qpei,t´1q
(2.3)
where the parameters in the conditional variance equation are constrained to be posi-
tive, Fi,t denotes the set of information available on series Ri up to and including time t,
1r¨,¨sp¨q is the indicator function, and sktpνi, γiq denotes the skewed t distribution as pro-
posed by Fernandez and Steel (1998) with degrees of freedom parameter νi P p2,8q
and skewness parameter γi P p0,8q. With ft denoting the probability density function
(pdf) of a univariate standard t distribution, the pdf of sktpνi, γiq, fskt, is given by
fsktpε; νi, γiq “ 2
γi ` 1γi
„
ft
ˆ
ε
γi
˙
1r0,8qpεq ` ftpγiεq1p´8,0qpεq

(2.4)
As becomes apparent from (2.4), the γi parameter controls the allocation of mass to
each side of the mode, and sktpνi, γiq nests the standard t distribution in case of γi “ 1.
That is, γi ‰ 1 indicates skewness in the marginal time series, Ri, i “ 1, 2, 3.10
Note that the distribution of the return shocks, ei,t, differs across the individual time
series, Ri, but is constant over time, whereas the distribution of Ri does vary through
time due to the conditional mean and variance dynamics discussed above. The GJR-
GARCH(1,1) model in (2.3) is straightforwardly estimated via maximum likelihood.
10We refer to Fernandez and Steel (1998) for a detailed discussion on the statistical properties of
sktpνi, γiq.
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2.2.2 Dependence modeling with dynamic R-vine copulas
We now turn to the task of modeling the joint distribution of stock returns, bid-ask
spreads, and default intensities of multiple firms. To capture both linear dependences
and potential non-linearities in the dependence structure, we rely on copulas in our
modeling approach. More precisely, we employ dynamic R-vine copulas which pro-
vide us with a powerful tool to model high-dimensional distributions and to capture
complex and time-varying dependences in an extremely flexible way. Subsequently,
we discuss R-vine copulas and present our dynamization approach. We start with a
brief review on copulas and pair-copula constructions.
2.2.2.1 Copulas and pair-copula constructions
Generally speaking, a d-dimensional copula function is a multivariate distribution
function on the unit cube r0, 1sd with standard uniform margins. More precisely, a
copula specifies the link between a multivariate distribution and its one-dimensional
marginal distributions (see Nelsen, 2006). Formally, with pX1, ..., Xdq denoting a d-
dimensional random vector with joint density f “ p f1, ..., fdq and distribution function
F “ pF1, ..., Fdq, the copula C of the distribution F is given by
Cpu1, ..., udq “ FpF´11 pu1q, ..., F´1d pudqq, (2.5)
where F´1i is the generalized inverse of Fi and ui P r0, 1s, i “ 1, ..., d. The theoretical
framework of copulas goes back to Sklar (1959) who shows that, under certain condi-
tions, every copula is a joint distribution function and vice versa (see Nelsen, 2006, for
a detailed discussion). Using (2.5), the joint density, f , can be expressed as
fpx1, ..., xdq “ cpF1px1q, ..., Fdpxdqq
dź
i“1
fipxiq, (2.6)
where c denotes the density of C. Hence, we can separate the dependence structure
from the marginal structure and thus model the joint distribution by first modeling the
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marginal distributions and then specifying a model for the dependence structure.11
In case of bivariate data (i.e., d “ 2), there is a wide range of Archimedean and
elliptical copulas available that allow for flexible dependence modeling.12 In case of
multivariate data sets (that is, d ą 2), however, this becomes much more difficult so
that existing studies in the econometrics and statistics literature emphasize the need
for flexible copula models in high dimensions (see Chollete et al., 2009, Aas et al.,
2009, Dißmann et al., 2013).13 While some papers attempt to construct multivariate ex-
tensions of (bivariate) Archimedean copulas (Embrechts et al., 2003, Savu and Trede,
2010, Hofert, 2011), another strand in the literature aims to construct flexible mul-
tivariate dependence models by splitting up the copula density, c, into a cascade of
bivariate (unconditional and conditional) copulas.14 The resulting expression is called
a pair-copula construction (PCC hereafter) and can be derived as follows.
Let f j|k “ f j|kpx j|xkq, F j|k “ F j|kpx j|xkq, ci j|k “ ci j|kpFi|k, F j|kq, and be η a pd ´ 1q-
dimensional vector satisfying ηℓ P t1, ..., du z tiu and ηℓ1 ‰ ηℓ2 for ℓ1 ‰ ℓ2. Then, we
can decompose the multivariate density, f , in the following way
f “ fd
d´1ź
i“1
fd´i|d´i`1,...,d. (2.7)
Further, as stated in Aas et al. (2009), the conditional density, f j|η, can be factorized as
f j|η “ c jηm|η´m f j|η´m , (2.8)
where ηm is an arbitrarily chosen component of η and η´m results from removing ηm
from η, m P t1, ..., d ´ 1u. Combining the two factorizations in (2.7) and (2.8) then
11Note that the expression in (2.6) provides the theoretical basis for our modeling strategy since we first
model the marginal densities using GARCH processes and then model the dependence structure with
R-vine copulas.
12See Nelsen (2006) for a detailed overview.
13Note that, in high dimensions, the choice of copulas is virtually reduced to elliptical copulas such as
the normal and the t copula which are only useful if the assumption of elliptical dependence is valid.
14For further details, see the seminal works by Joe (1997), Bedford and Cooke (2001, 2002), Whelan
(2004).
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yields the following expression for a PCC
f “
dź
k“1
fk
d´1ź
h“1
d´hź
i“1
ciηm|η´m , (2.9)
where h “ dimpηq and m “ mph, iq P t1, ..., hu is arbitrarily chosen.15
Based on the pioneering works by Joe (1996, 1997) and Bedford and Cooke (2001,
2002), Aas et al. (2009) introduced the concept of pair-copulas to the finance literature
and spurred a surge in empirical applications of PCCs (see, e.g., Heinen et al., 2009,
Aas and Berg, 2009, Chollete et al., 2009, Min and Czado, 2010, 2011). For our mod-
eling framework, the use of PCCs is especially appropriate in many respects. First,
splitting up the multivariate density according to (2.9) results in a computationally fea-
sible density for likelihood estimation and, therefore, enables us to handle the high
dimensionality of our modeling approach. Moreover, PCCs provide us with an ex-
tremely flexible tool to capture the presumably intricate dependences between stock
returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities. Using PCCs, we are able to choose
each pair-copula from a different parametric copula family and, further, PCCs permit
the modeling of not only the pairs of the original variables but also pairs of conditional
distributions of recomputed variables (see Weiß and Supper, 2013).16 Since we follow
Patton (2006) and estimate dynamic processes for the parameters of the pair-copulas,
the dynamic PCCs are also capable of accounting for potentially time-varying patterns
in the dependence structure.
2.2.2.2 Regular vines
As can be seen from the expression in (2.9), there exist many different PCCs for a given
multivariate distribution, F.17 To select a particular PCC and to determine the way in
which the marginals are to be coupled, Bedford and Cooke (2001, 2002) introduce so-
called (regular) vines. Vines are convenient tools with a graphical representation that
15We use the convention iηm|H “ iηm. Thus, h “ 1 yields unconditional pair-copulas ciηm , i “ 1, ..., d´
1.
16That is, we are capable of specifying the conditional dependence structure for the joint distribution.
17This results from the fact that ηm is arbitrarily chosen.
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facilitate the description of the conditional specifications made for the joint distribu-
tion, F. More precisely, an R-vine is a graphical tree model that is based on a nested
set of trees satisfying certain conditions.
To formally describe the concept of R-vines, we label the components of X from
1 to d and recall that a tree, T “ tN, Eu, is an acyclical graph, where N Ă N and
E Ă `N2˘ denote the set of nodes and edges, respectively. Bedford and Cooke (2002)
define a regular vine on d elements, V, as a nested set of trees, V “ tT1, ...,Td´1u,
that satisfies the following conditions
(c1) T1 is a tree with nodes N1 “ t1, ..., du and a set of edges denoted E1.
(c2) For i “ 2, ..., d, Ti is a tree with nodes Ni “ Ei´1 and |Ni| “ i ` 1.
(c3) For i “ 2, ..., d ´ 1 and ta, bu P Ei, it must hold that |a X b| “ 1.
To derive the PCC induced by V, each edge in Ti is associated with a bivariate (un-
)conditional copula, i “ 1, ..., d ´ 1. The edges of the R-vine trees are computed
according to (c1)-(c3) and on the basis of set operations on so-called conditioning and
conditioned sets, which are given as follows.18 With Uei denoting the set of all indices
contained in ei “ ta, bu P Ei, the conditioning set, Dei , is given by Dei “ Ua XUb, and
the conditioned set, Cei , is defined to be Cei “ Ua∆Ub, with ∆ denoting the symmetric
difference operator.19
As shown in Bedford and Cooke (2001, 2002), there is a unique PCC associated
withV, which can be expressed as
f “
dź
k“1
fk
d´1ź
h“1
ź
ePEh
cCe|De . (2.10)
Hence, R-vine copulas as used in our modeling approach are particular PCCs, i.e.
PCCs with a particular decomposition (2.9), which are determined according to the
combinatorial rules presented above.20
18We follow the presentation in Dißmann et al. (2013).
19Note that |Cei | “ 2 and Cei X Dei “ H.
20A detailed description on the construction of R-vines and R-vine copulas as well as examples and il-
lustrations can be found in Bedford and Cooke (2001, 2002), Aas et al. (2009), Dißmann et al. (2013).
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2.2.2.3 Fitting an R-vine copula
Fitting an R-vine copula can be organized into three steps: (1) Selection of R-vine
structure, (2) Selection of bivariate copula families, and (3) Estimation of copula pa-
rameters. These steps are accomplished following the sequential method as proposed
in Dißmann et al. (2013) and Hobæk Haff (2013), which exploits the tree-by-tree struc-
ture of vines and under which selection and estimation are performed treewise, con-
ditioning on the precedingly selected trees and estimated copula parameters.21 More
precisely, for a given tree, Ti P V, we first calculate the empirical Kendall’s tau,
τˆ j,k, for all possible variable pairs, t j, ku, j, k “ 1, ..., d, and determine the edges of
Ti by selecting the spanning tree that maximizes the sum of absolute empirical taus.22
Then, each of the resulting edges is associated with a bivariate (un-)conditional copula,
which is selected according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC).23 We calculate
the AIC for each copula family considered and choose the copula with the minimum
AIC.24 Using the fitted copulas in tree Ti, we now compute the transformed variables
by means of the corresponding h-functions and repeat the above procedure until we
reach tree Td´1 (see Dißmann et al., 2013, for details), resulting in a total of dpd´1q{2
dynamic (un-)conditional pair-copulas.
Since we need standard uniform data to consistently estimate copulas, fitting the R-
vine copula in our econometric approach should be based on white-noise time series.
Assuming that the GARCH processes discussed above correctly specify the marginal
densities, we apply the R-vine copula to the corresponding GARCH residuals, εi,t.
The pseudo-observations used for estimation, ui, are then computed as the ranks of the
residuals, i.e. ui “ Fipεiq.
21Note that this method does not necessarily lead to a global optimum. Most of the dependence is,
however, captured in the first tree so that the model fit is considerably influenced by the fit of the
copulas in the first tree.
22Actually, we use Prim’s (1957) algorithm and calculate the minimum spanning tree with weights´τˆ j,k.
23As found in Manner (2007), the AIC provides a reliable criterion, especially when compared to alter-
native criteria such as copula goodness-of-fit tests.
24We include dynamic extensions of the normal, t, (rotated) Clayton, (rotated) Gumbel, and (rotated)
Joe copula. Details can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Data
This section presents the data used in our empirical study and provides descriptive
statistics. Starting with a description of the data sources, we also discuss the procedure
applied to extract default intensities from CDS spreads.
2.3.1 Data sources
To implement our econometric modeling strategy discussed in the preceding section,
we need to collect data on stock prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities. In our
empirical study, we focus on S&P 500 constituents, and obtain the corresponding mid,
bid, and ask quotes from Thomson Reuters Datastream. More precisely, we collect
daily quotes of all constituents in the S&P 500 index as reported by Datastream from
January 2008 to December 2013. Bid-ask spreads are then calculated as the difference
between ask and bid quotes to proxy for the liquidity of the underlying stock.
Further, since default intensities are not observable in the market, we follow
Christoffersen et al. (2014) and extract default intensities from CDS spreads (see be-
low). Daily CDS spreads are retrieved from Datastream, where we start with an initial
sample of all constituents of the S&P 500 index between January 2008 and December
2013. Since we need to restrict our sample to companies with traded CDS contracts,
we apply the following screening procedures to identify these companies. First, we
match Datastream’s equity codes with CDS codes.25 If there is no match according
to this criterion, we additionally perform a search using the ’related series’ function
in Datastream to confirm that there is no corresponding CDS spread to the respective
company’s name as it appears in the S&P 500 constituents list. Moreover, we focus on
dollar-denominated CDS contracts with a five-year maturity and a modified restructur-
ing clause, since these are the most frequently traded contracts in the U.S. market and,
25The corresponding Datastream CDS codes are constructed as follows. First, we decompose each
firm’s Mnemonics (Datastream code) into its general (i.e., ’U’ and ’@’) and firm-specific component.
To each three- or four-digit firm-specific component, we add the dollar sign to specify the currency.
Finally, we complement the CDS Mnemonic with the two-digit string ’MR’ to specify the restructuring
clause.
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consequently, unlikely to be distorted from low levels of liquidity. These restrictions
reduce the initial sample to a total of 209 companies. For increased transparency, we
list the names of all sample firms in Appendix A.1.
Finally, as discussed in the next section, extracting default intensities from CDS
spreads relies on the valuation of CDS contracts and, therefore, requires the construc-
tion of spot rate curves to derive discount rates. We follow existing studies in the
literature and use the bootstrapping procedure suggested by Longstaff et al. (2001) to
compute spot rate curves with maturities reaching from one day up to five years for
each trading day between January 2008 and December 2013 (see, e.g., Jarrow et al.,
2007, Longstaff and Rajan, 2008).26 Using Datastream, we collect daily observations
for the overnight, one-week, one-month, three-month, six-month, and one-year LI-
BOR rates as well as for the midmarket two-year, three-year, four-year, and five-year
par swap rates. As in Longstaff et al. (2001), we then use a standard cubic spline algo-
rithm to interpolate the par curve at semi-annual intervals, and compute spot rates by
bootstrapping the interpolated par curve. The resulting semi-annual spot rates, in turn,
are interpolated employing cubic splines and are used to compute the discount factors
required in the CDS valuation formula.
2.3.2 Extracting default intensities from CDS spreads
A credit default swap is essentially an insurance contract that provides protection
against credit loss due to default. The buyer of a CDS contract makes periodic pay-
ments (referred to as premiums) to the seller of the contract and, in exchange, receives
a payoff from the seller if the reference entity defaults on a loan or a bond prior to the
maturity date of the contract. The periodic amount that the protection buyer pays the
protection seller is quoted in terms of a spread, which is commonly measured in basis
points and can be converted into a dollar amount by multiplying with the contract size
(i.e., the notional principal).27
26That is, the five-year spot rate curve contains daily spot rates and is updated each day.
27See, e.g., Duffie and Singleton (2003) for details.
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There now exists a substantial body of literature on CDS contracts. As stated in
Oh and Patton (2015), the pronounced interest is largely driven by the close relation
between CDS spreads and the market perception of default probabilities. For instance,
CDS spreads are higher for entities which the market perceives to have higher default
probabilities or higher losses given default (see Creal et al., 2014). Since we require
default probabilities for our empirical study in Section 2.4, we shall exploit this relation
and subsequently show how default probabilities (or rather, default intensities) can be
extracted from CDS spreads.28
We follow Christoffersen et al. (2014) and Hull and White (2003) in our presenta-
tion and denote the periodic payments from the protection buyer to the seller as the
premium payment leg of the CDS contract, and the compensating payoff from the pro-
tection seller to the buyer in case of default as the payoff leg of the CDS. Further, we
assume that the CDS contract has quarterly payment dates T “ tti|i “ 1, ..., Nu (with
tN denoting the maturity of the contract), spread S t, and notional 1, where the payment
dates fall on the 20th of March, June, September and December, and N “ 20 (corre-
sponding to a maturity of five years). If default occurs, the reference entity recovers a
certain percentage, r, of the notional where the (risk-neutral) probability that the entity
defaults before time t is given by Pptq “ Pr rτ ď ts, with τ denoting the time of de-
fault.29 The corresponding default intensity, h, is defined by hptqdt “ Pr rτ P dt|τ ą ts
and can be computed according to
Pptq “ 1 ´ exp
ˆ
´
ż t
0
hpsqds
˙
. (2.11)
Finally, let vpt,Tiq denote the discount factors calculated from the spot rate curve, and
let ∆i “ ti ´ ti´1 be the time period between two payment dates. With qps, tq, s ă t,
being the risk-neutral survival probability, the value of the premium payment leg, Vprem,
28See (2.11) for the formal link between default intensities and probabilities.
29Consequently, in case of default the protection buyer receives a payoff equal to the difference between
the notional of the contract and the recovered value, i.e. 1 ´ r.
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can then be calculated according to
Vprempt,T, S tq “ S t
Nÿ
i“1
vpt, tiq
„
∆iqpt, tiq `
ż ti
ti´1
ps ´ ti´1q Ppdsq

, (2.12)
where the integral accounts for the accrual payment the protection buyer has to make
for the time frame from the last payment date to the time of default.30 The value of the
payoff leg, Vpay, is given by
Vpaypt,T, S tq “ p1 ´ rq
ż tN
t
vpt, sqPpdsq. (2.13)
Following Christoffersen et al. (2014), we compute the integrals in (2.12) and (2.13)
by numerical approximations and, for this purpose, define a grid of daily maturities,
tsi|i “ 0, ...,mu, where s0 “ t and sm “ tN . Furthermore, we assume default intensities
to be constant, i.e. hptq ” h. The integrals can then be approximated as follows
ż ti
ti´1
ps ´ ti´1q Ppdsq «
ÿ
t j|s jPpti´1,tisu
ps j ´ ti´1q pexp phti´1q ´ exp phtiqq ,
ż tN
t
vpt, sqPpdsq «
ÿ
t j|s jPpti´1,tisu
vpti´1, s jq pexp phti´1q ´ exp phtiqq
(2.14)
In a final step, the equation Vpaypt,T, S tq ´ Vprempt,T, S tq “ 0 is solved numerically
to obtain the default intensity, h. The default probability, Pptq, can now be calculated
using (2.11).
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
In our empirical study, we use monthly log-differences of daily mid prices, bid-ask
spreads, and default intensities to estimate the marginal and dependence parameters,
and employ monthly default probabilities to incorporate credit risk into conventional
VaR. More precisely, for each trading day, t, between January 2008 and December
2013, monthly log-differences are calculated using the mid prices, bid-ask spreads,
30Note that qps, tq “ 1 ´ rPptq ´ Ppsqs.
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and default intensities at days t and t ´ 30. Daily bid-ask spreads are computed as the
difference between daily ask and bid quotes, and daily default intensities are extracted
from daily CDS spreads as discussed in the preceding section using a fixed recovery
rate of 30% (i.e., r “ 0.3).31 Monthly default probabilities are derived employing
(2.11) adjusted for a monthly horizon, that is
Pptq “ 1 ´ exp
ˆ
30
360h
˙
(2.15)
As a simple first step, we start our empirical investigation by analyzing the cross-
sectional variation in our data. Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics on the cross-
sectional distribution of daily mid prices, bid-ask spreads, default intensities, and de-
fault probabilities for the period from January 2008 to December 2013.
31Note that holding the recovery percentage at a constant level is fairly standard in existing studies
involving CDS or (defaultable) bond valuation (see, e.g., Duffie, 1999, Duffie and Singleton, 1999,
Longstaff et al., 2005, Christoffersen et al., 2014). As stated by Hull and White (2000), the fixed re-
covery rate assumption has little impact on CDS valuation when the expected recovery rate is in the
0% to 50% range.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities/probabilities.
The table reports descriptive statistics on the cross-sectional distribution of daily mid prices, bid-ask spreads, default intensities,
and default probabilities for the period from January 2008 to December 2013. The sample consists of the 209 companies listed in
Appendix A.1. We first calculate the time-series percentiles and moments for each firm in the sample, and then compute the cross-
sectional percentiles and mean in a second step. That is, the columns present the percentiles and mean from the cross-sectional
distribution of the measures listed in the rows. Mid prices and bid-ask spreads are denominated in U.S. dollar, where the latter
are calculated as the difference between ask and bid quotes. Default intensities are extracted from CDS spreads according to the
procedure discussed in Section 2.3 and have a horizon of one year. Default probabilities are derived from the intensities using the
formula in (2.15) and thus have a horizon of one month.
Percentiles
Min 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Max Mean
Panel A: Mid prices
Percentiles
- Min 0.8400 3.6280 9.9300 17.0900 26.9000 45.8640 89.0900 20.2645
- 1st 1.2760 5.0117 11.8050 19.9050 31.0920 50.2999 105.5355 23.3106
- 5th 2.3325 6.3485 14.8925 23.3652 36.7150 55.4575 115.3875 27.0530
- 25th 6.0900 11.2805 20.2625 32.3463 47.9500 76.1260 150.8350 36.2797
- Median 7.4300 14.0420 24.8525 37.8950 55.8950 84.1910 255.6450 43.6447
- 75th 9.9475 17.5680 31.5783 45.5750 65.0250 103.7060 368.5473 52.3385
- 95th 12.8400 23.6085 42.0950 57.4525 82.7050 138.7835 736.6686 70.1802
- 99th 13.5535 25.9969 44.8700 63.3770 89.6535 153.0323 921.4764 76.6626
- Max 14.1100 26.8480 46.4800 67.4800 92.1000 161.2720 993.9536 80.0887
Moments
- Mean 8.2180 14.9015 26.7132 40.0617 57.8519 88.2465 258.5393 45.1288
- St. Dev. 1.8085 4.0083 6.8227 10.1979 14.3946 28.3231 208.9269 13.0255
- Skewness -1.2140 -0.5642 -0.0150 0.3789 0.7668 1.5137 2.8058 0.4088
- Exc. Kurt. -1.5268 -1.2267 -0.6563 -0.1856 0.3355 1.9105 6.5508 0.0611
- AC(1) 0.9834 0.9891 0.9931 0.9949 0.9963 0.9976 0.9983 0.9943
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
Percentiles
- Min 0.0025 0.0050 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0094
- 1st 0.0025 0.0050 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0094
- 5th 0.0025 0.0054 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0096
- 25th 0.0025 0.0088 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0600 0.0104
- Median 0.0075 0.0100 0.0100 0.0200 0.0200 0.0300 0.1200 0.0180
- 75th 0.0100 0.0200 0.0200 0.0300 0.0400 0.0760 0.1899 0.0369
- 95th 0.0200 0.0300 0.0500 0.0700 0.1090 0.1900 1.0056 0.0908
- 99th 0.0300 0.0600 0.1272 0.1800 0.3044 0.6206 4.5000 0.2715
- Max 0.0900 0.6300 3.0000 6.0500 10.5475 55.4340 194.0000 12.2525
Moments
- Mean 0.0126 0.0179 0.0280 0.0383 0.0550 0.1087 0.3186 0.0494
- St. Dev. 0.0061 0.0352 0.1090 0.2156 0.3732 1.7631 4.9038 0.4049
- Skewness 3.6236 8.0310 17.6093 21.9631 26.4984 36.6845 39.4965 22.2276
- Exc. Kurt. 24.0800 114.8145 337.4985 529.0167 775.7203 1398.1281 1558.6459 616.4122
- AC(1) -0.0011 0.0172 0.0941 0.2140 0.3463 0.4755 0.6675 0.2255
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities/probabilities (continued).
Percentiles
Min 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Max Mean
Panel C: Default intensities
Percentiles
- Min 0.0015 0.0023 0.0039 0.0056 0.0092 0.0229 0.0452 0.0080
- 1st 0.0020 0.0027 0.0045 0.0068 0.0102 0.0256 0.0453 0.0090
- 5th 0.0020 0.0036 0.0053 0.0081 0.0120 0.0292 0.0484 0.0105
- 25th 0.0030 0.0047 0.0071 0.0113 0.0163 0.0359 0.1205 0.0145
- Median 0.0037 0.0056 0.0085 0.0135 0.0209 0.0462 0.1474 0.0179
- 75th 0.0052 0.0067 0.0105 0.0178 0.0285 0.0606 0.5800 0.0256
- 95th 0.0062 0.0101 0.0154 0.0299 0.0530 0.1153 1.2542 0.0486
- 99th 0.0067 0.0114 0.0183 0.0362 0.0658 0.1626 1.2552 0.0619
- Max 0.0082 0.0122 0.0201 0.0409 0.0720 0.1949 1.2618 0.0718
Moments
- Mean 0.0044 0.0062 0.0094 0.0146 0.0249 0.0530 0.4055 0.0219
- St. Dev. 0.0003 0.0012 0.0030 0.0057 0.0125 0.0327 0.4631 0.0124
- Skewness -10.1455 -0.8015 0.6270 1.4298 2.1049 3.0180 11.0968 1.3137
- Exc. Kurt. -1.6157 -0.7029 0.3303 2.4236 4.8407 10.7446 172.9344 4.8357
- AC(1) 0.5482 0.9604 0.9904 0.9938 0.9960 0.9979 0.9986 0.9835
Panel D: Monthly default probabilities
Percentiles
- Min 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 0.0019 0.0038 0.0007
- 1st 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0021 0.0038 0.0007
- 5th 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010 0.0024 0.0040 0.0009
- 25th 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0014 0.0030 0.0100 0.0012
- Median 0.0003 0.0005 0.0007 0.0011 0.0017 0.0038 0.0122 0.0015
- 75th 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0015 0.0024 0.0050 0.0472 0.0021
- 95th 0.0005 0.0008 0.0013 0.0025 0.0044 0.0096 0.0992 0.0040
- 99th 0.0006 0.0009 0.0015 0.0030 0.0055 0.0135 0.0993 0.0051
- Max 0.0007 0.0010 0.0017 0.0034 0.0060 0.0161 0.0998 0.0059
Moments
- Mean 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 0.0012 0.0021 0.0044 0.0325 0.0018
- St. Dev. 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0010 0.0027 0.0365 0.0010
- Skewness -10.1516 -0.8023 0.6249 1.4276 2.1030 3.0159 11.0892 1.3107
- Exc. Kurt. -1.6162 -0.7069 0.3297 2.4192 4.8266 10.5930 172.7859 4.8158
- AC(1) 0.5482 0.9604 0.9904 0.9938 0.9960 0.9979 0.9986 0.9836
Panel (A) of Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the mid prices of the 209
sample firms. As indicated by the statistics on the time-series means, our sample is
characterized by strong cross-sectional variation of mid prices, with the time-series
means ranging from 8.23 U.S. dollars (USD hereafter) to 258.54 USD and being 45.13
USD on average. Further, mid prices are positively skewed and weakly leptokurtic on
average, with an average skewness and excess kurtosis of 0.4088 and 0.0611, respec-
tively. Not surprisingly, mid prices exhibit significant autocorrelation with the average
first-order autocorrelation being about 99.43%.
Turning to the bid-ask spreads in Panel (B), we find the average bid-ask spread to
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be 0.05 USD. Again, our panel data exhibit considerable cross-sectional variation with
the time-series means ranging from 0.01 USD to 0.31 USD. This finding is further
supported by the statistics on the percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution. As
we employ the bid-ask spreads of the companies as a proxy for stock liquidity, these
results indicate that the trading costs associated with immediately trading the shares
of a particular firm differ remarkably across our sample. Thus, in view of the sub-
stantial variation in bid-ask spreads, incorporating liquidity risk into conventional VaR
appears to be economically essential to adequately capture losses from potential liquid-
ity shocks. Finally, the time-series distributions of bid-ask spreads are heavily skewed
and leptokurtic on average.
In Panels (C) and (D) of Table 2.1, we present descriptive statistics for the default
intensities and default probabilities extracted from the CDS spreads of our sample
firms. Regarding the latter, the average time-series mean is at a comparatively modest
level of 0.18%, whereas the minimum and maximum time-series means are given by
0.04% and 3.25%, respectively, indicating that default risk varies considerably across
our sample firms. Of particular note is the substantial amount of default risk of some
S&P 500 constituents in our sample during the period from January 2008 to Decem-
ber 2013. To be precise, as follows from the statistics on the time-series maxima, the
monthly default probabilities amount to a maximum of about 10%. Consequently, the
significant variation and serious amounts of default risk further motivate our approach
of adjusting standard VaR for credit risk. Turning to the higher-order moments, we
find that default probabilities are positively skewed, leptokurtic, and significantly au-
tocorrelated on average.
In addition to the summary statistics on stock prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities, we also present corresponding statistics for all data in differences. The
descriptive statistics for the log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities are presented in Table 2.2.
2.3. DATA 34
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and
default intensities.
The table reports descriptive statistics on the cross-sectional distribution of monthly log-differences of
mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for the period from January 2008 to December 2013.
For each trading day, t, log-differences are calculated using the prices, spreads, and intensities at days
t and t ´ 30. The sample consists of the 209 companies listed in Appendix A.1. We first calculate the
time-series percentiles and moments for each firm in the sample, and then compute the cross-sectional
percentiles and mean in a second step. That is, the columns present the percentiles and mean from the
cross-sectional distribution of the measures listed in the rows. Bid-ask spreads are calculated as the
difference between ask and bid quotes. Default intensities are extracted from CDS spreads according to
the procedure discussed in Section 2.3 and have a horizon of one year.
Percentiles
Min 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Max Mean
Panel A: Stock returns
Percentiles
- Min -2.4172 -1.1086 -0.6718 -0.5019 -0.3763 -0.2487 -0.1456 -0.5646
- 1st -1.7198 -0.6902 -0.4206 -0.3245 -0.2442 -0.1524 -0.1105 -0.3612
- 5th -0.5608 -0.2909 -0.2092 -0.1570 -0.1182 -0.0799 -0.0660 -0.1698
- 25th -0.1242 -0.0795 -0.0534 -0.0392 -0.0278 -0.0188 -0.0113 -0.0427
- Median -0.0129 0.0013 0.0090 0.0130 0.0191 0.0271 0.0411 0.0137
- 75th 0.0274 0.0373 0.0500 0.0622 0.0735 0.0945 0.1195 0.0630
- 95th 0.0656 0.0785 0.1110 0.1412 0.1737 0.2530 0.3481 0.1492
- 99th 0.0882 0.1116 0.1705 0.2237 0.2995 0.4728 0.9937 0.2549
- Max 0.1155 0.1534 0.2532 0.3534 0.4798 0.8391 1.3251 0.4010
Moments
- Mean -0.0436 -0.0089 0.0003 0.0051 0.0091 0.0159 0.0217 0.0044
- St. Dev. 0.0438 0.0546 0.0744 0.0978 0.1231 0.1801 0.3478 0.1059
- Skewness -2.8099 -1.8866 -1.2889 -0.8675 -0.5818 -0.1877 0.7702 -0.9438
- Exc. Kurt. 0.4175 0.9385 2.1253 3.6449 5.4871 9.6011 15.1429 4.2101
- AC(1) 0.8984 0.9172 0.9360 0.9447 0.9537 0.9626 0.9698 0.9437
Panel B: Log-differences of bid-ask spreads
Percentiles
- Min -9.8730 -8.4583 -6.7719 -6.2832 -5.5984 -3.5666 -1.6094 -6.1205
- 1st -3.7483 -2.8421 -2.3979 -2.1846 -1.9459 -1.6094 -1.0986 -2.1828
- 5th -2.3988 -1.5593 -1.3863 -1.0986 -1.0986 -0.6931 -0.6931 -1.1752
- 25th -0.7215 -0.6931 -0.4700 -0.4055 -0.2231 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3449
- Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
- 75th 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2877 0.4055 0.5596 0.6948 0.2473
- 95th 0.6931 0.6931 1.0986 1.0986 1.2528 1.4642 2.6378 1.1241
- 99th 1.0986 1.4390 1.9459 2.1972 2.4965 2.8916 3.7677 2.1941
- Max 1.7918 3.6687 5.6168 6.2766 6.7719 8.4841 9.8730 6.1533
Moments
- Mean -0.0710 -0.0328 -0.0255 -0.0216 -0.0166 -0.0098 0.0014 -0.0213
- St. Dev. 0.3300 0.6064 0.7596 0.8368 0.9172 1.0662 1.4616 0.8384
- Skewness -0.2592 -0.1267 -0.0086 0.0444 0.1147 0.2441 0.3778 0.0518
- Exc. Kurt. 0.7405 2.9375 8.2886 12.5335 16.6561 23.5607 58.6048 12.8523
- AC(1) 0.0381 0.1510 0.2237 0.2635 0.2989 0.3522 0.4762 0.2586
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and
default intensities (continued).
Percentiles
Min 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Max Mean
Panel C: Log-differences of default intensities
Percentiles
- Min -1.9458 -0.6973 -0.3701 -0.2705 -0.2120 -0.1338 -0.0512 -0.3332
- 1st -0.2704 -0.1347 -0.1030 -0.0883 -0.0784 -0.0542 -0.0423 -0.0918
- 5th -0.0730 -0.0592 -0.0482 -0.0395 -0.0285 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0354
- 25th -0.0210 -0.0119 -0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0038
- Median -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005
- 75th -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0006 0.0082 0.0211 0.0013
- 95th -0.0004 0.0004 0.0285 0.0433 0.0535 0.0660 0.0825 0.0389
- 99th 0.0922 0.0973 0.1023 0.1083 0.1192 0.1553 0.2137 0.1148
- Max 0.0937 0.1603 0.2518 0.3338 0.4543 0.8304 2.1231 0.4007
Moments
- Mean -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0008 0.0023 0.0001
- St. Dev. 0.0131 0.0225 0.0294 0.0334 0.0364 0.0533 0.1565 0.0351
- Skewness -19.3336 -1.1683 0.4377 1.0662 1.9198 6.2680 23.9300 1.3678
- Exc. Kurt. 5.4259 9.1788 14.2182 27.1295 48.2334 217.8431 622.8101 57.0487
- AC(1) -0.4265 -0.2422 -0.0711 0.0611 0.1297 0.1805 0.2660 0.0183
Panel (A) of Table 2.2 reports summary statistics on the cross-sectional distribution
of stock returns. As can be seen from the panel, the stock returns of our sample firms
exhibit the usual stylized facts of a negligible mean of 0.44%, pronounced negative
skewness, and significant leptokurtosis on average. The average autocorrelation of
stock returns is around 94% and thus slightly smaller than that of mid prices. As
expected, given the fact that our sample period partly comprises the financial crisis, the
stock returns are characterized by considerable time-series variation, with the average
time-series minimum and maximum being given by about -56% and 40%, respectively.
Further, as indicated by the statistics on the percentiles and the time-series means, the
stock returns also vary considerably in the cross-section.
Turning to the cross-sectional statistics on log-differenced bid-ask spreads in Panel
(B), we find that the time-series means of log-differences vary from approximately -
7% to 0.14% and are -2% on average. Interestingly, as in the case of stock returns,
bid-ask spread changes exhibit strong time-series variation, as indicated by, e.g., the
average interquartile range which reaches from about -34% to 25% and, therefore,
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implies considerable dispersion in the time-series distributions of log-differenced bid-
ask spreads. That is, our sample period is characterized by substantial changes in the
stock liquidity of the average sample firm. Finally, the log-differences are slightly
skewed and considerably autocorrelated on average.
Regarding the log-differences of default intensities in Panel (C) of Table 2.2, we find
that the corresponding time-series means vary from -0.15% to 0.23% and are 0.01% on
average, implying only slight cross-sectional variation. Turning to the time-series vari-
ation, however, we can see from the panel that changes in the default intensities of the
sample firms vary considerably from -33% to 40% on average, indicating fundamental
changes in the market perception of default risk during the sample period. Further-
more, log-differences of default intensities are heavily skewed and only slightly auto-
correlated, so that log-differencing already eliminates most of the serial dependence in
default intensities.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the temporal variation in the cross-section of our data. More
precisely, the figure plots the time evolution of daily mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and
default intensities, as well as of the corresponding log-differences, where we calculate
the cross-sectional average across all 209 sample firms for each trading day between
January 2008 and December 2013.
Panels (a) and (b) show the time evolution of average mid prices and stock returns,
respectively. As can be seen from Panel (a), stock prices experienced sharp declines
during the financial crisis and decreased significantly from more than 50 USD in 2008
to approximately 20 USD in 2009. The post-crisis years as of the second quarter in
2009 are characterized by a strong and stable upward trend, with the mid prices rising
to pre-crisis levels. Turning to the time evolution of monthly stock returns, we find
that the temporal variation of average returns is as expected. The time period compris-
ing the financial crisis is characterized by substantial price changes and pronounced
volatility, with stock returns ranging from -50% to 50%. In the post-crisis period,
however, volatility of average returns declines remarkably and returns stay relatively
flat, varying between -20% and 20%.
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Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.1 present the time evolution of average daily bid-
ask spreads and the corresponding monthly log-differences. Not surprisingly, average
bid-ask spreads increased steeply during the financial crisis, indicating a severe dete-
rioration of stock liquidity and, consequently, implying increased trading costs for the
stocks of the average sample firm. The increased log-differences in Panel (b) in the
second half of 2008 result from the temporary surge in (average) bid-ask spreads and
reflect the considerable changes in the stock liquidity of the sample firms. In subse-
quent years, bid-ask spreads and the corresponding log-differences return to low levels
and stay relatively flat, indicating that liquidity restores and trading costs decline to
pre-crisis levels.32
Finally, Panels (e) and (f) show the time evolution of average default intensities and
the corresponding log-differences. The temporal variation of default intensities is as
expected and shows that default risk significantly increased during the financial crisis.
Average default intensities increased from approximately 1% in 2008 to nearly 5% in
2009 and returned to pre-crisis levels in the following years. Interestingly, as indicated
by the 5th to 95th percentile range and as discussed above, the sample is characterized
by strong cross-sectional variation, with the average 95th percentile default intensity
peaking at about 15% in 2009. Turning to the log-differences, we find that the in-
creased intensities during the financial crisis coincide with increased log-differences
and increased volatility of log-differences.
32Note that the surges in bid-ask spreads and log-differences in the post-crisis period are predominantly
driven by outliers lacking any economic relevance. In our empirical study, however, we remove spu-
rious outliers by winsorising to assure the validity of our results.
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Figure 2.1: Time evolution of cross-sectional data.
The figure shows the time evolution of daily mid prices, bid-ask spreads and default intensities, as well
as of the corresponding monthly log-differences for the period from January 2008 to December 2013.
The sample consists of the 209 companies listed in Appendix A.1. For each day of the sample period, we
calculate the cross-sectional average (black line) as well as the cross-sectional interquartile (dark-gray
shaded area) and 5th/95th percentile range (light-gray shaded area). Mid prices and bid-ask spreads are
denominated in US dollar, where the latter are calculated as the difference between ask and bid quotes.
Default intensities are extracted from CDS spreads according to the procedure discussed in Section 2.3
and have a horizon of one year. Monthly log-differences are calculated for each day in the sample period
using the prices, spreads, and intensities at days t and t ´ 30.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
(a) Mid prices
Pr
ic
es
 (in
 U
S 
do
lla
r)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−0.5
0.0
0.5
(b) Mid price returns
R
et
ur
n
s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(c) Bid−ask spreads
Sp
re
ad
s 
(in
 U
S 
do
lla
r)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−5
0
5
(d) Log−differences of bid−ask spreads
Lo
g−
di
ffe
re
n
ce
s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
(e) Default intensities
In
te
ns
iti
es
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
(f) Log−differences of default intensities
Lo
g−
di
ffe
re
n
ce
s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cross−sectional average
Interquartile range
5th/95th percentile range
2.4. EMPIRICAL STUDY 39
2.4 Empirical study
In this section, we first characterize the dynamic linear and extreme dependence in eq-
uity, liquidity, and credit risk. We then implement our econometric modeling approach
and illustrate the usefulness of our previous findings in a risk management setting by
investigating the performance of our newly proposed VaR-model in a comprehensive
simulation study.
2.4.1 Anecdotal evidence
As a simple first step, we start our empirical study by reporting anecdotal evidence on
the relation between stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities, providing
further motivation for our risk management application in the next section. Taking
returns, spreads, and intensities as proxies for market price, liquidity, and credit risk,
we are especially interested in the dynamic dependence of these risk types and shall
document linear dependences as well as potential non-linearities in the dependence
structure. To this purpose, we implement the following simple econometric modeling
strategy. First, for each trading day between January 2008 and December 2013 and
for each of the 209 firms in the sample, we calculate monthly log-differences of mid
prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities (extracted from daily CDS spreads, see
Section 2.3), resulting in the respective time series
!
R ji,t
)T
t“1
, i “ 1, 2, 3; j “ 1, ..., 209,
where T “ 1542. To filter the time series and compute white-noise residuals, we then
apply standard AR(3)-GARCH(1,1) processes with normally distributed innovations
to the log-differenced time series, capturing most of the first- and second-moment
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dependence.33 That is
Ri,t “ µi,t ` ei,t “ µi,t ` σi,tεi,t, εi,t|Fi,t´1 „ iid Np0, 1q,
µi,t “ µi ` φ1,iRi,t´1 ` φ2,iRi,t´2 ` φ3,iRi,t´3,
σ2i,t “ ωi ` αie2i,t´1 ` βiσ2i,t´1,
(2.16)
where the subscript denoting the respective firm, j, is omitted for convenience. Pseudo-
observations, ui, are then obtained by calculating the corresponding ranks, i.e. ui “
Fipεiq.
In a next step, we then calculate dynamic correlations and tail dependences be-
tween the stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of the same firm.34
The former are computed using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model as
proposed by Engle (2002).35 The DCC model uses the residuals from the univariate
GARCH processes as building blocks and assumes that the dynamics in the correla-
tion matrix, Rt, are driven by some autoregressive term and the cross-product of return
shocks, i.e.
R jt “ diagpQ jt q´1Q jt diagpQ jt q´1,
Q jt “ p1 ´ ψ j1 ´ ψ j2qQ j ` ψ j2Q jt´1 ` ψ j1ε˜ jt´1ε˜ jJt´1,
(2.17)
where ψ j1 and ψ
j
2 are non-negative parameters, Q j is the unconditional correlation ma-
trix, and ε˜ jt “
´
ε˜
j
1,t, ε˜
j
2,t, ε˜
j
3,t
¯J
with ε˜ ji,t given by ε
j
i,t
b
Q jii,t, j “ 1, ..., 209 (see Aielli,
2013, for details).
Dynamic tail dependences, on the other hand, are calculated using Patton’s (2006)
dynamic t copula, which is outlined in Appendix A. Copula estimation is conducted
33Note that we merely aim to provide first evidence on the time-varying linear and non-linear depen-
dences between stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities. Due to computational feasibil-
ity, in this section, we therefore neglect such issues as asymmetry in volatility and fat tails as well as
skewness in the marginal distributions. These issues are however addressed in our risk management
application in the next section.
34This restriction is necessary to ensure computational feasibility. Note, however, that the model ap-
proach discussed in Section 2.2 and employed in the next section, accounts for all relevant cross-
dependences.
35In fact, we use the modified DCC model according to Aielli (2013).
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for each of the three possible pairs of returns, spreads, and intensities on the basis of
the corresponding pseudo-observations, pui1 , ui2q, where i1, i2 “ 1, 2, 3; i1 ‰ i2.
Table 2.3 reports the cross-sectional distribution of estimates for the marginal and
dependence parameters.
The former are captured in Panel (A) and presented separately for stock returns, bid-
ask spreads, and default intensities. The estimation results for stock returns are fairly
standard. We find the first two AR lags to be strongly significant, capturing the auto-
correlation evidenced in Section 2.3. Further, the conditional variance models reveal
an only mild effect of lagged return shocks on current volatility, as indicated by the α
parameter being around 0.05 on average. The autoregressive β parameter is, however,
dominating with the cross-sectional average being around 0.94. As is commonly found
in the literature, volatility persistence is quite high (0.99 on average).36
Turning to the marginal parameters of bid-ask spreads, we find all three AR lags
to be strongly significant. Moreover, as in the case of stock returns, the variance pa-
rameters indicate low values for the estimates of the news-arrival parameter, α, (0.08
on average) and high values for the autoregressive β parameter (0.89 on average). As
above, volatility persistence is high at 0.97 on average.
Regarding default intensities, we can see from the marginal parameter estimates that
the first two AR lags turn out to be significant. Interestingly, the α parameter is around
0.29 on average and, thus, considerably higher for default intensities than for stock
returns and bid-ask spreads, indicating that news arrival affects volatility of default
intensities to a greater extent than volatility of stock returns and bid-ask spreads. At the
same time, the autoregressive β parameter is much smaller and about 0.53 on average.
Volatility persistence, on the other hand, remains high at 0.82 on average, but appears
to be relatively low when compared to volatility persistence of stock returns and bid-
ask spreads.
Turning to the DCC parameter estimates in Panel (B) of Table 2.3, we find the au-
toregressive ψ2 parameter to be clearly dominating (0.90 on average). Further, the
36See, e.g., Christoffersen et al. (2012) and Engle (2002).
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Table 2.3: Cross-sectional distribution of parameter estimates.
The table shows summary statistics of the parameter estimates for the marginal distributions as well as the correlation and copula models used to report first evidence on the dependence of prices, liquidity, and credit
risk. The marginals are modeled as AR(3)-GARCH(1,1) processes with standard normally distributed innovations, and correlations are computed from Engle’s (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model
(using the Aielli (2013) modification). The copula models are based on Patton’s (2006) dynamic t copula as discussed in Appendix A. For each of the 209 firms in the sample (see Appendix A.1), the models are
estimated on monthly log-differences of the mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of the same firm for the period from January 2008 to December 2013, where estimation of the DCC and the t copula
models is based on the corresponding AR-GARCH residuals. Descriptive statistics are then calculated cross-sectionally across all sample firms. Persistence for the marginal and DCC models is computed as α ` β
and ψ1 ` ψ2, respectively.
Cross-sectional distribution
Percentiles Moments
Min 1st 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Exc. Kurt.
Panel A: Parameter estimates for AR-GARCH processes
Stock returns
µ 0.7099 0.7521 0.8032 0.9053 0.9425 0.9778 1.0150 1.0698 1.1261 0.9345 0.0664 -0.7963 1.2636
φ1 -0.1705 -0.1231 -0.0948 -0.0385 -0.0050 0.0448 0.1369 0.1982 0.2309 0.0062 0.0721 0.5639 0.1035
φ2 -0.1733 -0.1218 -0.0897 -0.0247 0.0093 0.0396 0.0753 0.1100 0.1170 0.0046 0.0510 -0.5435 0.4564
φ3 -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0018 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0800 2.0703
ω 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.8841 14.0772
α 0.0000 0.0232 0.0291 0.0420 0.0527 0.0611 0.0789 0.0956 0.0994 0.0527 0.0155 0.2690 0.4786
β 0.8946 0.9025 0.9114 0.9289 0.9398 0.9484 0.9638 0.9718 0.9994 0.9391 0.0157 -0.0100 0.7668
Persistence 0.9560 0.9747 0.9825 0.9890 0.9929 0.9953 0.9993 1.0016 1.0024 0.9918 0.0056 -1.9519 8.6149
Bid-ask spreads
µ 0.0376 0.0857 0.1265 0.1774 0.2127 0.2455 0.3084 0.3869 0.4848 0.2137 0.0592 0.6655 2.5100
φ1 -0.1078 -0.0498 0.0262 0.0723 0.1049 0.1377 0.1879 0.2141 0.2590 0.1037 0.0545 -0.3384 1.1941
φ2 -0.0469 -0.0264 0.0513 0.0979 0.1311 0.1585 0.1980 0.2612 0.2888 0.1276 0.0502 -0.2115 1.3672
φ3 -0.0381 -0.0241 -0.0204 -0.0142 -0.0113 -0.0083 -0.0015 0.0014 0.0045 -0.0113 0.0056 -0.2702 2.2573
ω 0.0000 0.0003 0.0017 0.0093 0.0140 0.0216 0.0403 0.1652 0.3870 0.0201 0.0350 7.6350 68.2337
α 0.0304 0.0325 0.0442 0.0635 0.0784 0.1013 0.1409 0.1917 0.2919 0.0849 0.0341 1.8250 6.6965
β 0.4415 0.5391 0.8387 0.8796 0.8991 0.9139 0.9411 0.9639 0.9644 0.8881 0.0622 -4.4872 24.6484
Persistence 0.6417 0.7072 0.9461 0.9664 0.9785 0.9897 1.0040 1.0181 1.0680 0.9729 0.0440 -5.4572 36.1846
Default intensities
µ -0.5321 -0.5137 -0.2581 -0.0644 0.0550 0.1216 0.1766 0.2091 0.2701 0.0119 0.1473 -1.2988 2.0961
φ1 -0.4508 -0.2737 -0.1172 -0.0047 0.0394 0.0712 0.1100 0.1263 0.1474 0.0196 0.0823 -2.3825 8.6786
φ2 -0.1694 -0.1162 -0.0739 -0.0159 0.0132 0.0392 0.0816 0.1273 0.1492 0.0106 0.0480 -0.3077 1.0732
φ3 -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009 0.0020 0.0022 0.0000 0.0005 0.7591 3.5747
ω 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0008 0.0012 0.0014 0.0003 0.0003 1.4110 1.8542
α 0.0000 0.0002 0.0112 0.1114 0.2326 0.3815 0.7161 1.0000 1.0000 0.2901 0.2326 1.2397 1.4225
β 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2441 0.6017 0.8359 0.9722 0.9915 0.9998 0.5326 0.3304 -0.2887 -1.3085
Persistence 0.0374 0.0930 0.3301 0.6327 0.9123 0.9927 1.1087 1.4202 1.5210 0.8227 0.2647 -0.5796 0.4133
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Table 2.3: Cross-sectional distribution of parameter estimates (continued).
Cross-sectional distribution
Percentiles Moments
Min 1st 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Exc. Kurt.
Panel B: Parameter estimates for DCC models
ψ1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.0031 0.0073 0.0164 0.0237 0.0320 0.0051 0.0056 1.7866 3.7179
ψ2 0.0007 0.0494 0.2750 0.9447 0.9636 0.9776 0.9895 0.9940 0.9955 0.8950 0.2076 -3.0676 8.4476
Persistence 0.0207 0.0515 0.2758 0.9504 0.9681 0.9815 0.9926 0.9962 0.9966 0.9000 0.2065 -3.0832 8.5102
Panel C: Parameter estimates for copula models
Stock returns - Bid-ask spreads
c -0.3755 -0.2286 -0.1579 -0.0086 0.0048 0.0416 0.1881 0.2938 0.3214 0.0148 0.0963 -0.0505 2.5971
b -2.0121 -2.0086 -1.9593 -1.3570 -0.0164 1.5862 1.9352 1.9700 2.0356 0.0850 1.4664 -0.0645 -1.5590
a -0.7829 -0.7021 -0.4633 -0.1025 0.0233 0.0994 0.3801 0.5293 0.7382 -0.0162 0.2460 -0.4087 1.1521
ν 6.1908 8.9543 12.1979 20.7282 37.5850 63.6554 93.8263 99.9548 99.9995 44.4172 26.0986 0.4750 -0.9234
Stock returns - Default intensities
c -0.1870 -0.1385 -0.0333 0.0086 0.0693 0.2590 0.6596 0.8174 1.1433 0.1653 0.2209 1.5093 2.2150
b -2.1471 -2.0622 -2.0168 -1.3190 0.3870 1.6951 1.9810 2.0028 2.0363 0.1837 1.4668 -0.2149 -1.4834
a -0.6104 -0.4915 -0.3039 -0.0615 0.0224 0.1072 0.4002 0.6315 0.9743 0.0318 0.2025 0.6263 3.0254
ν 8.2157 8.6381 10.4262 15.3369 24.2336 44.4626 79.4284 99.6542 99.9992 32.7019 22.9692 1.2417 0.8157
Bid-ask spreads - Default intensities
c -0.3462 -0.2171 -0.1323 -0.0437 -0.0066 0.0086 0.0994 0.2263 0.2777 -0.0167 0.0752 -0.1227 3.8508
b -2.0353 -2.0130 -1.9991 -1.7140 -0.2303 1.1646 1.8970 2.0045 2.0118 -0.2421 1.4562 0.1702 -1.5744
a -0.8831 -0.6167 -0.3822 -0.1680 -0.0132 0.1279 0.3330 0.4137 0.4695 -0.0202 0.2216 -0.4639 0.6792
ν 8.6169 9.5970 14.3452 31.5501 54.2957 78.5693 99.9412 99.9996 99.9999 56.0324 27.7647 0.0326 -1.2075
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estimates indicate considerable persistence in the conditional correlation of stock re-
turns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of the same firm.
Panel (C) reports the parameter estimates for the dynamic t copulas and, on the one
hand, shows that there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the dependence be-
tween stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities. On the other hand, the
estimates reveal that the dependence between returns and spreads, returns and intensi-
ties, and between spreads and intensities differ considerably, indicating that each pair
of returns, spreads, and intensities is characterized by specific patterns in dependence.
The temporal variation of correlations and tail dependences is depicted in Figure
2.2.
Panel (a) plots the corresponding correlations and shows that correlations exhibit
considerable time variation and differ materially across the three pairs of returns,
spreads, and intensities. While dynamic correlations between returns and spreads and
between returns and intensities range from approximately -40% up to 50%, correla-
tions between spreads and intensities stay at comparatively moderate levels and vary
in the range of -30% to 25%. These patterns can also be found for the dynamic tail
dependences in Panel (b). To be precise, dynamic tail dependences also exhibit con-
siderable variation across time as well as across the three pairs of returns, spreads, and
intensities. With the tail dependences between returns and spreads and between returns
and intensities varying between 0% and 15% and between 0% and 20%, respectively,
the tail dependence between spreads and intensities is somewhat less pronounced and
remains in the 0% to 2.5% range.
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic correlations and tail dependences.
The figure shows the minimum/maximum range of dynamic correlations and tail dependences of stock
returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities. For each trading day between January 2008 and De-
cember 2013 and for each of the 209 firms in the sample (see Appendix A.1), we calculate dynamic
correlations and tail dependences between the returns, spreads, and intensities of the same firm, result-
ing in a total of each 627 correlation and tail dependence coefficients per firm and day. We then calculate
cross-sectional minimum and maximum values for each day. Dynamic correlations are computed from
Engle’s (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model (using the Aielli (2013) modification),
and dynamic tail dependence coefficients from Patton’s (2006) dynamic t copula (see Appendix A).
The models are estimated on the basis of the residuals from AR(3)-GARCH(1,1) processes applied to
monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities.
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic correlations and tail dependences (continued).
(b) Dynamic tail dependences
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2.4.2 Forecasting Liquidity- and Credit-Adjusted Value-at-Risk
We now turn to our VaR simulation study, which applies the dynamic vine copula
model discussed in Section 2.2 to forecasting liquidity- and credit-adjusted VaR. We
first discuss our approach to incorporate liquidity and credit risk into the standard VaR
framework and present the simulation design. We then discuss the simulation and
forecasting results and compare the performance of competing dependence models.
2.4.2.1 Simulation design
The onset of the VaR concept as a de-facto industry standard has spurred a surge in
theoretical and empirical VaR studies in the risk management literature. Since then,
a recurring topic has been the incorporation of liquidity risk into the standard VaR
framework which only accounts for market price risk. Being subject of an intense and
controversial debate in the literature, much effort has been spent on the incorporation
of liquidity risk into standard VaR and many different extensions have been proposed
in existing studies (see, e.g., Berkowitz, 2000, Bangia et al., 2002, Qi and Ng, 2009).
The incorporation of credit risk, on the other hand, has also been widely discussed in
the literature (see Crouhy et al., 2000, for an overview), but has so far been restricted to
portfolios of credit-linked securities, i.e., bond portfolios (Andersson et al., 2001) and
portfolios of derivatives with defaultable counterparties or borrowers (Duffie and Pan,
2001). Following the notion of stockholders as the residual claimants on a firm’s assets
(Vassalou and Xing, 2004), we argue that VaR measures of stock portfolios as well
need to be modified by considering potential future losses from credit events since
stock portfolios are subject to credit risk and might suffer severe losses in case of the
underlying firm being in financial distress. Because a firm defaults when it fails to
service its debt obligations and equity, in turn, is serviced subordinately to debt, credit
losses might be passed to stockholders causing stock values to suffer sharp declines
and forcing stockholders to significantly write off their portfolios.
To formally describe our liquidity- and credit-adjusted VaR (subsequently denoted
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as LC-VaR) as well as the simulation design, we adopt the notation introduced in the
preceding sections and, in the first step, estimate the AR(3)-GJR-GARCH(1,1) pro-
cesses for the marginal time series of log-differences,
!
R ji,t
)
, with i “ 1, 2, 3 de-
noting the type of series (returns, spreads, intensities) and j “ 1, ..., d denoting the
corresponding firm. The resulting residuals,
!
εˆ
j
i,t
)
, are then used to compute pseudo-
observations (i.e., copula data),
!
uˆ
j
i,t
)
, by calculating the corresponding ranks via the
transformation uˆ ji “ ˆF ji pεˆ ji q, with ˆF ji denoting the empirical distribution function. In
the next step, we estimate the dynamic R-vine copula model as discussed in Section
2.2, where estimation is based on the copula data,
!
uˆ
j
i,t
)
. Note that, for each day t in
the estimation period, there are three observations for each of the d firms, resulting in
a 3d-dimensional random vector given as
`
uˆ11,t, uˆ
1
2,t, uˆ
1
3,t, ..., uˆ
d
1,t, uˆ
d
2,t, uˆ
d
3,t
˘J
. (2.18)
Having estimated the R-vine copula, we employ the sampling algorithm as discussed in
Dißmann et al. (2013) and simulate K “ 500 independent observations,
!
kuˇ
j
i,t`1
)K
k“1
,
from the specified copula model.37 The simulated (or rather, forecasted) copula data
can then be converted to simulated log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and
default intensities in the following way. With qsktp ¨ ; ν ji , γ ji q denoting the quantile func-
tion of the skewed t distribution of Fernandez and Steel (1998), the simulated time
series can be calculated as
k ˇR ji,t`1 “ µˇ ji,t`1 ` eˇ ji,t`1 “ µˇ ji,t`1 ` σˇ ji,t`1εˇ ji,t`1,
εˇ
j
i,t`1 “ qsktpkuˇ ji,t`1; νˆ ji , γˆ ji q,
(2.19)
where µˇ ji,t`1 and σˇ
j
i,t`1 are computed by inserting the estimated AR-GJR-GARCH
parameters into equations (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. The forecasted mid prices,
37This results in 500 vectors of the form as in (2.18). Note that, as indicated by the time subscript, we
identify these vectors as the forecasted pseudo-observations for day t ` 1.
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!
kmˇ
j
t`1
)
, bid-ask spreads,
!
k sˇ
j
t`1
)
, and default intensities,
!
k ˇh jt`1
)
, are given by
kmˇ
j
t`1 “ m jt exp
´
k ˇR j1,t`1
¯
, k sˇ
j
t`1 “ s jt exp
´
k ˇR j2,t`1
¯
, k ˇh jt`1 “ h jt exp
´
k ˇR j3,t`1
¯
,
(2.20)
where the forecasted monthly default probabilities,
!
k pˇ jt`1
)
, can be calculated accord-
ing to (2.15) as follows
k pˇ jt`1 “ 1 ´ exp
ˆ
30
360 k
ˇh jt`1
˙
. (2.21)
Computing LC-VaR forecasts, ­LC-VaR jt`1pθq, now essentially reduces to calculating
empirical quantiles of forecasted mid price returns, bid-ask spreads, and default prob-
abilities, where θ denotes the corresponding confidence level. More precisely, with
rs
j
t “ s jt {m jt being the relative spread and b jt denoting the bid price, LC-VaR forecasts
are calculated according to
­LC-VaR jt`1pθq “ }VaR jt`1pθq ` ­L-VaR jt`1pθq ` ­C-VaR jt`1pθq, (2.22)
where
}VaR jt`1pθq “ m jt ´1 ´ exp´qˆ´!k ˇR j1,t`1) ; θ¯¯¯ (2.23)
is the standard VaR and
­L-VaR jt`1pθq “ 12m jt qˆ´!krˇs jt`1) ; 1 ´ θ¯ , ­C-VaR jt`1pθq “ b jt qˆ´!k pˇ jt`1) ; 1 ´ θ¯
(2.24)
denote the liquidity- and credit-adjustment, respectively, with qˆp ¨ ; θq denoting the em-
pirical quantile function evaluated at probability θ.
The liquidity-adjustment in (2.24) is proposed by Bangia et al. (2002) and accounts
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for the exogenous liquidity risk of the underlying stock. Exogenous liquidity risk
is proxied by the bid-ask spread and refers to the cost of immediate trading, which
results from the liquidity suppliers’ purchasing at the bid and selling at the ask price
(see Kyle, 1985, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Further, C-VaR jt denotes the credit-
adjustment we propose to account for default risk of the underlying firm. The idea
of incorporating credit risk into VaR calculation is based on the fact that stockholders
are serviced subordinately to debt holders in case of financial distress and might bear a
large portion of the credit losses when default occurs. Note that we base the calculation
of C-VaR jt on the simplifying assumption that stockholders loose all of their capital
invested in a particular firm in the event of default, i.e. they suffer a loss equal to the
bid price of the corresponding stock.38 Thus, we define C-VaR jt to be the maximum
(expected) credit loss over the next month that will not be exceeded with probability
1 ´ θ.
2.4.2.2 Forecasting LC-VaR: The baseline approach
In our baseline approach, we estimate and forecast portfolio LC-VaR based on a port-
folio consisting of six firms from the S&P 500, resulting in an 18-dimensional vector
of prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for each trading day in the sample pe-
riod.39 The firms included in LC-VaR forecasting are printed in bold type in Appendix
A.1 and comprise 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard, Tenet Health-
care, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores. Portfolio LC-VaR is calculated at a monthly time
horizon with a confidence level of 95% (i.e., θ “ 0.95). Formally, portfolio LC-VaR
forecasts are derived by replacing m jt , k ˇR
j
1,t`1, krˇs
j
t`1, b
j
t , and k pˇ
j
t`1 in (2.23) and (2.24)
with the corresponding portfolio prices, returns, spreads, and intensities calculated us-
ing cross-sectional equally-weighted averages.
The marginal models and the dependence model are estimated on an in-sample com-
38Note, however, that the potential recovery for stockholders in the event of default is a result from
renegotiation between claim holders and depends on the degree of shareholder advantage (see
Garlappi et al., 2008). To make C-VaR computation feasible for our purposes, we rely on the as-
sumption of zero stockholder recovery.
39That is, we set d “ 6 and obtain vectors of the form as in (2.18) for each day t.
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prising monthly log-differences of prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for
the 261 trading days in 2010. The estimated models are then used to forecast LC-VaR
numbers for the trading days in January 2011. The in- and out-of-samples are subse-
quently shifted forward one month and the models are re-estimated based on the period
from February 1st, 2010 to February 1st, 2011, where forecasting is now conducted for
February 2011. We repeat this procedure ten times, resulting in 230 LC-VaR forecasts
for the 230 trading days following January 1st, 2011. The marginal models are re-
estimated every day, whereas the dynamic R-vine copula model is re-estimated every
month due to computational complexity.
Descriptive statistics on the sample firms’ stock prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities in levels and log-differences are provided in the Appendix in Tables A.2 and
A.3, respectively. The time evolution of the stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities of the six companies are plotted in Figure 2.3.
The different panels of Figure 2.3 highlight that all six companies in our sample
are characterized by volatile stock returns and increasing liquidity. For several sam-
ple companies, default intensities exhibit a U-shaped time evolution with default risk
reaching its minimum at the start of 2011 and increasing through most of 2011. Fur-
thermore, almost all time series exhibit extreme data points underlining the need to
account for the non-linear dependence structure in our data. For example, the shares of
3M Company plummeted by more than 40% on one day in August 2011 with American
Express, Hewlett-Packard, and Textron experiencing losses of similar magnitude on
their equity. Quite similarly, the illiquidity of our sample firms’ stocks spiked as well
during the sample period (see, e.g., the bid-ask spreads of 3M Company and Hewlett-
Packard in 2010). Finally, the time series of default intensities are expectedly less
volatile than the companies’ stock returns but are also characterized by few extreme
observations.
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Figure 2.3: Time evolution of stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of
firms included in the Value-at-Risk study.
The figure plots the time series of stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for the six firms
included in the Value-at-Risk (VaR) study. The six firms include 3M Company, American Express,
Hewlett-Packard, Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores. The plots refer to the in- and out-of-
sample time periods in the VaR study, which cover the period from January 2010 to November 2011.
For each day, t, in the sample period, stock returns are calculated using the mid prices at days t and
t ´ 30. Bid-ask spreads are calculated as the difference between ask and bid quotes. Default intensities
are extracted from CDS spreads according to the procedure discussed in Section 2.3 and have a horizon
of one year.
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Figure 2.3: Time evolution of stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of
firms included in the Value-at-Risk study (continued).
(c) Hewlett−Packard (d) Tenet Healthcare
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Figure 2.3: Time evolution of stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities of
firms included in the Value-at-Risk study (continued).
(e) Textron (f) Wal−Mart Stores
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In the next step, we shortly comment on the parameter estimates for the marginal
models of the six sample companies in our Value-at-Risk study. Average parameter
estimates for the marginal distributions of monthly log-differences on daily mid prices,
bid-ask spreads, and default intensities are presented in Table 2.4.
The parameter estimates for the mean dynamics show that at least the first two AR
lags are strongly significant for stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensi-
ties. The results on the Ljung-Box test up to ten lags (denoted as LB(10) test) further
indicate that the AR(3) processes are successful in capturing the serial dependence ev-
idenced in Section 2.3. The estimation results for the variance dynamics, on the other
hand, are fairly standard. Of particular note are the estimates for the δ parameter which
captures asymmetry in volatility. While the δ estimates for stock returns and bid-ask
spreads predominantly reveal only mild statistical evidence of asymmetry in volatility,
volatility of default intensities appears to be characterized by strong asymmetry across
all six firms.40 Further, the estimates for the skewed t distribution indicate fat tails and
slight skewness for the returns, spreads, and intensities of most firms. Finally, to check
the adequacy of the variance models, we apply the LB(10) test to the squared stan-
dardized GARCH residuals. Impressively, the GJR-GARCH models are able to pick
up most of the second-moment dependence inherent in the time-series data, as indi-
cated by the low number of rejections for the LB(10) test. We conclude from Table 2.4
that the marginal AR-GJR-GARCH models are capable of delivering the white-noise
residuals required to obtain unbiased estimates for the dependence parameters of our
dynamic R-vine copula model.
To get a better understanding of our model’s ability to account for non-linear de-
pendences in market price, liquidity, and credit risk, we quickly review the temporal
variation in the selected parametric pair-copulas in our dynamic R-vine copula. The
percentages of selected parametric bivariate pair-copulas are shown in Table 2.5.
40Note, however, that the estimated values for the δ parameter of default intensities are positive through-
out the sample firms, which is somewhat counterintuitive since negative AR residuals are associated
with good news (see Section 2.2). That is, the positive values imply an upward revision of volatility
in response to good news.
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Table 2.4: Average parameter estimates for marginal distributions.
The table reports average parameter estimates for the marginal distributions of monthly log-differences on daily mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for the
six firms investigated in our Value-at-Risk (VaR) study. The six firms include 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard, Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart
Stores. The marginal distributions are modeled using AR(3)-GJR-GARCH(1,1) processes with skewed-t distributed innovations as discussed in Section 2.2. Starting with an
in-sample comprising the 261 trading days in 2010, the estimation period for the marginal models is subsequently shifted forward one day after each VaR forecast, resulting
in 230 re-estimations. The parameter estimates shown in the table result from averaging across the re-estimations. Variance persistence (denoted Var. Pers. in the table) is
calculated as β` α` 12δ. The last two columns show the number of rejections (at the 0.01 level) across all 230 re-estimations from Ljung-Box tests for serial correlation up
to 10 lags as applied to the standardized and squared standardized residuals.
Mean dynamics Variance dynamics #Rej. of LB(10) test
µ φ1 φ2 φ3 ω β α δ Var. Pers. ν γ Resid. Sq. Resid.
Panel A: Stock returns
3M Company 0.9980 0.0238 -0.0762 0.0006 0.0000 0.9190 0.0550 0.0239 0.9859 17.5909 0.8578 0 0
American Express 0.9460 0.0292 -0.0317 0.0001 0.0000 0.9097 0.0305 0.0176 0.9490 11.4982 0.8934 0 7
Hewlett-Packard 0.9328 0.0993 -0.1152 0.0011 0.0000 0.9252 0.0157 0.0599 0.9709 6.6431 0.9982 9 0
Tenet Healthcare 0.9501 0.1252 -0.1455 0.0004 0.0000 0.9620 0.0143 0.0126 0.9826 9.8417 0.8842 2 16
Textron 1.0466 0.0071 -0.1040 -0.0013 0.0000 0.9307 0.0015 0.0801 0.9722 5.2423 1.0024 0 0
Wal-Mart Stores 0.8942 0.0459 0.0090 0.0009 0.0000 0.9931 0.0051 -0.0204 0.9880 3.2150 0.9207 0 0
Panel B: Log-differences of bid-ask spreads
3M Company -0.0131 -0.0665 -0.0448 -0.0457 0.0018 0.9807 0.0347 -0.0515 0.9896 3.3627 0.9713 1 0
American Express 0.0189 0.0745 0.1175 -0.0390 0.0029 0.8766 0.0652 0.1195 1.0015 5.5385 0.9406 0 0
Hewlett-Packard 0.1082 -0.0116 -0.0103 -0.0467 0.0092 0.9862 0.0281 -0.0576 0.9855 29.9999 1.0737 0 0
Tenet Healthcare 0.0317 0.0119 0.0467 -0.0763 0.0046 0.9963 0.0055 -0.0196 0.9920 8.9658 1.0573 0 0
Textron -0.0532 0.0741 0.0498 -0.0490 0.0066 0.9910 0.0249 -0.0637 0.9841 29.8826 1.0429 9 0
Wal-Mart Stores 0.0055 0.0357 -0.1111 -0.0123 0.0568 0.8016 0.2413 -0.1613 0.9623 2.1100 0.8096 0 0
Panel C: Log-differences of default intensities
3M Company -0.0545 0.0511 0.0244 0.0005 0.0000 0.8921 0.0035 0.1667 0.9790 3.8639 1.0657 0 0
American Express -0.2948 -0.1048 0.0061 0.0001 0.0001 0.4055 0.1286 0.3970 0.7326 2.9294 0.9821 0 61
Hewlett-Packard -0.1336 0.0266 -0.0025 0.0006 0.0001 0.6981 0.0082 0.2532 0.8330 4.0834 1.0327 0 42
Tenet Healthcare -0.1938 -0.0026 -0.0125 0.0002 0.0001 0.5834 0.0612 0.3558 0.8225 3.0183 0.9840 0 0
Textron -0.0668 0.0419 0.0231 -0.0011 0.0001 0.7984 0.0000 0.2218 0.9093 3.1483 0.9319 0 0
Wal-Mart Stores -0.0910 -0.0142 0.0034 0.0008 0.0000 0.9336 0.0025 0.1194 0.9958 2.9655 1.1106 0 0
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Table 2.5: Temporal variation of selected parametric pair-copulas.
The table reports results on the selected bivariate parametric pair-copulas in our dynamic R-vine copula model for each estimation period included in our Value-at-Risk
(VaR) study. The R-vine copula model is estimated on pseudo-observations of standardized log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for six
firms from the S&P 500, resulting in 153 (“ 18 ¨ 17{2) parametric pair-copulas that need to be specified and estimated for each R-vine copula estimation. The results in the
table show the number of a particular parametric copula family being selected as a percentage of the number of pair-copulas to be specified in each R-vine copula estimation
(that is, 153). The candidate copulas include dynamic versions of the standard normal, t, (rotated) Clayton, (rotated) Gumbel, and (rotated) Joe copula, where we follow the
dynamization approach suggested by Patton (2006) (as outlined in Appendix A). The selection of the bivariate pair-copulas is based on the sequential method as proposed
by Dißmann et al. (2013) and conducted using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as the selection criterion to be minimized.
Estimation period Parametric copula families (in %)Normal t Clayton Rotated Clayton Gumbel Rotated Gumbel Joe Rotated Joe
01/2010 - 01/2011 51.63 12.42 1.31 2.61 8.50 14.38 2.61 6.54
02/2010 - 02/2011 55.56 5.88 1.96 3.92 5.88 9.15 12.42 5.23
03/2010 - 03/2011 51.63 5.88 2.61 0.65 7.84 15.69 3.27 12.42
04/2010 - 04/2011 56.21 11.76 3.27 3.92 5.23 9.80 5.23 4.58
05/2010 - 05/2011 56.21 12.42 1.96 1.96 8.50 11.76 3.92 3.27
06/2010 - 06/2011 57.52 11.11 3.27 5.23 3.27 7.84 5.88 5.88
07/2010 - 07/2011 54.25 7.84 0.00 4.58 9.15 16.99 2.61 4.58
08/2010 - 08/2011 56.21 8.50 3.27 2.61 5.23 13.73 5.23 5.23
09/2010 - 09/2011 48.37 6.54 2.61 3.27 13.73 14.38 7.19 3.92
10/2010 - 10/2011 49.02 8.50 3.27 2.61 11.76 15.03 3.27 6.54
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The percentages given in Table 2.5 show that for around 50% of the bivariate pair-
copulas, the tail independent normal copula is selected. Between 5.88% to 12.42% of
the pair-copulas are modeled using the symmetrically tail dependent Student’s t cop-
ula. Conversely, 30% up to 45% of the pair-copulas are modeled using either upper-
or lower-tail dependent copulas underlining the notion that the dependence structure
of our data is indeed significantly non-linear and asymmetric. Furthermore, the per-
centages for several parametric copulas vary considerably during the course of our
sample period thus confirming the need to employ time-varying copulas. For example,
the upper-tail dependent Gumbel copula is chosen for 8.50% of the pair-copulas for the
first of our estimation periods with this percentage plummeting to 3.27% for the period
of June 2010 to June 2011 and increasing again to 13.73% for the period of September
2010 to September 2011.
The results so far emphasize that, while much of the dependence inherent in market
price, liquidity, and credit risk can be adequately modeled using tail independent nor-
mal copulas, the dependence structure of our data is also characterized by significant
asymmetric tail dependence. However, our particular estimation approach for the R-
vine copulas specifically tries to capture as much dependence as possible in the upper
trees of the vine structure. As a consequence, it could be that most of the unconditional
dependence in our data is actually linear while the tail dependent parametric copulas
are only selected in lower (less important) trees in which the conditional dependence
is modeled. To answer this question, Table 2.6 presents corresponding percentages of
selected parametric pair-copulas separately by the respective tree in the R-vine model.
The results of Table 2.6 show an opposite picture. The normal copula is selected
for only 35.88% of the pair-copulas in the first tree while the vast majority of bivariate
(unconditional) data pairs are modeled using tail dependent parametric copulas.41 In
the lower trees of the R-vines, the percentage for the normal copula increases up to
65% while several of the tail dependent parametric copulas are no longer selected.
41In Table A.4 in the Appendix, we additionally tabulate the selected parametric pair-copulas in the first
R-vine tree for all bivariate data pairs.
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Table 2.6: Treewise selection of parametric pair-copulas.
The table reports average results on the treewise selection of bivariate parametric pair-copulas in our dynamic R-vine copula model across the estimation periods included
in our Value-at-Risk (VaR) study. The R-vine copula model is estimated on pseudo-observations of standardized log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities for six firms from the S&P 500, resulting in 153 (“ 18 ¨ 17{2) parametric pair-copulas that need to be specified and estimated for each R-vine copula estimation.
The 18-dimensional R-vine copula is composed of 17 trees, where copula selection is based on the sequential method as proposed by Dißmann et al. (2013) and conducted
using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as the selection criterion to be minimized. Each tree, i, requires the selection and estimation of 18 ´ i bivariate parametric
pair-copulas. The results in the table show the number of a particular parametric copula family being selected in tree i, i “ 1, ..., 17, as a percentage of the total number
of pair-copulas to be specified in tree i (that is, 18 ´ i). The resulting percentages are averaged across all ten re-estimations conducted in our VaR study (see Section 2.4).
The candidate copulas include dynamic versions of the standard normal, t, (rotated) Clayton, (rotated) Gumbel, and (rotated) Joe copula, where we follow the dynamization
approach suggested by Patton (2006) (as outlined in Appendix A).
Tree Parametric copula families (in %)Normal t Clayton Rotated Clayton Gumbel Rotated Gumbel Joe Rotated Joe
1 35.88 18.82 0.59 1.18 7.06 22.94 1.76 11.76
2 46.88 5.00 5.00 2.50 11.25 12.50 6.88 10.00
3 57.33 8.00 0.00 9.33 10.00 10.00 2.67 2.67
4 47.14 15.00 3.57 2.86 5.71 17.86 4.29 3.57
5 52.31 11.54 3.85 0.77 9.23 13.85 1.54 6.92
6 55.00 9.17 1.67 1.67 9.17 10.00 8.33 5.00
7 56.36 10.00 4.55 3.64 6.36 8.18 5.45 5.45
8 62.00 9.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 9.00 6.00 4.00
9 64.44 7.78 1.11 3.33 7.78 6.67 5.56 3.33
10 62.50 1.25 5.00 1.25 3.75 11.25 10.00 5.00
11 61.43 7.14 1.43 0.00 11.43 11.43 4.29 2.86
12 61.67 1.67 0.00 1.67 6.67 13.33 8.33 6.67
13 52.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 8.00 12.00 10.00 4.00
14 65.00 5.00 0.00 2.50 10.00 10.00 5.00 2.50
15 56.67 3.33 3.33 3.33 10.00 13.33 3.33 6.67
16 65.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 15.00 5.00 5.00
17 50.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 10.00 0.00
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These results further underline our finding that our data indeed exhibit strong non-
linear dependence.
We now turn to the main results of our VaR study in which we intend to calculate
LC-VaR forecasts for the portfolio profits and losses (P/L) at time t, PLpft . The portfolio
P/L are calculated according to
PLpft “ bt ´ at´1, (2.25)
where bt and at denote the portfolio bid and ask price, respectively. The actual portfolio
P/L are then compared to the LC-VaR forecasts estimated at a confidence level of
θ “ 0.95 using monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities. In Figure 2.4, we plot the realized out-of-sample portfolio P/L against the
corresponding LC-VaR forecasts calculated from our dynamic R-vine copula model.
In Panel (a) of Figure 2.4, we first plot the realized portfolio P/L against the esti-
mated LC-VaR forecasts for the out-of-sample period that covers the full year 2011.
The plot shows that our LC-VaR forecasts stay relatively close to the realized P/L
throughout the out-of-sample. Even more importantly, the LC-VaR estimates appear
to capture the downward movements of the portfolio P/L quite adequately without un-
derestimating portfolio risk. This last finding is emphasized by the plot in Panel (b)
in which we illustrate the distance between the realized portfolio P/L and the LC-VaR
forecasts as well as the LC-VaR exceedances. First, we note that the distances be-
tween the P/L and the LC-VaR in case the LC-VaR is not exceeded are relatively small
throughout the out-of-sample. Consequently, companies employing the LC-VaR based
on our dynamic R-vine copula model are able to limit their excess regulatory capital
derived from the LC-VaR forecasts. At the same time, the distances are also small
to non-existent in case the portfolio losses exceeded the LC-VaR. Our model thus ap-
pears to produce small Expected Shortfall estimates as well. Second, our R-vine model
also seems to forecast portfolio P/L quite adequately based on the number of times the
portfolio losses exceed the respective daily LC-VaR forecast. This second finding is
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highlighted in Panel (c) of Figure 2.4 in which we only plot the losses that exceed the
LC-VaR forecasts.
Our analysis so far has shown that the LC-VaR forecasts from our dynamic R-vine
copula model adequately predict portfolio losses. Consequently, our results support the
notion that integrating information on the dependence between market price, liquidity,
and credit risk into a VaR model is vital for accurate risk forecasting. However, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the LC-VaR forecasts we estimate solely capture
market price risk and that the effect of liquidity and credit risk is negligible. If this
were the case, the good fit of our LC-VaR model would simply be due to chance
as it simply forecasts market price risk employing a significant amount of redundant
information on liquidity and credit risk. Figure 2.5 shows that the opposite is true.
In Figure 2.5, we decompose the LC-VaR forecasts into their market price (VaR),
liquidity risk (L-VaR) and credit risk component (C-VaR) and plot the time evolution
of the three components. The upper Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 compares the time evolution
of the standard market price VaR of our stock portfolio to the LC-VaR forecasts. As
expected, the LC-VaR forecasts predominantly consist of the standard VaR with the
market price component. However, a significant part of the LC-VaR forecasts (1%
to 5%) are due to the liquidity and/or credit components. The plot for the liquidity
component given in Panel (b) shows that liquidity risk plays a significant role in the
forecasting of LC-VaR as the liquidity component accounts for up to 2.5% of the LC-
VaR forecasts. Furthermore, the percentage of the liquidity component of the LC-
VaR shows only little time variation and decreases during the course of our out-of-
sample.42 Finally, Panel (c) of Figure 2.5 shows that up to 2% of the absolute LC-VaR
forecasts are due to credit risk. More importantly, the relative weight of the credit
component in the LC-VaR forecasts varies significantly during our sample period, thus
again underlining the need to account for the time dynamics in market price and credit
risk.
42This finding again reflects the increase in the overall liquidity of stocks during our sample period as
shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.4: Realized portfolio losses and Value-at-Risk forecasts.
The figure shows the realized out-of-sample portfolio profits and losses (P/L) on our sample portfolio
as well as the forecasts of liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (LC-VaR) calculated from our
dynamic R-vine copula model. The portfolio P/L at time t, PLpft , is calculated according to PL
pf
t “
bt ´ at´1, where bt and at denote the portfolio bid and ask price, respectively. The sample portfolio is
composed of six firms from the S&P 500 including 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard,
Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores. The forecasting period covers the 230 trading days
following January 1st, 2011. Starting with an in-sample comprising the 261 trading days in 2010 and
an out-of-sample covering January 2011, the in- and out-of-samples are shifted forward one month with
the R-vine copula model being re-estimated. LC-VaR forecasts are calculated at a confidence level of
θ “ 0.95 based on monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities.
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Figure 2.5: Decomposing liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk.
The figure presents the time evolution for the market price (VaR), liquidity (L-VaR), and credit com-
ponent (C-VaR) of liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (LC-VaR) forecasts. LC-VaR forecasts
are computed from the our dynamic R-vine copula model at a confidence level of θ “ 0.95 based
on monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for the six firms in
our sample portfolio. The six firms include 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard, Tenet
Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores. The forecasting period covers the 230 trading days follow-
ing January 1st, 2011. Starting with an in-sample comprising the 261 trading days in 2010 and an
out-of-sample covering January 2011, the in- and out-of-samples are shifted forward one month with
the R-vine copula model being re-estimated.
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2.4.2.3 Neglecting dynamics and non-linearities in dependence
In the last part of our empirical study, we address the question whether the additional
flexibility of using (a) a dynamic instead of a static model and (b) a copula instead of a
correlation-based model is indeed necessary for accurate risk forecasting. To this end,
we compare the forecasting accuracy of our proposed dynamic R-vine copula model
to that of a static R-vine model as well as Engle’s (2002) DCC model.
As a first step, we compare the realized out-of-sample portfolio profits and losses on
our sample portfolio with the forecasts of the LC-VaR calculated from the respective
dependence model. Here, we are especially interested in documenting the differences
of both dependence models relating to the portfolio profits and losses in our sample.
The results of this comparison are presented in Figure 2.6.
The upper parts of Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.6 plot the realized profits and losses
of our portfolio against the LC-VaR forecasts estimated from our static R-vine copula
and DCC model, respectively. The plots show that for both models, the LC-VaR fore-
casts stay relatively close to the realized portfolio losses. This finding is confirmed by
the middle plots in both panels in which we illustrate the distances between the real-
ized portfolio P/L and the LC-VaR forecasts. Compared to the corresponding plots for
our dynamic R-vine copula model, however, both models appear to be more conserva-
tive as both the distances between the realized P/L and the LC-VaR forecasts are larger
and the number of VaR-exceedances are (unnecessarily) smaller.43 This finding is con-
firmed in a direct comparison of the different models. The results of this comparison
are plotted in Figure 2.7.
The plots presented in Figure 2.7 clearly show that both the static vine copula and
the DCC model overestimate portfolio risk to a significant degree. While both models
yield LC-VaR forecasts that are exceeded on only few trading days, our dynamic R-
vine copula model produces forecasts that not only adequately capture extreme losses
43In untabulated results, we further check the forecasting accuracy of all three models by performing
tests of the models’ conditional coverage (see Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2004). The results of these
tests show that none of the models is rejected.
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but also limit the use of (regulatory) capital. Neglecting the time dynamics and non-
linearities in the dependence structure between market price, liquidity, and credit risk
thus leads to an excessive allocation of capital that is not needed and that ultimately
leads to unnecessarily high capital costs. In fact, the cumulative difference between
our dynamic R-vine copula and the static R-vine alternative increases to more than 200
USD at the end of our out-of-sample period showing the economically highly signifi-
cant potential to limit capital costs. Furthermore, as evidenced by Panel (c) of Figure
2.7, accounting for time variation in the dependence structure of the three LC-VaR
components seems to be more important than accounting for non-linear dependence.
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Figure 2.6: Realized portfolio losses and Value-at-Risk forecasts from alternative
dependence models.
The figure shows the realized out-of-sample portfolio profits and losses (P/L) on our sample portfolio as
well as the forecasts of liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (LC-VaR) calculated from alternative
dependence models. The alternative dependence models include a static R-vine copula model as well
as Engle’s (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model. The portfolio P/L at time t, PLpft ,
is calculated according to PLpft “ bt ´ at´1, where bt and at denote the portfolio bid and ask price,
respectively. The sample portfolio is composed of six firms from the S&P 500 including 3M Company,
American Express, Hewlett-Packard, Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores. The forecasting
period covers the 230 trading days following January 1st, 2011. Starting with an in-sample comprising
the 261 trading days in 2010 and an out-of-sample covering January 2011, the in- and out-of-samples are
shifted forward one month with the dependence models being re-estimated every day. LC-VaR forecasts
are calculated at a confidence level of θ “ 0.95 based on monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask
spreads, and default intensities.
(a) Static R−Vine (b) DCC model
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Figure 2.7: Dynamic R-vine copula model versus alternative dependence models.
The figure compares the liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (LC-VaR) forecasts from the dy-
namic R-vine copula model to the LC-VaR forecasts from the static R-vine copula model and Engle’s
(2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model. LC-VaR forecasts are calculated at a confi-
dence level of θ “ 0.95 based on monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default
intensities of six firms from the S&P 500 including 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard,
Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores. The forecasting period covers the 230 trading days
following January 1st, 2011. Starting with an in-sample comprising the 261 trading days in 2010 and
an out-of-sample covering January 2011, the in- and out-of-samples are shifted forward one month with
the dynamic R-vine model and the alternative dependence models being re-estimated every month and
every day, respectively. Portfolio profits and losses (P/L) at time t, PLpft , are calculated according to
PLpft “ bt ´ at´1, where bt and at denote the portfolio bid and ask price, respectively.
(a) Dynamic R−vine vs. Static R−vine (b) Dynamic R−vine vs. DCC model
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Figure 2.7: Dynamic R-vine copula model versus alternative dependence models
(continued).
(c) DCC model vs. Static R−Vine
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present first empirical evidence of persistent and time-varying asym-
metric extreme dependence in equity prices, liquidity, and credit risk. We propose to
use dynamic R-vine copulas to model the joint distribution of the market price, liquid-
ity, and credit risk of a multivariate stock portfolio at the security-level. Our model
is extremely flexible yet at the same time still tractable even for high-dimensional
multivariate distributions and accounts for possible time variation in a distribution’s
linear and non-linear dependence structure. Using the dynamic R-vine copula model,
we document the existence of significant time-varying tail dependence between the
returns, the liquidity, and the default intensities of companies listed in the S&P 500.
While non-linear dependence has been shown to exist in stock returns and between
individual stock and market liquidity, this paper is the first to confirm that the joint
distribution of equity returns, liquidity, and default risk is characterized by strong tail
dependence as well.
We then propose a liquidity- and credit-adjusted Value-at-Risk (LC-VaR) that not
only accounts for market price risk, but also for sudden peaks in illiquidity and default
probabilities. Using a portfolio of six companies from the S&P 500, we forecast the
portfolio’s LC-VaR with the help of our dynamic R-vine copula model. Not only do
we find the LC-VaR forecasts to adequately capture downside risk, we also find our dy-
namic R-vine copula model to significantly outperform static vine copula or dynamic
correlation-based models. While both benchmarks overestimate portfolio risk, our dy-
namic R-vine model significantly saves on risk capital while at the same time yielding
an acceptable number of VaR-violations.
Although our empirical study primarily deals with risk forecasting, our main finding
is not limited to the field of risk management. In fact, our proposed dynamic R-vine
copula model can be used in any context in financial economics in which one wishes
to model the dynamic tail dependence in a high-dimensional data set. Consequently,
future research should address the question whether dynamic R-vines are (economi-
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cally) significantly superior to static or correlation-based models in other application
like, e.g., asset pricing studies in the spirit of Ruenzi et al. (2013), Ruenzi and Weigert
(2013), and Meine et al. (2015).
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Chapter 3
Systemic Risk of Insurers Around the
Globe
“SIFIs are financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their
size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption
to the wider financial system and economic activity.”
Financial Stability Board, 11/04/2011
3.1 Introduction
At the climax of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, American International Group
(AIG) became the first example of an insurance company that required (and received)
a bailout due to it being regarded as systemically important. Not only did AIG’s near-
collapse come to the surprise of most economists who considered systemic risk to be
confined to the banking sector, but it also spurred a realignment of insurance regula-
tion towards a macroprudential supervision of so-called global systemically important
insurers (G-SIIs). As a consequence, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) together with
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) recently published a list
of nine G-SIIs which will ultimately face higher capital and loss absorbency require-
ments. In their methodology, insurers are deemed to be of systemic relevance to the
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global financial sector, if they are of such size and global interconnectedness that their
default would cause severe disruptions in the financial sector and subsequently the real
economy.
However, the (heavily criticized)44 methodology proposed by the IAIS has only un-
dergone limited empirical scrutiny so far. Most importantly, the relation between the
interconnectedness and systemic risk of insurers has not been analyzed before. In this
paper, we intend to fill this gap in the literature by investigating whether the intercon-
nectedness of insurers with the global financial sector in addition to their size increased
the insurers’ individual contribution to systemic risk. As the main result of our analysis
of a panel of global insurers from 2000 to 2012, we find that interconnectedness only
increases the systemic vulnerability of large life and non-life insurers. In contrast, the
impact of an insurer’s interconnectedness on its contribution to systemic risk is much
less clear.
Economists have long neglected the potential of the insurance sector to destabilize
the whole financial system. In contrast to banks, insurers are not subject to depositor
runs and thus do not face the risk of a sudden liquidity drain,45 hold more capital (see
Harrington, 2009) and are less interconnected horizontally with the rest of the financial
sector. However, the case of American International Group (AIG) showed that insurers
can become systemically important nonetheless if they engage too heavily in business
activities outside the traditional insurance sector. As a consequence, the Financial Sta-
bility Board urged the IAIS to identify G-SIIs that could potentially destabilize the
global financial sector and to implement new regulation for these insurers. Building on
the experiences made during the AIG case, the IAIS (2013) recently published a pro-
posal for a methodology for identifying G-SIIs that cites non-core and non-insurance
activities, insurer size and interconnectedness as the major drivers of systemic risk in
44For example, the Secretary General of the Geneva Association, John Fitzpatrick, criticized the IAIS
indicators for penalizing risk diversification.
45Although one could possibly think of an “insurer run” on life insurance policies, this possibility ap-
pears to be highly unlikely as insurance customers are often protected by guarantees and as cancelling
a long-term life insurance policy often implies the realization of severe losses. Consequently, there
exists no example of a default of an insurer in the past that caused significant contagion effects (see,
e.g., Eling and Pankoke, 2014).
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the insurance industry.
Both the question whether insurers can actually become systemically important and
the question whether the IAIS’s proposed methodology is suitable for identifying G-
SIIs remain relatively unanswered in the literature. Early treatments of the topic of sys-
temic risk in insurance include the works by Acharya et al. (2009), Harrington (2009)
and Cummins and Weiss (2014).46 In the latter, it is hypothesized that non-core ac-
tivities and high degrees of interconnectedness are the primary causes of insurers’
systemic relevance. The interconnectedness of insurers is also empirically analyzed
by Billio et al. (2012) who argue that illiquid assets of insurers could create systemic
risks in times of financial crisis. In a related study, Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that
systemic risks exist in the insurance sector even though they are smaller than in bank-
ing. More importantly, systemic risk in insurance appears to have grown partly as a
consequence to the increasing interconnectedness of insurers and their activities out-
side the traditional insurance business. Chen et al. (2014) put a special emphasis on
the insurance sector but find in their analysis of credit default swap and intraday stock
price data that the insurance sector is exposed but does not contribute to systemic risks
in the banking sector. While the former two studies are only concerned with the in-
terconnectedness of banks and insurers, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014) also study the
impact of size, leverage and other idiosyncratic characteristics included in the IAIS
methodology on the systemic risk exposure and contribution of U.S. insurers during
the financial crisis.47 Most importantly, they find that insurer size seems to have been a
major driver of the systemic risk exposure and contribution of U.S. insurers. Several of
the IAIS indicators (like, e.g., geographical diversification), however, do not appear to
be significantly related to the systemic risk of insurers. Finally, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel
(2015) support the too-big-to-fail conjecture for insurers by showing that insurer merg-
ers tend to increase the systemic risk of the acquiring insurers.
46Other analyses of systemic risk in insurance include the works of Eling and Schmeiser (2010),
Lehmann and Hofmann (2010) and van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
47In a related study, Cummins and Weiss (2014) analyze the characteristics of U.S. insurers that are
systemically important based on the insurers’ SRISK (see Acharya et al., 2012).
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We complement the existing empirical literature on systemic risk in insurance by
performing the first panel regression analysis of the systemic risk exposure and contri-
bution of international insurers. In particular, we test hypotheses that size and intercon-
nectedness could drive the systemic importance of international insurers. To measure
an insurer’s exposure and contribution to the fragility of the financial sector, we fol-
low Anginer et al. (2014b,a) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2015, 2014) and employ the
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010) and ∆CoVaR methodol-
ogy of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015), respectively. We then estimate these mea-
sures for a sample of 253 international life and non-life insurers for the period from
2000 to 2012 and perform panel regressions of the quarterly MES and ∆CoVaR esti-
mates. As independent variables, we use insurer-specific and macroeconomic variables
that have been discussed in the literature as potential drivers of systemic risk. Most
importantly, we employ the measure of interconnectedness proposed by Billio et al.
(2012) which is based on a principal component analysis of the stock returns of finan-
cial institutions.48
Based on a sample of 253 life and non-life insurers, we find systemic risk in the
international insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the
literature for banks. However, confirming the results of Baluch et al. (2011), we find a
strong upward trend in both the exposure and contribution of insurers to the fragility
of the global financial system during the financial crisis. In our panel regressions, we
find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the financial sector to be a signif-
icant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution
of insurers to systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ size and
leverage.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
data and the methodology used in our empirical study. Section 3.3 presents the results
of our investigation into the determinants of systemic risk in the insurance industry.
48Other potential measures of the interconnectedness of financial institutions include the measures pro-
posed by Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) which are both based on Granger causality tests.
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Concluding remarks are given in Section 3.4.
3.2 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample and presents the choice of our
main independent variables as well as descriptive statistics of our data.
3.2.1 Sample construction
We construct our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed international insurers
from the dead and active firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. For
reasons of relevance, we concentrate on insurance firms with total assets in excess of
$ 1 billion at the end of 2000. We then omit all firms for which stock price data are
unavailable in Datastream. Next, we exclude all secondary listings and nonprimary
issues from our sample. Further, we exclude Berkshire Hathaway which is listed as
an insurance company in Datastream due to its unusually high stock price. Balance-
sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the Thomson Worldscope database
and all stock market and accounting data are collected in U.S. dollars to minimize a
possible bias in our results stemming from currency risk.
Finally, we split our data sample into life and non-life insurers. The definition of
life and non-life insurance companies in the company lists of Datastream is some-
what fuzzy.49 Therefore, the industry classification of Datastream is cross-checked
with the firms’ SIC code (Worldscope data item WC07021, SIC codes 6311, 6321,
6331) and the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code (Worldscope data item
WC07040, ICB supersector 8500) to exclude firms which cannot be clearly classified
as life or non-life insurance companies.50 Additionally, all company names are manu-
ally screened for words suggesting a non-insurance nature of the companies’ business
and the respective companies being excluded from the sample. In total, we end up with
49For example, several medical service plans and medical wholesale companies are listed as life insur-
ance companies in Datastream’s company lists.
50Consequently, HMO, managed care and title insurance companies are not included in the final sample.
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an international sample of 253 insurers, containing 112 life insurers and 141 non-life
insurers. For increased transparency, the names of all insurers in our sample are listed
in Appendix B.1.
In the following subsections, we define and discuss the different dependent and in-
dependent variables we use in our empirical study. An overview of all variables and
data sources is given in Appendix B.2.
3.2.2 Systemic risk measures
Our analysis focuses on the exposure and contribution of individual insurers to the
systemic risk of the global financial sector during the period 2000 through 2012. Con-
sequently, we employ an insurer’s Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), Systemic Risk
Index/Capital Shortfall (SRISK) and ∆CoVaR as main dependent variables in our re-
gression analyses. We estimate the three measures of systemic risk for each quarter in
our sample using daily stock market data for our sample insurers. Our choice of these
systemic risk measures is motivated by the fact that these measures have been exten-
sively discussed in the literature and are also used by regulators and central banks for
monitoring financial stability (see Benoit et al., 2013).51 As our first measure of sys-
temic risk, we use the quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall which is a static structural
form approach to measure an individual insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. It is de-
fined by Acharya et al. (2010) as the negative average return on an individual insurer’s
stock on the days a market index experienced its 5% worst outcomes. As a proxy for
the market’s return, we use the World Datastream Bank Index in our main analysis.
Next, we implement the ∆CoVaR method proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2015), which is based on the tail covariation between the returns of individual finan-
cial institutions and the financial system. We use ∆CoVaR as an additional measure of
an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk as Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015) criticize
51All three systemic risk measures we employ share the property that they are all based on economic
theory and capture different aspects of systemic risk. Since the recent financial crisis, several other
measures of systemic risk have been proposed in the literature. Further examples for such measures
apart from those used in this study are due to De Jonghe (2010), Huang et al. (2012), Schwaab et al.
(2011), Hautsch et al. (2015), Hovakimian et al. (2012) and White et al. (2015).
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the MES measure for not being able to adequately address the procyclicality that arises
from contemporaneous risk measurement.52 While the unconditional ∆CoVaR esti-
mates are constant over time, the conditional ∆CoVaR is time-varying and estimated
using a set of state variables that capture the evolution of tail risk dependence over
time. However, since we calculate ∆CoVaR based on stock prices for a given quarter,
the standard state variables used for estimating the conditional CoVaR show almost
no time-variation. Consequently, we focus on estimating the unconditional version of
∆CoVaR in our analysis. An insurer’s contribution to systemic risk is then measured
as the difference between CoVaR conditional on the insurer being under distress and
the CoVaR in the median state of the institution. A lower value of ∆CoVaR indicates
a higher contribution to systemic risk, while a positive MES indicates an exposure to
systemic risk rather than a stabilizing effect.
As our third systemic risk measure, we use SRISK which attempts to measure
the expected capital shortfall of a firm. SRISK is given as the average quar-
terly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) and
Brownlees and Engle (2015). An insurer’s SRISK is estimated by the insurer’s book
value of debt weighted with a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%) plus the weighted long
run Marginal Expected Shortfall multiplied by the insurer’s market value of equity.
3.2.3 Explanatory variables
In this subsection, we characterize the main independent variables we use in our panel
regressions and robustness checks later on. In our analysis we attempt to capture the
key features that make insurers become systemically relevant. We thus concentrate on
the factors that have recently been suggested by the IAIS (2011, 2013) as potential
sources of systemic risk in insurance. We therefore include in our regressions proxies
for an insurer’s size, its capital structure, non-core activities, and interconnectedness
with the financial system.
52Conversely, Acharya et al. (2010) criticize the ∆CoVaR measure as being based on a non-coherent
risk measure.
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To proxy for the latter, we make use of the measure of interconnectedness of a
financial institution proposed by Billio et al. (2012). Let Zi be the standardized stock
returns of the ith institutions and G “ CovpZi,Z jqi j be the covariance matrix of the
institutions’s daily stock returns. Using principal component analysis, we are able to
decompose this matrix into a matrix Λ, which is a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues
λ1, . . . , λN of G, and a matrix L “ pLikqik that contains the eigenvectors of the returns’
correlation matrix. Billio et al. (2012) then define the system’s variance as
σ2S “
Nÿ
i“1
Nÿ
j“1
Nÿ
l“1
σiσ jLikL jkλk.
In their work, Billio et al. (2012) argue that the more interconnected a system is, the
less eigenvalues are necessary to explain a proportion of H of the system’s variance
σ2S .
53 A univariate measure of an institution’s interconnectedness with the system of
N financial institutions is then given by
PCAS i,n :“
nÿ
k“1
σ2i
σ2S
L2ikλk
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
hnąH
,
where PCAS i,n is the contribution of institution i to the risk of the system, and hn isřn
k“1 λkřN
k“1 λk
with a prescribed threshold H.54
The more interconnected an insurer is with the rest of the financial sector, the higher
its systemic relevance will be. We therefore expect our proxy for interconnectedness to
enter our regressions of ∆CoVaR with a significant negative sign. Similarly, we expect
interconnectedness to have a positive effect on both MES and SRISK, since being more
interconnected with the financial system exposes insurers to contagion risks from other
banks and insurers.
To proxy for the size of an insurer, we use the natural logarithm of an insurer’s total
53Following a suggestion in Billio et al. (2012), we set H “ 0.33.
54We calculate the proxy for interconnectedness using data on insurers and banks. To be precise, we
employ data on all insurance companies in our sample as well as data on all banks available from
Datastream with total assets in excess of $ 1 billion at the end of 2000. The total sample used for
estimating the interconnectedness of individual insurers comprises 1,491 banks and 253 insurers.
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assets.55 We expect insurer size to be an economically significant driver of systemic
risk. On the one hand, a larger company is less likely to suffer from cumulative losses
due to its broader range of pooled risks and better risk diversification. On the other
hand, an insurer could become more systemically relevant by being too-big-to-fail and
too-complex-to-fail (see IAIS, 2013).
Another important explanatory variable in our regressions is an insurer’s leverage
ratio. We follow Acharya et al. (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and approximate
an insurer’s leverage as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market
value of equity, divided by market value of equity. We have no prediction for the sign of
the coefficient on leverage in our regression. High leverage is a factor that incentivizes
managers into excessive risk-taking to increase a firm’s profitability.56 In contrast,
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) argue that managers of companies with high leverage
could feel pressured by investors to provide enough liquid assets to cover the payment
of interests. Consequently, a higher leverage could exert a disciplining function on
managers leading to a decrease in an insurer’s total risk.
Furthermore, we employ several other insurer- and country-specific characteristics
as control variables. We include the variable debt maturity which is defined as the
ratio of total long term debt to total debt. There exists a wide consensus among
economists and regulators that the dependence of certain banks and insurers on short-
term funding exposed these institutions to liquidity risks during the financial crisis
and ultimately led to significant systemic risks (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009,
Cummins and Weiss, 2014, Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Consequently, the IAIS has in-
cluded the ratio of the absolute sum of short-term borrowing and total assets in its
methodology as a key indicator of systemic relevance. We adopt their line of thought
but use total long-term debt instead of short term debt.
To include a proxy for an insurer’s investment success in our panel regression, we
55In our robustness checks, we use net revenues, given as the log value of an insurer’s total operating
revenue, as an alternative proxy for firm size.
56Support for this view is found by Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and
Hovakimian et al. (2012) who present empirical evidence that banks with low leverage during the
crisis performed better and had a smaller contribution to systemic risk.
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use the ratio of investment income to net revenues. It is defined as the ratio of an
insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute investment income and
absolute earned premiums. To characterize the quality of the insurance portfolio, in
our analysis we compute the insurer’s loss ratio, constructed by adding claim and loss
expenses plus long term insurance reserves and dividing by premiums earned. We
expect insurers with higher loss ratios to contribute more to systemic risk. In our
regressions, we also use an insurer’s market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value
of common equity divided by the book value of common equity.
Next, we employ the insurers’ operating expense ratio, given by the ratio of operat-
ing expenses to total assets, to control for the quality of management.57 Furthermore,
we follow the reasoning of the IAIS (2013) and control for the degree to which an
insurer engages in non-traditional and non-insurance activities. We use the variable
Other income defined as other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income.
If an insurer operates more outside the traditional insurance business, e.g., by mimick-
ing banks or becoming a central counterparty for credit derivatives, the more will it be
exposed to systemic risks from the financial sector as its interrelations with other fi-
nancial institutions increase. Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between other
income and systemic risk.
Another variable that captures the non-core activities of insurers is non-policyholder
liabilities, which is given by the total on balance-sheet liabilities divided by total in-
surance reserves. We suspect a positive correlation of non-policyholder liabilities and
systemic risk as policyholder liabilities are indicative of traditional insurance activities
(see IAIS, 2013). To proxy for an insurer’s profitability and past performance in our re-
gressions, we use the standard measures Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets
(ROA). Higher profits can act as a buffer against future losses thus shielding an insurer
against adverse effects spilling over from the financial sector. Additionally, we employ
the quarterly buy-and-hold returns on an insurer’s stock as an independent variable. It
57In our robustness checks, we also compute the operating expense ratio by dividing operating expenses
by earned premiums.
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is very likely that insurers that performed well in the past will continue to perform well
over time. However, institutions that took on too many risks in the past could also stick
to their culture of risk-taking (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and increase their exposure
and contribution to systemic risk. We therefore expect this measure to have a positive
impact on the systemic risk of insurers.
Finally, we also consider macroeconomic and country-specific variables like the
GDP growth rate (in %) and the log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. More-
over, we employ a country’s stock market turnover defined as the total value of shares
traded in a given country divided by the average market capitalization to proxy for
the development of a country’s equity market (see, e.g., Levine and Zervos, 1998,
Bartram et al., 2012).
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables we
use in our analysis.
For our full sample of life and non-life insurers, we only find limited evidence of a
systemic importance of insurers. Although weakly economically significant, insurers
had mean estimates of MES and ∆CoVaR of only 1% during our full sample period.
The summary statistics on SRISK also underline the finding that the majority of insur-
ers did not significantly contribute to the instability of the financial sector. However,
the minimum estimate of ∆CoVaR and the maximum SRISK estimate show that at
least some insurers contributed significantly to systemic risk at some point during our
sample period. Intuitively, we would expect insurers to have experienced the extreme
values of systemic relevance during the financial crisis. This intuition is proven in Fig-
ure 3.1 in which we plot the time evolution of the three systemic risk measures we use
over the course of our complete sample period.
We can see from Figure 3.1 that the mean MES is relatively constant over time,
showing a significant peak during the financial crisis. The exposure to systemic risk
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics.
The table presents descriptive statistics of the quarterly estimates of different systemic risk measures for a sample of 253 international insurers. The sample period runs
from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. Additionally, the table presents descriptive statistics for our set of explanatory variables. We report the number of observations, minimum and
maximum values, percentiles and moments. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix B.2.
Percentiles Moments
Obs Min 1th 5th 20th 80th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
MES 12,808 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.45 0.01 0.02 3.44 35.53
∆CoVaR 4,893 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -3.90 29.98
SRISK (in billions) 8,997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 2.46 12.30 42.09 166.22 2.80 8.50 7.56 81.36
Interconnectedness 11,361 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 2.37 123.99 399,010.80 386.98 8,929.08 29.26 982.91
Total assets (in billions) 10,998 0.02 0.59 1.18 29.03 61.37 331.62 865.13 2,076.19 65.63 165.79 5.40 38.05
Leverage 12,066 1.01 1.32 1.77 3.10 13.37 30.41 86.80 44,180.69 30.27 819.12 52.16 2,796.82
Debt maturity 11,104 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.32 -1.45 0.78
Foreign sales 7,131 -63.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.42 82.85 109.82 202.64 23.63 30.11 1.23 1.26
Investment success 12,065 -22.10 0.04 0.23 0.59 0.89 0.95 1.03 4.13 0.71 0.49 -34.67 1,614.19
Loss ratio 11,994 -1,717.91 3.39 38.53 64.26 109.65 196.19 770.70 8,439.29 107.48 211.37 20.09 681.64
Market-to-book 12,038 -14.10 0.26 0.55 0.91 2.27 4.16 7.49 45.12 1.78 1.67 8.32 167.10
Non-policyholder liabilities 12,025 0.56 1.01 1.05 1.12 1.70 4.78 35.67 1,144.63 4.03 35.51 21.25 524.18
Operating expenses 12,510 -0.18 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.32 0.54 0.78 1.39 0.23 0.16 2.06 7.81
Other income (in millions) 12,669 -4.87 -0.93 -0.10 -0.00 0.01 0.17 1.19 17.95 0.02 0.53 0.00 0.00
ROA 12,423 -30.22 -5.56 -1.09 0.39 3.44 6.94 10.90 38.08 1.88 3.22 1.30 30.09
Performance 12,744 -0.91 -0.43 -0.25 -0.09 0.12 0.30 0.57 10.64 0.02 0.21 11.83 559.55
Net Revenues (in billions) 10,954 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.73 11.40 44.61 105.30 172.37 9.70 19.15 3.95 18.57
ROE 9,853 -77.86 -66.22 -6.84 5.66 16.29 25.82 34.29 36.69 10.16 12.84 -3.39 19.27
GDP Growth 12,598 -8.54 -5.49 -3.11 0.81 4.10 5.54 9.30 14.78 2.21 2.57 -0.45 2.25
Inflation 12,598 -14.45 -2.22 -1.20 0.88 3.12 6.01 8.86 27.57 2.15 2.16 1.49 12.38
Stock market turnover 12,648 0.15 1.99 6.80 63.14 189.07 348.58 404.07 404.07 130.21 85.64 1.17 1.78
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Figure 3.1: Time evolution of the systemic risk measures for the period from 2000 to
2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES),
SRISK, and ∆CoVaR over our full sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253
international life and non-life insurers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure (black line)
is plotted against the corresponding 10% and 90% percent quantiles (grey lines). All variables and data
sources are defined in Appendix B.2.
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during this peak, however, is highly economically significant with insurers, on aver-
age, suffering losses of 5% on their stocks on those days the market plummeted. Some
insurers were hit even harder with MES estimates of up to 10%. The second plot
for our estimates of the insurers’ ∆CoVaR shows a similar picture. The contribution to
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systemic risk by insurers was low to non-existent until 2007 when both mean and mini-
mum ∆CoVaR estimates decreased dramatically. After the crisis, the average ∆CoVaR
of insurers increased again showing that the average contribution of insurers to sys-
temic risk was again limited. This result is corroborated by the plot of the insurers’
SRISK estimates.58
Although the summary statistics for our full sample yield some instructive infor-
mation on our sample, some of our variables differ significantly for life and non-life
insurers. To get a better understanding of the composition of our sample, we therefore
split our sample into life and non-life insurers and compare selected summary statistics
across both lines of business. The resulting summary statistics and tests of the equality
of sample means are presented in Table 3.2. Summary statistics are given separately
for our full sample period in Panel A and for the sub-sample of the quarters during the
financial crisis in Panel B.
In Panel A of Table 3.2, we compare the values of the systemic risk measures to-
gether with the three main (presumed) determinants of systemic risk (size, leverage,
and interconnectedness) for the life and non-life insurers in our sample.
We can see from both Table 3.2 that the means of the variables differ substantially
for life and non-life insurers. First, both the mean estimates of MES and ∆CoVaR
are higher for life insurers than for non-life insurers. In contrast, on average, non-life
insurers have significantly higher SRISK estimates than life insurers. These differences
are statistically significant although the absolute levels of the average contribution and
exposure to systemic risk are again not economically significant (at least not across our
full panel).59
Concerning the potential drivers of systemic risk in insurance, the univariate analysis
58Further summary statistics for our explanatory variables given in Table 3.1 show that the average
interconnectedness of the insurers in our sample is limited. Some insurers, however, are strongly
interconnected with the rest of the global insurance sector. Most notably, AIG, AON, AXA, Genworth,
and MunichRe are above the 99% quantile of our interconnectedness variable. The average size of a
sample insurer is ca. $ 65 billion. Note that our sample includes both very small (5% quantile: $ 1.2
billion) and very large insurers (95% quantile: $ 331.6 billion).
59Furthermore, the differences in the mean SRISK and ∆CoVaR estimates are most likely due to the
different sizes of the samples for which both measures can be computed.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: life and non-life insurer.
The table compares the characteristics of insurers in the life insurance sector relative to those in the non-life sector. Our sample consists of 253 international insurers (listed
in Appendix B.1) and covers the period from Q1 2000 to Q4 2012 (Panel A) and from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 (Panel B). We report the minimum, maximum, mean, 5%-
and 95%-quantiles, and the standard deviation of the variables. The equality of means of the different variables is tested using Welch’s t test for unequal sample sizes and
possibly unequal variances of the two samples. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix B.2. ***,**,* denote estimates that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Non-life Life
No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev. No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev. t-statistic
Panel A: Q1 2000 - Q4 2012
MES 6,386 -0.082 0.003 0.014 0.019 0.452 0.020 4,991 -0.047 0.004 0.016 0.023 0.304 0.020 -7.274***
∆CoVaR 2,272 -0.119 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 0.001 0.010 1,582 -0.089 -0.010 -0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.010 2.331**
SRISK (in billions) 5,150 0.000 0.103 3.210 1.718 1.662 10.280 3,847 0.000 0.108 2.242 1.836 79.23 5.190 5.842***
Interconnectedness 6,462 0.000 0.000 679.690 0.100 399,010.800 11,831.450 4,899 0.000 0.000 0.879 0.095 350.900 9.680 4.612***
Total assets (in billions) 6,180 0.02 2.75 43.00 24.13 1,483.00 134.65 4,818 0.11 7.22 94.66 93.28 2,076.00 194.91 -15.71***
Leverage 5,974 1.01 2.89 16.01 8.61 7,100.00 200.04 4,588 1.25 6.25 56.52 16.22 44,180.00 1,308.26 -2.08**
Panel B: Q3 2008 - Q2 2009
MES 520 -0.032 0.012 0.034 0.049 0.195 0.031 388 -0.032 0.009 0.040 0.059 0.227 0.039 -2.591***
∆CoVaR 109 -0.100 -0.021 -0.018 -0.006 -0.001 0.017 84 -0.089 -0.024 -0.020 -0.009 -0.003 0.019 0.957
SRISK (in millions) 369 0.000 0.440 5.988 4.863 88.650 13.040 262 0.000 0.376 4.970 5.156 79.230 9.330 1.144
Interconnectedness 529 0.000 0.000 773.100 0.070 294,900.000 13,698.390 405 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.205 0.098 202.800 10.710
Total assets (in billions) 443 0.16 3.63 47.89 27.45 1476.00 143.59 328 0.73 12.38 126.30 125.90 2,076.00 248.28 -5.12***
Leverage 443 1.32 3.02 11.67 9.88 210.60 23.42 322 1.50 7.18 297.00 22.93 44,180.00 3,475.01 -1.47
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given in Table 3.2 shows that non-life insurers are, on average, slightly more intercon-
nected but are significantly smaller and less levered than life insurers. Non-life insurers
have mean total assets of $ 43 billion while life insurers are significantly larger with
mean total assets of $ 94.66 billion. The leverage of the average non-life insurer is 16
whereas the average life insurer has a leverage 56. Although the mean estimates are
again distorted in part by the presence of few extreme outliers, the quantiles presented
in Table 3.2 underline the finding that life insurer are significantly larger and more
levered.
Before turning to our panel regression analysis of the systemic relevance of global
insurers, we shortly comment on the subset of nine Global Systemically Important
Insurers (G-SIIs) as identified by the Financial Stability Board in July 2013. In Table
3.3, we repeat our analysis of the summary statistics of our systemic risk measures and
selected explanatory variables for the nine G-SIIs.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for main variables of interest: Global Systemically
Important Insurers.
This table shows the respective descriptive statistics for the nine global systemically important insurers
(G-SIIs) as defined by the international association of insurance supervisors (IAIS) in the period from
Q1 2000 to Q4 2012 (Panel A) and from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 (Panel B). The nine G-SIIs are Allianz,
American International Group, Assicurazioni Generali, Aviva, Axa, MetLife, Ping An Insurance
(Group) Company of China, Prudential Financial and Prudential. All variables and data sources are
defined in Appendix B.2.
G-SIIs
No. obs. Min 25% Mean 75% Max St. dev.
Panel A: Q1 2000 - Q4 2012
MES 434 -0.001 0.011 0.028 0.035 0.452 0.031
∆CoVaR 249 -0.119 -0.014 -0.011 -0.004 0.000 0.012
SRISK (in billions) 378 0.000 2.065 18.209 27.387 125.494 21.956
Interconnectedness 460 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.094 30.800 1.785
Total assets (in billions) 424 24.55 293.00 521.20 730.90 1483.00 315.38
Leverage 416 1.36 3.71 10.69 14.67 55.08 10.76
Panel B: Q3 2008 - Q2 2009
MES 36 0.000 0.035 0.065 0.090 0.169 0.042
∆CoVaR 20 -0.100 -0.039 -0.028 -0.012 -0.008 0.025
SRISK (in billions) 28 0.037 6.544 25.198 36.902 79.229 24.351
Interconnectedness 32 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.037 0.850 0.239
Total assets (in billions) 32 107.80 438.20 615.00 844.80 1476.20 330.19
Leverage 32 2.918 16.909 42.930 32.141 210.612 62.609
During our full sample period, the nine G-SIIs had average MES and ∆CoVaR es-
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timates that did not significantly differ from those of insurers that were not deemed
to be systemically important by the Financial Stability Board. However, global sys-
temically important insurers had a significantly higher mean SRISK than insurers in
our full sample. Most importantly, however, average estimates for the three systemic
risk measures of G-SIIs increased significantly during the financial crisis as shown in
Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Time evolution of systemic risk measures for (systemically relevant)
insurers for the period from 2000 to 2012.
This figure plots the evolution of the systemic risk measures Marginal Expected Shortfalls (MES),
SRISK, and ∆CoVaR over a sample period from 2000 to 2012. The sample consists of 253 interna-
tional life and non-life insurers. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure in each quarter is
given for a sample of 253 international insurers (yellow shaded area) and for the nine insurers identified
as global systemically important by the IAIS (2013) (black bars). All data are winsorized at the 1%
level. Variables and data sources are defined in Appendix B.2.
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As expected, G-SIIs, on average also had significantly higher total assets and were
more interconnected. Interestingly, the mean leverage of the nine G-SIIs was lower
than the leverage of both the average life and non-life insurer in our full sample. Not
surprisingly, all variables are on average significantly higher during the crisis than in
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our full sample. Again, however, these univariate results for our full sample period do
not take into account the (possibly strong) correlations between size, interconnected-
ness, and leverage.
3.3 The determinants of systemic risk of insurers
In this section, we investigate the question which factors determine an insurer’s contri-
bution and exposure to systemic risk. First, we comment on the results of our baseline
panel regressions. Afterwards, we report and comment the results of various robust-
ness checks.
3.3.1 Panel regressions
Based on the findings from our univariate analysis, we now perform a multivariate
panel regression analysis of our sample of international insurers. In particular, we
intend to test the hypothesis that systemic risk in insurance is predominantly driven by
an insurer’s size, its leverage, and its interconnectedness with the rest of the insurance
sector. In our baseline setting, we perform several panel regressions with the three
systemic risk measures introduced in Section 3.2 as our dependent variables. The set
of independent variables includes both the set of key features of systemic relevance as
proposed by the IAIS (2013) and various control variables as outlined in Section 3.2.3
and Table B.2. The econometric strategy we use is illustrated below.
S ystemicRiski,t “ β0 ` β1 ¨ Interconnectednessi,t´1 ` β2 ¨ Leveragei,t´2
` β3 ¨ Total assetsi,t´2 ` Ω ¨ Insurer controlsi,t´2
` Θ ¨Country controlsi,t´1 ` εi,t,
(3.1)
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer
i in quarter t and Insurer controlsi,t´2 as well as Country controlsi,t´1 are various firm-
specific and country-specific control variables, respectively. To mitigate the possibility
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of reverse causality between our dependent and explanatory variables driving our re-
sults, we lag all explanatory variables based on accounting statements by two quarters.
The interconnectedness measure and country controls are lagged by one quarter. Fur-
thermore, we perform separate regressions for life and non-life insurers to account for
systematic differences in accounting in different lines of insurance business. In addi-
tion, we estimate all panel regressions with clustered standard errors on the country
level and with insurer- and time-fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
The results of our baseline regressions are presented in Table 3.4.
Starting with regressions (1) and (2) of the insurers’ ∆CoVaR, we can see that nei-
ther the life insurers’ interconnectedness nor their size is a significant driver of the
contribution to systemic risk. This first finding is in striking contrast to the hypotheses
formulated by the IAIS on the pivotal role of size and interconnectedness for an in-
surer’s systemic importance. For the leverage of a firm, we find that leverage enters the
regressions with a negative sign. Our results suggest that the more levered a life insurer
is, the more it contributes to the system’s fragility. This result is statistically significant
at the 10%- and 1% level, respectively. Furthermore, the effect is also economically
significant. For life insurers, an increase in leverage by one standard deviation leads
to a decrease of -13% in ∆CoVaR (1308.26 ˆ -0.0001) whereas for non-life insurers,
such an increase is associated with an increase in the contribution to systemic risk by
4% (200.04 ˆ -0.0002). Our result implies that the use of high leverage in the insur-
ance business therefore decreases the value of ∆CoVaR and consequently increases a
non-life insurer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Next, we report the results of our regressions (3) and (4) of the insurers’ Marginal
Expected Shortfall as the dependent variable. Interestingly, we find a positive rela-
tion between the interconnectedness of a non-life insurer and its exposure to systemic
risk spilling over from the insurance sector. We thus conclude that being highly inter-
connected does not necessarily lead to a significantly higher contribution to systemic
fragility, but rather to a higher exposure to adverse spillover effects. Additionally,
leverage enters both regressions for life and non-life insurers with a statistically and
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Table 3.4: Baseline panel regressions.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures
for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control vari-
ables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered
standard errors on the country level. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t “ β0 ` β1 ¨ Interconnectednessi,t´1 ` β2 ¨ Leveragei,t´2 ` β3 ¨ Total assetsi,t´2
` Ω ¨ Insurer controlsi,t´2 ` Θ ¨Country controlsi,t´1 ` εi,t,
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t
and Insurer controlsi,t´2 as well as Country controlsi,t´1 are various firm-specific and country-specific
control variables. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers
and 141 international non-life insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. P-values are reported
in parentheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters
and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data
sources are provided in Table B.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 11.6000 2.6100*** -11.7000 0.0078** -2132.9000 7.0100**
(0.728) (0.002) (0.308) (0.011) (0.556) (0.047)
Total assets -0.0030 0.0005 0.0049* -0.0004 1.0075* 5.5704**
(0.216) (0.568) (0.051) (0.820) (0.094) (0.016)
Leverage -0.0001* -0.0002*** 0.0002* 0.0004*** -0.0072 -0.1228***
(0.056) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) (0.443) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0019 0.0009 0.0754 -3.1216*
(0.403) (0.485) (0.309) (0.580) (0.837) (0.097)
Investment success 0.0008 -0.0067 -0.0049*** 0.0091 -0.4141 -2.1429
(0.652) (0.281) (0.004) (0.221) (0.434) (0.484)
Loss ratio -0.0057 0.0462* -0.0018 0.0006 0.0544 -1.5115
(0.183) (0.067) (0.128) (0.898) (0.666) (0.156)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0005* 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0002 0.1047 0.0943
(0.096) (0.348) (0.177) (0.155) (0.176) (0.486)
Non-policyholder liabilities -0.1759** 0.1890** -0.0022 -0.0424 -4.2576*** 14.8805
(0.030) (0.035) (0.637) (0.376) (0.003) (0.611)
Operating expenses -0.0291** -0.0041 0.0253** 0.0155* -1.9027 14.5905
(0.034) (0.304) (0.022) (0.050) (0.437) (0.101)
Other income -0.6770 0.0184 1.4500 -0.0290 267.000 523.000
(0.226) (0.875) (0.441) (0.947) (0.521) (0.461)
ROA 0.2000 0.0405 0.1811 0.0467 15.8181 156.7285
(0.649) (0.802) (0.512) (0.820) (0.693) (0.147)
Performance -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.3072 0.1843
(0.409) (0.471) (0.158) (0.966) (0.165) (0.726)
GDP growth 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0796 -0.0908
(0.150) (0.365) (0.516) (0.499) (0.150) (0.424)
Inflation -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0011*** -0.0269 -0.2008*
(0.397) (0.750) (0.074) (0.002) (0.648) (0.051)
Stock market turnover 0.0023 -0.0108 0.0460*** 0.0452*** 1.9347 26.7704***
(0.801) (0.225) (0.008) (0.003) (0.520) (0.000)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 925 1,333 2,658 3,569 2,508 3,426
Adj. R2 0.5865 0.5752 0.4422 0.4225 0.2040 0.1412
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economically significant positive sign. In our regressions, a one standard deviation
increase in the leverage of life insurers is associated with a 26.1% higher MES and
therefore an increase of an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk (1308.26 ˆ 0.0002).
For comparison, a one standard deviation increase in the leverage of a non-life insurer
is associated with an 8% increase in MES (200.04 ˆ 0.0004). In line with our expec-
tation, higher leverage thus appears to significantly increase an insurer’s exposure to
systemic risk. Higher operating to total assets ratios are associated with a higher MES
of insurers.
Finally, in model specifications (5) and (6), we employ the insurers’ SRISK as
the dependent variable. Underlining our previous findings from the regressions of
∆CoVaR, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that the contribution of insurers to
systemic risk is significantly affected by the interconnectedness of an individual life
insurer within financial system. For non-life insurers, we again find leverage to have a
mitigating effect on systemic risk with the effect being both statistically and economi-
cally significant. However, in contrast to our previous regressions, insurer size is now
statistically and economically significantly related to the SRISK of insurers. For the
life insurers in our sample, we find an increase of total assets to be associated with
an increase in SRISK of approx. 196 million (194.91 ˆ 1.0075). For non-life insur-
ers, we find the economic significance of size to be even larger with a one standard
deviation increase in size being associated with an increase in SRISK by approx. 750
million (134.65 ˆ 5.5704). These findings for SRISK have to be taken with careful
consideration, however, since the adjusted R-squared in the regressions of SRISK is
considerably lower than in the regressions of MES and ∆CoVaR.
3.3.2 Additional analyses
The results of our baseline regressions have produced only weak evidence that size, in-
terconnectedness, and leverage are fundamental drivers of systemic risk in insurance.
To get a deeper understanding of the relation between idiosyncratic insurer character-
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istics and systemic risk, we perform several additional analyses in this subsection.
First, we examine the question whether the exposure and contribution of large in-
surers to systemic risk are driven by different factors than the systemic risk measures
of insurers in our full sample. To this end, we restrict our sample to insurer-quarter
observations of institutions in the top 75% quantile of total assets. The motivation be-
hind our analysis is that the relation between some of our explanatory variables and
the systemic risk of an insurer might be mitigated or exacerbated by the insurer’s size.
The results for the regression using insurers in the top total assets quartile only are
presented in Table 3.5.
Several of the results from our baseline regressions carry over to our analysis of
large insurers. For example, the inferences for the insurers’ leverage remain more or
less unchanged. Higher leverage increases both the contribution and the exposure of
large life and non-life insurers to systemic risk. While leverage is positively related to
the purely equity-based measures of systemic risk, we find a significant negative corre-
lation between leverage and SRISK as our third measure of systemic risk. However, in
regression (2) in Table 3.5 we find one striking difference. In contrast to our baseline
regressions, the interconnectedness of an insurer is now positively related to its con-
tribution to systemic risk. An increased interconnectedness of large insurers induces
more contribution to overall systemic risk. This is intuitive, since an interconnected
insurance company could possibly contribute to systemic risk, but only if it is relevant
or large enough to have devastating effects through a default. Similarly to the analysis
of our full sample, insurer size is significant in the regression of the SRISK of non-life
insurers. Furthermore, and in line with our expectation, we find higher loss ratios to be
positively associated with the contribution of large insurers to systemic risk.
Next, we address the question whether the drivers of systemic risk in insurance differ
across countries. In fact, it is very possible that insurance companies and even whole
sectors function in a different way than their counterparts in foreign countries. Even
more importantly, insurance regulation differs substantially from country to country.
Although we control for these systematic differences by the use of country-fixed ef-
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Table 3.5: Panel regressions - Large insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures
for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic relevance and various control vari-
ables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered
standard errors on the country level. The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t “ β0 ` β1 ¨ Interconnectednessi,t´1 ` β2 ¨ Leveragei,t´2 ` β3 ¨ Total assetsi,t´2
` Ω ¨ Insurer controlsi,t´2 ` Θ ¨Country controlsi,t´1 ` εi,t,
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t
and Insurer controlsi,t´2 as well as Country controlsi,t´1 are various firm-specific and country-specific
control variables. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 112 international life insurers
and 141 international non-life insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to Q4 2012. In contrast to
our baseline setting, in these regressions, we only use insurer-quarters of insurers in the top total
assets quartile. P-values are reported in parantheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting
statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one
quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table B.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted
R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 1.1058 -0.2942** 0.0017 0.4796 0.3641 -205.6195
(0.179) (0.023) (0.120) (0.112) (0.337) (0.500)
Total assets -0.0008 -0.0037 0.0016 -0.0026 4.6792 11.8426***
(0.885) (0.117) (0.626) (0.415) (0.122) (0.000)
Leverage 0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** -0.0616 -0.0758**
(0.297) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.242) (0.047)
Debt maturity -0.0032 0.0032 -0.0007 -0.0082 -1.3610 -19.8851
(0.243) (0.292) (0.867) (0.208) (0.330) (0.105)
Investment success -0.0114 -0.0347** 0.0174 0.0232 3.8998 -20.3975**
(0.212) (0.032) (0.147) (0.418) (0.380) (0.023)
Loss ratio -0.1341** -0.0751* -0.0090** 0.0359 0.0280 1.9320
(0.022) (0.097) (0.028) (0.362) (0.987) (0.892)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0026** -0.0013 0.0004 0.0021 -0.4833 8.5890*
(0.011) (0.447) (0.605) (0.547) (0.294) (0.065)
Non-policyholder liabilities 0.4520 -0.9806 0.0398 -0.1975 10.0329 -59.2137
(0.685) (0.306) (0.341) (0.800) (0.367) (0.877)
Operating expenses 0.0220 -0.0730*** 0.0331** 0.0722 14.8526 79.9298*
(0.482) (0.004) (0.025) (0.119) (0.165) (0.056)
Other income 3.4200*** 0.0539 0.4310 0.1690 3670.0000*** -504.0000
(0.003) (0.767) (0.872) (0.774) (0.004) (0.306)
ROA -0.6000* -0.7000 0.5000* 2.0000* 167.0000 993.2000**
(0.078) (0.183) (0.099) (0.070) (0.290) (0.038)
Performance -0.0046** 0.0047** -0.0081** -0.0147*** -0.9752 -2.4596
(0.037) (0.024) (0.013) (0.005) (0.132) (0.298)
GDP growth 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.2241 -0.6056
(0.984) (0.421) (0.233) (0.837) (0.115) (0.337)
Inflation -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0007 0.6069** 0.7485
(0.465) (0.120) (0.415) (0.670) (0.019) (0.494)
Stock market turnover -0.0184 -0.0392** 0.0194 0.0629* -8.2560 68.5784***
(0.167) (0.027) (0.315) (0.055) (0.185) (0.002)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 377 296 858 560 843 554
Adj. R2 0.630 0.840 0.556 0.512 0.300 0.395
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fects in our robustness checks, it is nevertheless instructive to analyze these country
differences in the relation between systemic risk and the insurers’ idiosyncratic char-
acteristics in more detail. Our sample is composed of 95 insurers with headquarters
located in the United States and 158 insurers from other countries. To analyze the dif-
ferential drivers of systemic risk, we estimate separate panel regressions for U.S. and
non-U.S. insurers. The results are given in Table 3.6.
For U.S. non-based life insurers, interconnectedness enters the regression of
∆CoVaR with a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1% level while
for non-U.S. insurers it is significant for both lines of business. On the other hand,
interconnectedness seems to slightly increase the values of SRISK for non-life insur-
ers in the U.S. and for life insurers outside the United States. These mixed findings
indicate no clear trend on the impact of our interconnectedness measure on the contri-
bution of insurers to systemic risk. With the exception of the regressions of the SRISK
estimates of non-life insurers outside the U.S., total assets is not a statistically signif-
icant determinant of systemic risk. In contrast, leverage is significantly related to the
exposure to systemic risk of non-life insurers (U.S. and non-U.S.) and life insurers
(only non-U.S.). Our results suggest that the impact of leverage on the exposure and
contribution of systemic risk does not vary across countries or lines of business.
Finally, we investigate the question whether our results change significantly if we
restrict our sample to the time period of the financial crisis. In particular, we hypoth-
esize that size, interconnectedness, and leverage might only have been key drivers of
systemic risk in insurance during the financial crisis. To this end, in Table 3.7, we re-
peat our previous baseline regressions but restrict our sample to a smaller time period
covering the period from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010 (i.e., the time around and during the
financial crisis).
This time, we find no statistically significant impact of interconnectedness on any of
the systemic risk measures. Again, insurer size does not appear to be systematically
related to systemic risk of insurers except for SRISK of non-life insurers where we,
again, find a positive relation. While the signs of the coefficients for leverage remain
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Table 3.6: Panel regressions for U.S. and non-U.S. insurers.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic
relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered standard errors on the country level.
The estimated model is:
S ystemicRiski,t “ β0 ` β1 ¨ Interconnectednessi,t´1 ` β2 ¨ Leveragei,t´2 ` β3 ¨ Total assetsi,t´2
` Ω ¨ Insurer controlsi,t´2 ` Θ ¨Country controlsi,t´1 ` εi,t,
where S ystemicRiski,t is the value of one of the three systemic risk measures for insurer i in quarter t and Insurer controlsi,t´2 as well as Country controlsi,t´1 are various
firm-specific and country-specific control variables. The samples include insurer-quarter observations of 95 U.S. and 158 non-U.S. insurers over the time period Q1 2000 to
Q4 2012. P-values are reported in parentheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country
control are lagged by one quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table B.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted R-squared.
US Non-US
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
Interconnectedness 34.3000 2.8900*** -129.6 0.0072* 645.1000 5.4200* 2.8900*** -6.1100** 0.0072* 0.6020 5.4200* -142.4000
(0.470) (0.000) (0.295) (0.085) (0.810) (0.064) (0.000) (0.041) (0.085) (0.771) (0.064) (0.833)
Total assets 0.0005 0.0026 0.0070 -0.0021 0.9090 1.6734 0.0026 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0012 1.6734 6.1613**
(0.952) (0.126) (0.105) (0.340) (0.272) (0.124) (0.126) (0.919) (0.340) (0.555) (0.124) (0.021)
Leverage 0.0002 -0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0020 -0.1180*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.0006** -0.1180*** 0.0368
(0.545) (0.000) (0.537) (0.000) (0.822) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.573)
Other control varialbes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 258 812 723 1,917 678 1,807 812 521 1,917 1,652 1,807 1,619
Adj. R2 0.589 0.574 0.452 0.540 0.379 0.221 0.574 0.689 0.540 0.377 0.221 0.195
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Table 3.7: Panel regressions for the crisis period.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly systemic risk of international insurers on
key indicators of systemic relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated
with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with clustered standard errors country level. The conceptual
approach is the following:
S ystemicRiski,t “ β0 ` β1 ¨ Interconnectednessi,t´1 ` β2 ¨ Leveragei,t´2 ` β3 ¨ Total assetsi,t´2
` Ω ¨ Insurer controlsi,t´2 ` Θ ¨Country controlsi,t´1 ` εi,t,
The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 253 international insurers over the time period Q1
2006 to Q4 2010. P-values are reported in parantheses. All insurer characteristics based on accounting
statements are lagged by two quarters and Interconnectedness and country control are lagged by one
quarter. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table B.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is adjusted
R-squared.
Dependent variable: ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES SRISK SRISK
Sample: Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interconnectedness 0.6409 0.0405 -0.0316 -0.0316 29.8448 -2.2579
(0.252) (0.920) (0.962) (0.377) (0.833) (0.851)
Total assets -0.0192 0.0042 -0.0001 -0.0072 3.9042 6.9138**
(0.269) (0.539) (0.994) (0.537) (0.214) (0.016)
Leverage 0.0002 -0.0003*** 0.0005 0.0006*** 0.2112 -0.0841***
(0.480) (0.000) (0.254) (0.000) (0.180) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0146 -0.0049 0.0015 0.0061 -2.0916 1.1335
(0.226) (0.274) (0.774) (0.251) (0.547) (0.684)
Investment success -0.0281 -0.0585** -0.0127 -0.0016 -6.1390 -0.5964
(0.316) (0.020) (0.555) (0.722) (0.439) (0.581)
Loss ratio -0.0595 0.0016 0.0342 0.0004 -9.6110* -1.0701*
(0.432) (0.979) (0.298) (0.941) (0.062) (0.057)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -1.4385 -0.0573
(0.686) (0.732) (0.930) (0.754) (0.305) (0.471)
Non-policyholder liabilities -10.8000*** -1.7117 0.5478 -0.1793 -702.6164 13.0993
(0.001) (0.233) (0.764) (0.340) (0.370) (0.787)
Operating expenses 0.0157*** -0.0061 0.0031 0.0187 5.1510 -1.1348
(0.005) (0.476) (0.820) (0.316) (0.538) (0.796)
Other income 14.3000 1.8100 -15.8000 0.2190 -130.0000 60.0000**
(0.224) (0.429) (0.182) (0.970) (0.597) (0.021)
ROA -0.9207 -3.4268** 0.3275 0.5115 77.5754 67.3172
(0.776) (0.023) (0.549) (0.559) (0.628) (0.422)
Performance -0.0091** -0.0031 0.0088 0.0004 2.4556** 4.7450
(0.024) (0.294) (0.356) (0.947) (0.046) (0.180)
GDP growth 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 0.1959 0.3530
(0.770) (0.753) (0.243) (0.328) (0.373) (0.517)
Inflation 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0024 0.2310 -0.4832*
(0.656) (0.107) (0.801) (0.143) (0.320) (0.058)
Stock market turnover 0.0085 -0.0319* 0.0667** 0.0590** 4.2736 34.6236**
(0.679) (0.068) (0.018) (0.035) (0.654) (0.012)
Insurer-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 239 387 788 379 772
Adj. R2 0.787 0.847 0.575 0.470 0.244 0.155
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the same, we only find a statistically significant impact on systemic risk for non-life
insurers. The economic significance of this effect is, however, moderate with a one
standard deviation increase in leverage causing a change of almost minus one percent
in ∆CoVaR during the crisis period (23.42 ˆ -0.0003). In the cross-section of non-life
insurers’ MES during the crisis period, a one standard deviation increase in leverage is
associated with an 1.4% higher exposure to systemic risk (23.42 ˆ 0.0006).
3.3.3 Insurers and the systemic risk in the financial sector
While we have investigated the factors influencing the marginal systemic risk of insur-
ers at the micro-level, we have not yet addressed the overall level of systemic risk that
emanates from the insurance sector (and its possible macroeconomic consequences).
In our final analysis, we therefore employ a macro-level measure of systemic risk
to capture the insurance sector’s propensity to cause real macroeconomic downturns.
More, specifically, we employ the CATFIN measure introduced by Allen et al. (2012)
and compare their results with the CATFIN measure estimated for our sample of in-
surers. CATFIN is defined as the average of three Value-at-Risk estimates of monthly
stock returns in excess of the 1-month treasury bill rate. We fit the Generalized Pareto
Distribution and the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution to generate Value-at-Risk
estimates from the cross-section of our insurers’ monthly stock returns at the 99%
level. Additionally, the third estimate is from the cross-sectional 1% sample quantile.
The resulting CATFIN measures are plotted in Figure 3.3 for the time period 07/2001
to 12/2012.
From the figure, we can see that the time evolution of the two time series of CATFIN
estimates are very similar, but vary in magnitude. Before the crisis, the estimated index
values are closely together until the beginning of the crisis. While the insurer CATFIN
peaks at around 60% in the beginning of 2009, the original estimates from Allen et al.
(2012) reach a maximum of over 70%. The monthly values for the original CATFIN
index seem to be higher than the insurer CATFIN for the most part after the crisis.
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Figure 3.3: Time evolution of CATFIN.
This figure plots the time evolution of the CATFIN measure introduced in Allen et al. (2012). CATFIN
is calculated by averaging the three Value-at-Risk estimates from the Generalized Pareto Distribution,
the Skewed Generalized Error Distribution, and the nonparametric sample quantiles for the cross-
section of stock returns of financial institutions in excess of the 1-month treasury bill rate. The red
line represents the CATFIN measure for the cross section of insurers in our sample and the black line
is the original CATFIN measure calculated in Allen et al. (2012) taken from the authors’ website at
http://faculty.msb.edu/tgb27/workingpapers.html. The sample used for calculating the CATFIN of the
insurance sector consists of 253 international life and non-life insurers.
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Despite the small difference in the magnitude of the peaks of both CATFIN time series,
the plot in Figure 3.3 underlines the finding that the overall level of systemic risk in
the insurance sector was significant and high, especially during the crisis. However,
another important insight from Figure 3.3 is that the overall level of systemic risk in
the insurance sector fails to predict economic downturns, since insurer stocks seem to
lag behind the overall financial sector.
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3.3.4 Robustness checks
We also estimate regressions in which we employ alternative measures of an insurer’s
size (net revenues instead of total assets), profitability (ROE instead of ROA) and in-
vestment activity (ratio of the insurers investment income to net revenues instead of
the ratio of the insurers absolute investment income to the sum of absolute investment
income and absolute earned premiums), respectively. Additional regressions using the
beta of an insurer’s stock yield no change in our results. As mentioned before, we also
replace total assets with premiums earned in the calculation of our variable operating
expenses. However, our previous conclusions remain valid.
Next, it could be argued that our results are driven by the specific manner in which
we estimate the Marginal Expected Shortfall and the other systemic risk measures. To
control for this potential bias, we recalculate MES and ∆CoVaR using three alternative
indexes. To be precise, we employ the World DS Full Lin Insurer Index, the MSCI
World Banks Index and the MSCI World Insurance Index taken from Datastream. The
results show that our conclusions remain unchanged.
Another potential concern with our analysis could be that some of the insurers in
our sample might in fact just be locally rather than internationally active market partic-
ipants. Consequently, the presence of local insurers in our sample could bias our results
on systemic risk as the systemic relevance of locally active insurers should generally
lower than for globally important insurers. However, we believe that the inclusion of
locally active insurers in the context of our analysis is sensible for the following rea-
sons. First, we cannot rule out the possibility that insurers with insurance activities in
only their home country contribute to global systemic risk due to off-balance sheet and
non-insurance activities. Second, sheer size and relevance in an insurer’s home country
might be enough to destabilize a nation’s economy and thus cause global financial sta-
bility.60 Nevertheless, we perform an additional robustness check in which we include
in our baseline regressions the variable Foreign sales, which is the ratio of an insurer’s
60The anecdotal evidence of the inclusion of the Ping An Insurance Group in the list of the nine G-SIIs
underlines this notion.
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international sales to its total sales, to control for business activities abroad. Including
this factor does neither change our main results, nor is the variable significant in any
of the regressions.
Additionally, we employ GMM-sys regressions (see Blundell and Bond, 1998) that
include one lag of our dependent variables and explanatory variables lagged by one
quarter. In these regressions, double-lagged values of the insurer characteristics are
used as instruments for estimation. In doing so, we mitigate concerns on possible
endogeneity in our regression models. Our main results, however, remain valid.
Finally, we winsorize all data at the 1% and 99% quantiles to minimize a possible
bias due to outliers and reestimate all our regressions using winsorized data. The
results of these alternative regressions are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
those reported in the paper.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the exposure and contribution of 253 international life and
non-life insurers to global systemic risk in the period from 2000 to 2012. As our main
result, we find systemic risk in the international insurance sector to be small in com-
parison to previous findings in the literature for banks in our full sample. During the
financial crisis, however, insurers did contribute significantly to the instability of the
financial sector. Further, we conclude that systemic risk of insurers is determined by
various factors including an insurer’s interconnectedness and leverage, the magnitudes
and significances of these effects, however, differ depending on the systemic risk mea-
sure used and with the analyzed insurer line and geographic region. Most interestingly,
we find the interconnectedness of large insurers with the insurance sector to be a signif-
icant driver of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of
insurers to systemic risk appears to be driven by (among others) leverage, loss ratios,
and the insurer’s funding fragility.
Our results also show that life insurers do not contribute significantly more to global
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systemic risk than non-life insurers. In addition, there seems to be little difference in
the interconnectedness of life and non-life insurers. In our study, we find no convinc-
ing evidence in support of the hypothesis that insurer size is a fundamental driver of
the contribution of an insurer to systemic risk. In contrast to the banking sector, we
show that the insurance sector predominantly suffers from being exposed to systemic
risk, rather than adding to the financial system’s fragility. Finally, our study reveals
that both the systemic risk exposure and the contribution of international insurers were
limited prior to the financial crisis with all measures of systemic risk increasing signifi-
cantly during the crisis. In contrast to the banking sector, however, systemic risk in the
insurance sector does not appear to lead but rather follow macroeconomic downturns
as evidenced by our analysis of the insurers’ CATFIN estimates.
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Chapter 4
Size is Everything: Explaining SIFI
Designations
4.1 Introduction
At the climax of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, American International Group (AIG)
became the first international insurer that required (and ultimately received) a bailout
as regulators considered AIG to be too systemically important to default. At the time,
AIG’s near-collapse came to the surprise of most analysts and financial economists as
systemic risk was considered to be a problem confined to banking, but not insurance.
As a response to this wakeup-call, regulators have recently started to realign the reg-
ulation of international insurance companies towards a macroprudential supervision.
Most prominently, on July 18, 2013, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in collabo-
ration with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) published a
list of nine Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) which will ultimately face
higher capital and loss absorbency requirements. In essence, regulators deem insurers
to be globally systemically important in the views of regulators if they are of such size
and global interconnectedness that their default would trigger severe adverse effects on
the financial sector. Previously, in November 2011, the FSB had similarly identified
a set of 29 banks as Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs).
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However, the validity of these classifications and the actual determinants of the deci-
sion of regulators to designate a financial institution as global systemically important
remain relatively unknown.
Until the financial crisis, economists had never expected systemic risks to arise from
the insurance sector. In contrast to banking, insurance companies are not vulnerable to
runs by customers and thus are not subject to sudden shortages in liquidity. Although
theoretically, one could think of runs on life insurance policies, there has not been a
single example in history for such a run to take place and cause systemwide defaults
of insurers (see, e.g., Eling and Pankoke, 2014).61 Furthermore, even the largest inter-
national insurers are significantly smaller in size, less interconnected, and hold more
capital (see Harrington, 2009) than the largest global banks. In light of this, the case
of AIG seems to have been a major exception to the rule that insurers do not cause
systemic risks.
As insurers do not accept customer deposits, they do not face the risk of a sudden
shortage in liquidity due to a bank run. In addition, insurers in contrast to banks often
rely more strongly on long-term liabilities thus further decreasing their exposure to
liquidity risk. Furthermore, insurers are said to be less interconnected than banks re-
sulting in a lower probability of contagion among insurers (see Bell and Keller, 2009).
Based on the experiences from the financial crisis, the IAIS (2013) published a method-
ology for assessing the systemic risk of international insurers. In this methodology, the
key determinants of systemic risk in insurance are non-core and non-insurance activi-
ties, insurer size and interconnectedness.62
However, the empirical evidence on the questions whether insurers can be-
come systemically relevant and whether these factors drive systemic risk is lim-
ited. Shortly after the financial crisis, Acharya et al. (2009), Harrington (2009), and
61An “insurer run” is regarded as unlikely by most economists as customers are often protected by
guarantees that are similar to explicit deposit insurance schemes in banking.
62The non-core activities listed by the IAIS include credit default swaps (CDS) transactions for non-
hedging purposes, leveraging assets to enhance investment returns, as well as products and activities
that concern bank-type (or investment bank-type) activities. Furthermore, the IAIS argues that in-
surance companies which engage in non-traditional insurance activities are more affected to financial
market developments and contribute more to systemic risk of the insurance sector.
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Cummins and Weiss (2014) discussed the role of insurers during the financial crisis.63
More recently, due to the increased attention regulators are giving this topic, several
studies have analyzed different aspects of systemic risk in insurance. For example,
Cummins and Weiss (2014) and Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014) study the effect of dif-
ferent factors from the IAIS methodology on the systemic risk of U.S. insurers. In
addition, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2015) support the too-big-to-fail conjecture for insur-
ers by showing that insurer mergers tend to increase the systemic risk of the acquiring
insurers.
In this paper, we analyze the question whether common measures of systemic
risk are significantly driven by the size, the interconnectedness, and the leverage of
global banks and insurers. As systemic risk measures, we employ the institutions’
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) (see Acharya et al., 2010) and their ∆CoVaR (see
Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2015). We then perform separate quantile regressions for
both a sample of the world’s largest banks and insurers of these two measures of sys-
temic risk on size, interconnectedness, leverage, and a set of control variables. For both
banks and insurers, the results of these quantile regressions are inconclusive and coun-
terintuitive. The extreme quantiles of both MES and ∆CoVaR (i.e., institutions that are
most exposed and contribute the most to systemic risk) are not significantly affected
by size. Higher leverage and interconnectedness counterintuitively seem to decrease
systemic risk. We then turn to probit regressions of the probability of membership in
the groups of G-SIFIs and G-SIIs. Our results are extremely revealing: the decision of
regulators to declare a financial institution (bank or insurer) as systemically relevant is
only driven by the institution’s size.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Related literature is presented in
Section 4.2. The data and variables used in our empirical study are discussed in Section
4.3. The outline and the results of our empirical study are given in Section 4.4. Section
4.5 concludes.
63Additional analyses of systemic risk in insurance are due to Eling and Schmeiser (2010),
Lehmann and Hofmann (2010), and van Lelyveld et al. (2011).
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4.2 Related literature
The case of systemic risk in the banking sector has been discussed extensively in the
recent literature. However, the question whether insurers can actually become system-
ically relevant for the financial system and the question whether the IAIS’s proposed
methodology is suitable for identifying G-SIIs remain relatively unanswered in the lit-
erature so far. Only few studies focus on the exposure and contribution of insurers
to systemic risk and the key determinants that could cause severe consequences for
insurers. Reviewing the academic literature, Trichet (2005) argued that the traditional
insurance business is not vulnerable to “insurance runs” and that interconnectedness
in the insurance sector is weak in contrast to the banking sector. After the financial
crisis this view changed significantly. For example, Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that
systemic risks exist in the insurance sector even though they are smaller than in bank-
ing. More importantly, systemic risk in insurance appears to have grown partially as a
consequence of the increasing interconnectedness of insurers to other financial institu-
tions and their activities outside of the traditional insurance business. Further, Trichet
(2005) argues that new non-traditional insurance activities, for example, writing credit
derivatives, can cause contagion in the financial sector. A warning that came almost
three years before the near-collapse of AIG.
In the empirical literature, several studies have focused on the the interconnected-
ness of insurers as a primary driver of systemc risk. Billio et al. (2012) analyze the
interconnectedness of global financial institutions based on their stock prices. They
argue that illiquid assets of insurers could create systemic risks in times of financial
crisis. In a related study, Chen et al. (2014) analyze the interconnectedness of banks
and insurers but find in their analysis of credit default swap and intraday stock price
data that the insurance sector is exposed to but does not contribute to systemic risks in
the banking sector.
While the former two studies only address the interconnectedness of banks and in-
surers, the effect of additional factor like size, leverage, and profitability on systemic
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risk in the insurance sector is studied by Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2014).64 Most impor-
tantly, they find that insurer size has been a major driver of the systemic risk exposure
and contribution of U.S. insurers. Several of the IAIS indicators (e.g., geographical
diversification), however, do not appear to be significantly related to the systemic risk
of insurers. The hypotheses behind these suspected causal relations are similar to argu-
ments brought forward in banking. Insurer size, for example, could have an increasing
effect on systemic risk in the insurance sector, because larger insurance companies
have a wider range of different risks covered and thus are less prone to suffer from
cumulative losses (see Hagendorff et al., 2014). Yet, larger insurance companies could
become too-interconnected-to-fail and thus systemically relevant (see Acharya et al.,
2009).
Additionally, the IAIS has also argued that high leverage could increase the sys-
temic importance of individual insurers (especially in combination with size and in-
terconnectedness). High leverage incentivizes managers into excessive risk-taking to
increase a firm’s profitability (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2010, Fahlenbrach et al., 2012).
However, leverage is obviously not bad per se. For example Vallascas and Hagendorff
(2011) stress the disciplining function of leverage as it pressures managers into secur-
ing the payments of interest to investors and to secure a firm’s liquidity. In addition,
insurers that engage too heavily in non-core activities such as derivatives trading could
also single-handedly destabilize the financial sector. For example, one of these non-
traditional activities identified by the IAIS is the use of catastrophe bonds to hedge
against severe losses induced by natural catastrophes. The assumption that these hedg-
ing vehicle could make insurers more interconnected with financial markets and thus
more systemically relevant is confuted in Weiß et al. (2013). Concerning derivatives
trading, Cummins and Weiss (2014) note that excessive derivatives trading by insurers
was a major source of systemic risk in insurance during the financial crisis.
Probably the most fundamental question, however, remains whether systemic risk in
64In a related study, Cummins and Weiss (2014) also analyze the characteristics of U.S. insurers that are
systemically important.
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insurance companies (if it even exists) is large enough to destabilize the whole finan-
cial sector. In this respect, Bierth et al. (2015) find systemic risk in the international
insurance sector to be small in comparison to previous findings in the literature for
banks. However, confirming the results of Baluch et al. (2011), they find a strong up-
ward trend in both the exposure and contribution of insurers to the fragility of the global
financial sector during the financial crisis. In further panel regressions, they find the
interconnectedness of large insurers with the financial sector to be a significant driver
of the insurers’ exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the contribution of insurers to
systemic risk appears to be primarily driven by the insurers’ size and leverage.
4.3 Data
This section describes the construction of our sample of banks and insurers and
presents the choice of our dependent and main independent variables as well as de-
scriptive statistics of our data.
4.3.1 Sample construction
Balance sheet and income statement data are retrieved from the Thomson Worldscope
database and all stock market and accounting data are collected in U.S. dollars to min-
imize a possible bias as a result from currency risk.
To construct our sample, we select all publicly listed international insurers from the
dead and active firm list in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and omit all firms
for which stock price data are unavailable in Datastream. We exclude Berkshire Hath-
away due to its unusual high stock price, although it is listed as an insurer in Datas-
tream. For our analysis we restrict our dataset to the one hundred largest insurance
companies, measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006.
A similar procedure is used for the construction of our international sample of
banks. Initially, we start with a sample of all firms in the active and dead-firm “banks”
4.3. DATA 108
and “financial services” lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. 65 As in
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we then select all companies with SIC codes between
6000 and 6300 (i.e., we eliminate insurers, real estate operators, holding and invest-
ment offices as well as other non-bank companies in the financial service industry from
our sample of banks). It is crucial for our analysis that we have accounting price and
stock price data available in Thomson Worldscope and Datastream. Therefore, we
exclude firms for which these data are not available. We exclude a stock from our
sample if it is identified in Datastream as a non-primary quote or if it is an American
Depositary Receipt (ADR). All OTC traded stocks and preference shares are also re-
moved. Similar to the insurer sample, we restrict our data set to the 150 largest banks,
measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006. Due to secondary
listings, we have to remove another two banks and two insurers from the samples. The
geographical distribution of our sample banks and insurers covers 36 countries with
most banks (25 out of 148) and insurers (27 out of 98) being from the United States.
Following the U.S., the four most prominent countries in our samples are China (10
banks/2 insurers), Japan (16/6), the United Kingdom (11/8), and Germany (8/11). The
geographical spread of our sample firms is shown in Table 4.1. 66 For increased trans-
parency, the names of the 98 insurers and 148 banks in our final sample can be found
in Appendix C.2 and C.1.
65Since we cannot rule out that some banks are erroneously listed in the “financial services” instead of
the “banks” category in Datastream, we use both lists to generate our final sample.
66The names of the 98 insurers and 148 banks in our final sample are available upon request.
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Table 4.1: Geographic sample distribution.
The table shows the geographic spread for the sample of the largest 148 banks and for the 98 largest
international insurers. The minimum and maximum values for the total assets in 2006 are given in
billion US-$.
Banks Insurer
Country Number Min Max Number Min Max
AT 4 65.81 213.96 2 25.86 26.98
AU 5 77.73 453.41 4 19.04 72.99
BE 3 97.64 667.95 1 979.41 979.41
BM - - - 1 19.55 19.55
BR 1 123.21 123.21 - - -
CA 6 99.94 458.57 7 19.48 326.43
CH 3 84.34 1815.56 6 25.1 327.94
CN 10 56.62 930.42 2 61.96 96.71
DE 8 76.7 1324.18 11 24.24 1311.58
DK 1 433.14 433.14 - - -
ES 5 85.01 972.82 1 28.07 28.07
FI - - - 1 58.96 58.96
FR 5 252.57 1697.21 4 20.38 907.91
GB 10 77.85 1841.03 7 22.03 527.71
GR 3 58.42 90.01 - - -
HK 1 86.29 86.29 - - -
IE 4 86.41 262.94 2 59.49 94.49
IL 2 61.37 62.59 - - -
IN 2 61.48 154.75 - - -
IS 1 64.03 64.03 - - -
IT 6 80.59 963.16 7 23.68 454.27
JP 15 58.02 1578.76 5 26.12 143.65
KR 6 70.71 209.69 - - -
LU 1 72.85 72.85 - - -
MY 1 59.01 59.01 - - -
NG 1 130.39 130.39 - - -
NL 1 1160.22 1160.22 2 404.42 1318.22
NO 1 194.97 194.97 1 33.67 33.67
PT 2 69.66 92.84 - - -
RU 1 120.62 120.62 - - -
SE 4 170 393.23 - - -
SG 3 90.91 118.69 1 25.83 25.83
TR 1 63.15 63.15 - - -
TW 3 68.09 72.33 3 44.97 107.62
US 25 56.62 1841.03 27 17.91 985.44
ZA 3 78.04 152.69 3 29.89 51.96
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Next, we define and discuss the main dependent and independent variables for our
analysis in the subsequent sections. Appendix C.1 gives an overview of all variable
definitions and data sources in our empirical study. To minimize the possibly biasing
effect of extreme outliers in our sample on our results, all data are winsorized at the
1% and 99% levels.
4.3.2 Systemic risk measures
This study employs two different measures of systemic risk that proxy for an insti-
tution’s sensitivity or exposure and contribution to systemic risk in a larger financial
system. Systemic risk is calculated for the crisis period which we define as the period
between July 2007 and the end of december 2008 (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Simi-
lar to the recent literature (see, e.g., Anginer and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2014, Anginer et al.,
2014a, Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel, 2014), we use as our measures of systemic risk the un-
conditional ∆CoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015) and the Marginal
Expected Shortfall as defined by Acharya et al. (2010).
One of the more established measures of systemic risk that is also used by regulators
is the unconditional ∆CoVaR measured as the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of
a financial sector index67 conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR
of the sector index conditional on the median state of the insurer. Therefore, ∆CoVaR
can be interpreted as the actual contribution to systemic risk in the financial system by
the respective observed company.
In contrast, the Marginal Expected Shortfall is defined as the negative average return
on a firm’s stock on the days an index (in our case the MSCI World index) experienced
its 5% worst outcomes. 68 A positive MES thus indicates a positive exposure to sys-
temic risk rather than a stabilizing effect.
67In our main analysis, we employ the MSCI World Index. For further robustness checks, we also
employ the the World DS Full Line Insurer Index, the MSCI World Banks Index, and the MSCI World
Insurance index for the calculation of ∆CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall.
68Additionally, we employ the Dynamic Marginal Expected Shortfall calculated following the procedure
laid out by Brownlees and Engle (2015) for robustness checks later on.
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4.3.3 Explanatory variables
The focus of our analyses is to shed more light on the interplay of systemic risk and
possible determining factors proposed by the Financial Stability Board and the IAIS
(2013). Thus, we concentrate on size, leverage, and the interconnectedness of banks
and insurers. We intend to show whether these factors can explain the decisions of
regulators to propose global systemic relevance for some of the banks and insurers in
the financial system. Furthermore, we compare the predictive power of these factors
for explaining the cross-sectional variation in both the institutions’ MES and ∆CoVaR.
As a standard proxy for size we employ the natural logarithm of an institution’s total
assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006. The effect of size on systemic risk could be am-
biguous. On the one hand, if a bank or insurer is deemed “too-big-to-fail”, and hence
might receive subsidies from safety net policies in a situation of undercapitalization,
this could incentivize managers to take more risks than socially optimal. Consequently,
large banks or insurers are more likely to contribute significantly more to systemic risk
than smaller institutions (see, e.g., O’Hara and Shaw, 1990, Acharya and Yorulmazer,
2008, Anginer et al., 2014a). Additionally, Gandhi and Lustig (2015) find that, in con-
trast to non-financial firms, size is a priced factor in the cross-section of bank stock
return. According to their study this is due to the pricing of implicit bailout guarantees
by stock market investors. On the other hand, a larger firm generally has more op-
portunities to diversify and thus hedge against times of financial turmoil, which could
decrease the firm’s systemic risk.
As the next main variable of interest, we measure a firm’s leverage as the book
value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided
by the market value of equity (see Acharya et al., 2010). High leverage is a factor
that incentivizes managers into excessive risk-taking to increase a firm’s profitability.69
In contrast, managers could be disciplined by higher leverage since they could feel
69Support for this view is found by Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and
Hovakimian et al. (2012) who empirically show that banks with low leverage during the crisis per-
formed better and had less contribution to systemic risk than firms with high leverage ratios.
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more pressured to provide enough liquid assets to cover interest payments (see, e.g.,
Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). This could in turn decrease a bank’s or insurer’s total
risk. We therefore include leverage as a main independent variable in our regressions
with no prediction for the sign of the coefficient.
The third important factor entering our analyses is the interconnectedness of banks
and insurers within the financial system. Since we do not have information on, e.g.,
interbank lending markets, we make use of the measure of interconnectedness of a fi-
nancial institution proposed by Billio et al. (2012) based on standardized stock returns
of individual banks and insurers.
Billio et al. (2012) propose an univariate measure PCAS of an institution’s inter-
connectedness with the system (using all types of financial institutions) which is based
on a principal component analysis of the correlations between all institutions’ stocks.
The measure then computes the contribution of an individual institution to the overall
risk of the financial system. The more interconnected an insurer or bank is with the
rest of the financial sector, the higher its systemic relevance will be. We therefore sus-
pect PCAS to enter our regressions with a significant increasing effect on systemic risk
(see Arnold et al., 2012, Black et al., 2013, IAIS, 2013). An interconnected financial
institution will be more exposed to shocks within the system. However, being more
intertwined with the system does not automatically translate into a higher contribu-
tion to the systemic risk itself. Furthermore, similar to the too-big-to-fail argument,
the too-interconnected-to-fail hypothesis (see Arnold et al., 2012, Black et al., 2013,
IAIS, 2013) states that institutions that are too-interconnected-to-fail are guaranteed
a safety net by governments to fall back on. Consequently, our expectations for the
impact of the interconnectedness variable are unrestricted.
In addition to our three main independent variables that cover the most important
(presumed) driving factors of systemic relevance, we include in our regressions several
firm-specific characteristics that have shown to be significant drivers of performance
and systemic risk of banks and insurers in the recent literature. An overview of all the
variable definitions, data sources and our hypotheses regarding the analyses is given in
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Appendix C.1.
We include a firm’s annual buy-and-hold stock returns in 2006, since institutions
that took on too many risks in the past could also stick to their culture of risk-taking
(see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and increase their exposure and contribution to systemic
risk. Next, we include standard proxys for a firm’s valuation (market-to-book ratio)
and its profitability (return on assets) and expect them to decrease a bank’s and in-
surer’s systemic risk. The literature suggests that banks and insurers that relied heavily
on short-term funding were exposed to liquidity risks during the recent financial cri-
sis and increased their overall systemic risk (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009,
Cummins and Weiss, 2014, Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Consequently, we control for
the degree to which an insurer or bank relied on long-term debt before the crisis (debt
maturity).
Turning to the variables specifically related to the insurance business, we control
for the success of an insurer’s asset management (investment success) and whether
the form of generated income (fixed income) influences systemic risk. If an insurance
company relies more on asset management rather than underwriting it could be more
intertwined with the global financial markets and could thus contribute and be more ex-
posed to global systemic risk. To check for other possible non-core activities we also
include the variables non-policyholder liabilities and other income. Additional risk
could arise in the form of poor management of the company which could also mani-
fest itself in the quality of the insurance portfolio. We therefore include the variables
loss ratio and operating expenses. Regarding our sample of banks, we use the com-
position of the bank’s liabilities (deposits) to control whether banks with more deposit
financing are in fact more stable. Next, we include the natural logarithm of expenses
set aside as an allowance for uncollectable or troubled loans (loan loss provisions) to
proxy for a bank’s credit risk. A larger buffer against troubled loans should serve as
a stabilizing factor for a bank’s systemic risk. Also, we control for the loans-to-assets
ratio (loans) of a bank, since it could indicate a business model that focuses on lending
rather than more risky activities, which reduces systemic risk. With a similar reason-
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ing, we include the ratio of non-interest income to total interest income (non-interest
income) as a variable in our analysis. A bank relying more on non-deposit taking ac-
tivities like, e.g., investment banking, could also be riskier than banks with a focus on
traditional lending (see, e.g., Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Finally, we employ a bank’s
Tier-1-capital ratio (tier-1-capital) to check whether higher regulatory bank capital acts
as a buffer against losses and stabilizes the individual bank within the financial sector.
4.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics for our two dependent variables for the time period
July 2007 to the end of 2008 (crisis period) and for our three main explanatory variables
of interest, total assets, leverage and interconnectedness in the year 2006.70
The summary statistics for the banks in our sample are given in Panel A and for the
insurers in Panel B of Table 4.2. First, we notice that the means of the variables of
the banking sector differ substantially from the insurance sector. The average MES is
higher for insurers than for banks while the opposite is true for ∆CoVaR. One expla-
nation for this finding could be the fact that both measures are purely based on stock
market data. As insurers will most likely have a higher sensitivity of their asset side
to downturns in equity markets, so will their own equity. Consequently, the higher
estimates for MES of insurers could be indicative of a) a higher overall (average) sys-
temic importance of insurers or b) a higher sensitivity of their equity to market crashes
(which in part could also indicate a higher systemic risk). Conversely, the sheer size
of the asset management activities of the larger insurance companies and crisis-related
shifts in their asset portfolios could also explain the lower average ∆CoVaR in our
sample.
Insurers have a mean of total assets of $ 158 billion while banks are significantly
larger with a mean of total assets of $ 350 billion. Furthermore, the leverage of banks
is on average 13.430 whereas the insurers have a mean leverage of 9.285, which un-
70Note that the sample size is slightly reduced by the unavailability of some balance sheet items for
smaller banks and insurers in Worldscope.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics: banks and insurers.
The table shows summary statistics for the sample of the largest 148 banks and for the 98 largest international insurers. The values for the systemic risk measures MES and
∆CoVaR are given for the crisis period (July 2007 to December 2008) and the values for the three independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006. Variable
definitions and data sources are documented in Appendix C.1. All data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Banks
No. Obs. Min. 10% 25% Median Mean 75% 90% Max.
MES 148 -0.166 -0.048 0.001 0.033 0.025 0.064 0.097 0.137
∆CoVaR 148 -0.021 -0.015 -0.010 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001
Total assets (in billions) 148 56.620 65.278 85.010 151.200 350.800 345.500 1046.447 1841.000
Leverage 146 4.071 5.221 6.585 9.046 13.430 14.110 22.114 96.060
Interconnectedness (in 10´9) 148 0.000 0.000 0.012 15950.000 108900.000 149556.000 328951.000 1211000.000
Insurers
No. Obs. Min. 10% 25% Median Mean 75% 90% Max.
MES 98 0.009 0.020 0.034 0.051 0.056 0.073 0.098 0.150
∆CoVaR 98 -0.021 -0.019 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.004
Total assets (in billions) 98 17.910 23.187 27.080 56.390 158.700 147.300 405.449 131.000
Leverage 98 1.729 3.322 5.273 7.309 9.285 11.350 17.265 42.260
Interconnectedness (in 10´9) 98 0.000 0.003 0.012 0.078 0.078 0.211 0.368 1.001
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derlines the increased leverage in banking compared to other industries. As expected,
on average, banks had significantly higher total assets, leverage and were more inter-
connected than insurers. Additionally, we find only little evidence of strong intercon-
nectedness of the insurers in our sample compared to the bank sample. Based on the
univariate analysis, we hypothesize that size and leverage are the driving systemic risk
while interconnectedness does not play such an important role for explaining differ-
ences in MES and ∆CoVaR.
4.4 The determinants of systemic relevance
This section investigates which (possibly differential) factors determine the systemic
relevance of banks and insurers. We first present the results of our cross-sectional
OLS and quantile regressions of the institutions’ MES and ∆CoVaR during the crisis.
Afterwards, we report and comment on the results of our probit regressions for the
determination of factors that influence systemic relevance as stated by regulators.
4.4.1 Cross-sectional regressions
Instead of only using the standard OLS approach for cross-sectional regressions, we
perform the multivariate analysis of the determinants of extreme values of MES and
∆CoVaR in two ways. In particular, we employ cross-sectional quantile regressions
with bootstrapped standard errors71 and simple OLS regressions with robust standard
errors of our systemic risk proxies during the crisis on our (lagged) main independent
and the various control variables in 2006. The use of quantile regressions benefits us
with reasonable benefits compared to OLS regressions. OLS models the relationship
between the conditional mean of the dependent variable and the independent vari-
ables. We do not include all active Banks and insurance companies with available
data in Datastream because the values of our systemic risk measures (or the dummy
71By using bootstrapped standard errors, we are able to partially obviate possible biases by the non-i.i.d.
character of our data.
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variables for our probit regressions) would be distorted by the inclusion of too many
firms in a mechanical way. The quantile regression approach by Koenker and Basset
(1978) circumvents the problems that arise in OLS due to heteroskedasticity in the
data by estimating the change in a specified quantile of the dependent variable given
the covariates produced by the independent variables. Quantile regression models the
quantiles of the dependent variable’s distribution and therefore does not suffer from the
usual heteroskedasticity problem. For the MES, we analyze the 95%-percentile and for
∆CoVaR we analyze in the 5%-percentile, with both indicating extreme systemic risk.
The results of our cross-sectional analysis for banks are shown in Table 4.4 and 4.3.
Table 4.3: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk (∆CoVaR) of banks.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 148 largest banks.
Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006 and the systemic risk measures are
calculated for the crisis period (July 2007 to December 2008). Regressions on MES are on the
95%-percentile. The OLS regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and
the quantile regression uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable definitions and
data sources are documented in Appendix C.1. Interconnectedness is given in millions. Test statistics
and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests on heteroskedasticity are reported below.
Dependent vari-
able:
∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) 0.0008 0.0022 0.0008 0.0034*
(0.121) (0.100) (0.527) (0.090)
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.529) (0.986) (0.914) (0.178)
Interconnectedness 0.0118*** 0.0000** 0.0153 0.0061
(0.001) (0.049) (0.410) (0.259)
Performance -0.0040 -0.0096*
(0.176) (0.082)
ROA -0.0019 -0.0012
(0.177) (0.528)
Debt maturity -0.0021 -0.0033
(0.469) (0.647)
Deposits -0.0016 -0.0037
(0.761) (0.709)
Loan loss provi-
sion
-0.0016 -0.0031
(0.346) (0.283)
Loans 0.0048 -0.0036
(0.371) (0.839)
Tier-1-capital 0.0939 0.1515
(0.175) (0.115)
Non-interest
income
-0.0024 -0.0074**
(0.340) (0.045)
No. Obs. 148 146 148 92 148 146 148 92
R2 0.0169 0.0025 0.1360 0.3204 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0108 0.0012 0.1066 0.4826
χ2 1.01 0.05 4.02 23.23 - - - -
p-value 0.316 0.817 0.045 0.000 - - - -
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Table 4.4: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk (MES) of banks.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 148 largest banks.
Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006 and the systemic risk measures are
calculated for the crisis period (July 2007 to December 2008). Regressions on ∆CoVaR are on
the 5%-percentile. The OLS regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors and the quantile regression uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in paren-
theses. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level respectively.
Variable definitions and data sources are documented in Appendix C.1. Interconnectedness is given
in millions. Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests on heteroskedasticity are reported below.
Dependent vari-
able:
MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) 0.0042 0.0062 0.0071 0.0022
(0.389) (0.669) (0.311) (0.888)
Leverage -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0046
(0.475) (0.530) (0.589) (0.205)
Interconnectedness -0.1150** -0.2070*** 0.0192 -0.1920*
(0.018) (0.000) (0.483) (0.069)
Performance -0.0030 -0.0267
(0.889) (0.385)
ROA -0.0132 -0.0451**
(0.196) (0.027)
Debt maturity 0.0153 0.0382
(0.592) (0.462)
Deposits -0.0422 -0.2903*
(0.383) (0.051)
Loan loss provi-
sion
0.0040 0.0254
(0.844) (0.333)
Loans -0.0287 0.1026
(0.704) (0.197)
Tier-1-capital 0.5999 1.3814
(0.196) (0.173)
Non-interest
income
-0.0122 -0.0283
(0.567) (0.281)
No. Obs. 148 146 148 92 148 146 148 92
R2 0.0047 0.0028 0.1409 0.2975 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0212 0.0053 0.0003 0.2319
χ2 5.71 0.02 34.21 0.14 - - - -
p-value 0.017 0.895 0.000 0.713 - - - -
The first three regressions in all settings are concerned with the individual effects
of our three main dependent variables: size, leverage, interconnectedness with the
financial system, as well as systemic risk.
In the OLS regressions of banks we find no significant effect of the variables total
assets and leverage on our systemic risk measures except for a strong significance at
the 1% level of interconnectedness on ∆CoVaR. Surprisingly, the variable enters the
quantile regression with a positive coefficient and thus increases the value of ∆CoVaR,
which we interpret as a decrease in the systemic risk contribution of the bank, since
smaller values of ∆CoVaR indicate a higher contribution to systemic risk. However, by
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adding our control variables, we only lose some of the significance of the coefficient
of interconnectedness and find no statistically significant influence of any other vari-
able on ∆CoVaR. Looking at the respective quantile regressions on the 5%-quantile
of ∆CoVaR reveals that only bank size is a slightly statistically significant predictor
of extreme contribution of banks to systemic risk. The variable enters the quantile
regression with a positive sign of the coefficient at a 10% level, which indicates the
unintuitive impression that larger banks contribute less to systemic risk.
The OLS regressions of MES on our main variables of interest show that only the in-
terconnectedness influenced the exposure of banks to external shocks during the crisis.
The coefficient of interconnectedness enters both the OLS and the quantile regression
with a negative sign that is significant at the 1% level in the regression of the condi-
tional mean and at the 10% level for the regression of the 95%-quantile. Thus, at least
for this sample, we find the counterintuitive result that being more interconnected does
not necessarily increase the exposure of banks to systemic risk. Interestingly, we note
a slightly significant decreasing effect of the variable deposits on MES which leaves us
with the interpretation that banks with higher deposit financing were more stable and
less sensitive to external shocks during the financial crisis.
The regressions of banks’ systemic risk on the indicators of systemic relevance re-
veal that only the interconnectedness of banks with the financial sector helps in ex-
plaining the magnitude of the contribution or exposure to systemic risk. In Tables 4.5
and 4.6, we show the results from the OLS and quantile regressions of ∆CoVaR and
MES on the proposed factors of systemic relevance for insurers.
Table 4.5 shows that an insurer’s size decreases ∆CoVaR (significant at the 10%
level) and thus, indicates a higher contribution to systemic risk by larger insurers.
This significance, however, vanishes when including other control variables and is
also never significant when regressing the conditional quantile of systemic risk. A
very similar pattern can be found in Table 4.6 concerning insurer size, where total as-
sets to increase the exposure to systemic risk. On the other hand, we find that a higher
leverage induces a lower systemic risk contribution. Again, this counterintuitive result
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Table 4.5: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk (∆CoVaR) of insurers.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 98 largest insurance
companies. Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006 and the systemic risk measures
are calculated for the crisis period (July 2007 to December 2008). Regressions on ∆CoVaR are on the
5%-percentile. The OLS regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and
the quantile regression uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable definitions
and data sources are documented in Appendix C.1. Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests
on heteroskedasticity are reported below.
Dependent vari-
able:
∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) -0.0006* -0.0009 0.0003 0.0007
(0.082) (0.408) (0.367) (0.237)
Leverage 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002*
(0.063) (0.043) (0.214) (0.078)
Interconnectedness 0.0032* 0.0022 0.0021 0.0058*
(0.089) (0.468) (0.344) (0.087)
Performance -0.0003 0.0006
(0.873) (0.743)
ROA 0.0006 0.0011***
(0.237) (0.000)
Debt maturity 0.0014 -0.0006
(0.550) (0.804)
Investment success 0.0064 0.0063
(0.305) (0.094)
Loss ratio 0.0000 0.0000**
(0.651) (0.015)
Non-policyholder
liab.
-0.0004 0.0000
(0.283) (0.974)
Operating ex-
penses
-0.0124 -0.0036
(0.111) (0.353)
Other income 0.0000 0.0000
(0.623) (0.853)
Fixed income 0.0000 -0.0012**
(0.999) (0.025)
No. Obs. 98 98 98 71 98 98 98 71
R2 0.0307 0.0307 0.0315 0.1973 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0092 0.0283 0.0332 0.3263
χ2 0.01 0.37 0.40 0.75 - - - -
p-value 0.909 0.544 0.53 0.385 - - - -
could be due to our proxies of systemic risk not being able to fully capture all facets
of an institution’s systemic relevance. For the interconnectedness variable, we find the
same effects on systemic risk as in the models involving our sample of banks, although
with statistically less significant results.
Turning to the quantile regressions for our insurer sample, we notice that intercon-
nectedness exhibits a strong influence on systemic risk. Although the actual values of
interconnectedness of insurers are much lower than those for the sample of banks, we
notice that being interconnected with the financial system as an insurer has a much
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Table 4.6: Cross-sectional regression of systemic risk (MES) of insurers.
The table shows the OLS and quantile regression results using a sample of the 98 largest insurance
companies. Independent variables are calculated for the fiscal year 2006 and the systemic risk measures
are calculated for the crisis period (July 2007 to December 2008). Regressions on MES are on the
95%-percentile. The OLS regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and
the quantile regression uses bootstrapped standard errors. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-,5%- and 10%-level respectively. Variable definitions
and data sources are documented in Appendix C.1. Test statistics and p-values for Breusch-Pagan tests
on heteroskedasticity are reported below.
Dependent vari-
able:
MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES
Estimation: OLS regression Quantile regression
Log(Total assets) 0.0095*** 0.0019 0.0111 -0.0106
(0.000) (0.806) (0.269) (0.442)
Leverage -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0013
(0.131) (0.204) (0.752) (0.575)
Interconnectedness -0.0275** 0.0156 -0.0734 -0.0141
(0.020) (0.453) (0.179) (0.795)
Performance -0.0390*** -0.0594**
(0.001) (0.012)
ROA 0.0024 -0.0018
(0.551) (0.805)
Debt maturity 0.0048 -0.0022
(0.762) (0.967)
Investment success 0.1042* 0.1318
(0.063) (0.199)
Loss ratio -0.0001** -0.0001
(0.025) (0.363)
Non-policyholder
liab.
0.0006 -0.0055
(0.858) (0.651)
Operating ex-
penses
-0.0934 -0.1014
(0.277) (0.497)
Other income 0.0000 0.0000
(0.422) (0.691)
Fixed income 0.0077 0.0188
(0.210) (0.206)
No. Obs. 98 98 98 71 98 98 98 71
R2 0.1128 0.0154 0.0339 0.4932 - - - -
Pseudo R2 - - - - 0.0432 0.0098 0.0394 0.4905
χ2 0.88 0.02 1.55 5.13 - - - -
p-value 0.347 0.880 0.213 0.024 - - - -
stronger impact on the systemic risk of the insurer than for banks. The coefficients in
the quantile regressions are positive for ∆CoVaR and negative for MES which indicates
a decrease in the contribution and the exposure to systemic risk. This holds true at the
1% level. Again, this counterintuitive result could be due to our proxies of systemic
risk not being able to fully capture all facets of an institution’s systemic relevance.
Additionally, we find that profitability and higher loss ratios also have a decreasing
effect on the contribution to systemic risk. Throughout all of the regressions neither
size nor leverage consistently enter the analysis with a significant coefficient. Conse-
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quently, a simple analysis of MES and ∆CoVaR could lead to the conclusion that both
size and leverage are not significant drivers of systemic risk in banking and insurance.
4.4.2 Probit regressions
In this section, we explain the probability of being declared a global systemically im-
portant bank or insurer by regulators. Employing a probit regression model allows us
to explain the probability that a bank or an insurer will be declared systemically rele-
vant or not. To this end, we employ the same set of explanatory variables as before in
our quantile regressions.
The results of the probit regressions for the 148 largest banks, measured by their
total assets in 2006, are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Systemic relevance of banks: probit regressions.
The table shows the results of several probit regressions on a dummy variables that is one if a bank
was nominated as global systemically important by the Financial Stability Board and zero otherwise.
Our sample consists of the 148 largest banks measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year
2006. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial
accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. P-values are given in parentheses and
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level. Definitions of variables as well as
descriptions of the data sources are given in Table C.1 in the Appendix.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log(Total assets) 1.5630*** 1.5620*** 1.8896***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.0020 -0.0157 0.0336
(0.811) (0.574) (0.480)
Interconnectedness 0.0000 0.0000
(0.939) (0.743)
MES 5.1186** 3.0310 3.4083
(0.031) (0.327) (0.325)
∆CoVaR 14.5811
(0.462)
Market-to-book ratio 0.2961
(0.532)
Performance -0.0411
(0.975)
ROA 0.4492
(0.304)
Debt maturity 0.5344
(0.685)
Deposits 0.9625
(0.621)
Non-interest income 1.4046*
(0.052)
Observations 146 144 146 146 146 141 108
AIC 55.43 140.74 141.57 136.36 141.02 59.68 55.14
Table 4.7 shows the results of several probit regressions on dummy variables that
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take on the value of one if a bank was declared global systemically important by the
Financial Stability Board and zero otherwise.
Starting with probit regressions (1) to (3) of systemic relevance of banks, we can see
that neither the banks’ leverage nor their interconnectedness are significant indicators
of an institution’s systemic importance. This first finding is in striking contrast to the
hypotheses formulated by the Financial Stability Board on the pivotal role of leverage
and interconnectedness for a bank’s systemic relevance. Interestingly, our results in
regression (4) imply that the banks’ Marginal Expected Shortfalls has a significant
influence on the global importance of a bank as perceived by regulators (from model
(5) we see that ∆CoVaR is not statistically significant). In model specifications (6) and
(7), we include several control variables in our regressions but only find size to be a
driving factor for systemic importance. More precisely, the MES of the banks which
previously entered the regression with a significant positive coefficient now loses all
its statistical significance. Consequently, we find strong evidence that the nomination
as a G-SIFI is only driven by the institution’s size.
The probit regression results for the sample of insurers are shown in Table 4.8.
Similar to the results for the banks, we can see from the probit regressions (1) to
(5) that neither the insurers’ leverage nor their interconnectedness are significant in-
dicators of the nomination as a G-SII by the FSB and the IAIS. These findings are
also in striking contrast to the hypotheses of the pivotal role of leverage and intercon-
nectedness for an insurer’s systemic importance. In regression (5) we find an insurer’s
∆CoVaR to be a significant determinant of the probability to be included in the list of
G-SIIs. However, this effect vanishes as soon as we add total assets and other con-
trols to our regression model. Similar to the probit regressions for banks, we find in
regression (6) that size is the only reliable predictor of systemic relevance according to
regulators. This holds true even when we include various control variables.
In summary, the results of our probit regression analyses show that the inclusion of
an institution in the list of G-SIFIs or G-SIIs is only a question of size. While MES
and ∆CoVaR do appear to capture some of aspects of systemic risk, these measures
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Table 4.8: Systemic relevance of insurers: probit regressions.
The table shows the results of several probit regressions on a dummy variables that is one if an insurer
was nominated as global systemically important by the Financial Stability Board and zero otherwise.
Our sample consists of the 98 largest insurers measured by their total assets at the end of the fiscal year
2006. Stock market data are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream while financial
accounting data are taken from the Worldscope database. P-values are given in parentheses and
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level. Definitions of variables as well as
descriptions of the data sources are given in Table C.1 in the Appendix.
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Total assets) 0.9546*** 1.526***
(0.000) (0.005)
Leverage 0.0287 -0.0760
(0.188) (0.482)
Interconnectedness -0.1704 1.468
(0.844) (0.567)
MES 7.0939
(0.177)
∆CoVaR -145.0350** -64.3375
(0.032) (0.526)
Market-to-book ratio -0.027
(0.950)
Performance 1.9750
(0.227)
ROA -0.354
(0.672)
Debt maturity -0.3316
(0.810)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
AIC 37.95 62.67 64.08 62.51 58.28 41.86
cannot explain the methodology proposed by regulators. They determine the systemic
importance of a financial institution (regardless whether it is a bank or insurer) only by
the institutions’ size.
4.4.3 Robustness checks
To underline the validity of our results, we perform additional robustness checks. First,
our results could be biased by the manner in which we calculate the systemic risk
measures ∆CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall. Reestimating the measures using
the MSCI World Banks Index and MSCI World Insurance Index does not significantly
change our main results. For our cross-sectional analysis, we reestimate the OLS and
quantile regression models with alternative definitions of our key variables leverage
(ratio of total liabilities to total assets) and size (natural logarithm of net revenues).
Except for the OLS regression for banks of MES on control variables, where we find
a statistical significance of leverage at the 10% level, our main inferences are robust to
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these changes. Also, to control for an insurer’s line of business, we include a dummy
variable in our cross-sectional analyses that is one if the company is a life insurer
(SIC code 6311), and zero otherwise. Including this variable neither changes our main
inferences, nor do we find it to be significant in most of the regressions. However, in the
regression of an insurer’s ∆CoVaR on the control variables, we find a positive relation
of the life insurer dummy and ∆CoVaR that is significant at the 10% level indicating
that life insurers in our sample have a lower contribution to systemic risk than non-life
insurers. Finally, we reestimate our probit regressions for banks and insurers using data
from later years, i.e., 2009 and 2010 (if available) as it could be argued that regulators
identified systemically relevant financial institutions based on post-crisis data rather
than data from 2006. Our additional analyses, however, reveal no new information
and also suggest that size was the most common factor when constructing the list of
systemically relevant institutions.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the determinants of the systemic importance of the world’s
largest banks and insurers during the financial crisis. Using a sample of the largest
148 banks and 98 insurers in the world, we analyze the cross-sectional variation in two
popular measures of systemic risk of financial institutions during the crisis. In the sec-
ond step of our analysis, we try to explain the decision of regulators to include certain
banks and insurers in the lists of global systemically important financial institutions
and global systemically important insurers.
Our results show that our quantile regressions of banks’ and insurers’ MES and
∆CoVaR as our systemic risk proxies mainly produce counterintuitive results. We find
little to no evidence that higher leverage and interconnectedness increase the exposure
or contribution of individual institutions to systemic risk.
As our second main finding, we show that regulators only seem to care about an
institution’s size proxied by its total assets in their decision to declare the institution
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global systemically important. We find some correlation between the probability of
being a G-SIFI and G-SII, and the institution’s MES (banks) and ∆CoVaR (insurers).
Nevertheless these proxies of systemic risk cannot explain the classification by regula-
tors as soon as size is included in our probit regressions. We thus conclude that despite
the methodologies published by regulators themselves, the decision to include a bank
in the G-SIFI list was purely a question of bank size. Global systemically important
insurers are clearly identifiable by a simple look at the total assets in their balance
sheet.
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Chapter 5
Non-life Insurer Solvency and Default
Risk
5.1 Introduction
Reinvigorated by the financial crisis of 2007-2009, academics and regulators have
taken a renewed interest in the impact of higher capital requirements for financial
institutions on the stability of the financial sector. For example, the Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) all have designed new rules
and frameworks to warrant the safety of the financial system including banks, insur-
ers, and other financial intermediaries. Among other approaches and concepts, they
propose a framework to identify global systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs), focusing not only on banks but also on globally active insurance compa-
nies. Institutions identified as SIFIs are required to fulfill stricter solvability or cap-
ital requirements and are more likely to be monitored more closely by supervisors.
In fact, regulators and academics alike are demanding higher capital restrictions on
financial institutions to decrease the likelihood of a firm defaulting. The effective-
ness of higher capital requirements, however, is debatable as such requirements might
weaken an institution’s profitability and could tempt managers to engage in excessive
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risk-taking and regulatory arbitrage (see, e.g., Kashyap et al., 2008, Matutes and Vives,
2000, Berger and Bouwman, 2013, Jime´nez et al., 2015, Ongena et al., 2013).
In the light of these recent discussions, the study of idiosyncratic default risk and its
determinants in the insurance sector is important and of high relevance to regulators.
Especially the interplay of required solvency capital (which is the main instrument of
regulators to improve financial stability) and the default risk of institutions is of great
interest to both regulators and managers. Although higher capital requirements are the
most favorite tools for regulators to support financial stability, they are also viewed by
managers as being counterproductive as they reduce profits thereby increasing financial
instability. However, the effects of higher solvency of insurers is also of great impor-
tance to policyholders since they could be affected by increases in insurance premia or
could demand more protection from the contract’s issuer.
In this paper, we investigate the question whether higher capital leads to a signifi-
cant reduction in the default risk of insurers. More precisely, we study the effects of an
insurer’s solvency on its default probability for an international sample of non-life in-
surance companies. The question whether the idiosyncratic default risk of insurers can
be explained by idiosyncratic fundamentals or rather by country-specific determinants
is relatively unexplored in the literature. Most studies on an insurer’s likelihood to de-
fault focus on the U.S. sector only or employ relatively short time frames from several
decades ago.72 One approach to explain the variation in insurers’ default risk around
the globe is to look at the differences in regulation across countries. We extend the ex-
isting empirical literature on the determinants of insurers’ default risk by performing
panel regression analyses for an international sample of non-life insurers from 2000 to
2013. In particular, we are interested in the question which idiosyncratic factors are
able to explain a non-life insurer’s default risk and how the explanatory power of firm
fundamentals relates to the one of country-specific factors.
72For example, Shiu (2011) analyzes a panel of non-life insurance companies from 1985 to 2002 fo-
cusing on the interplay of reinsurance and leverage and argues that highly levered companies are
more likely to become insolvent and thus, instead of raising costly capital, are more inclined to buy
reinsurance.
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Our study is related to Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013) who use information obtained
from surveys on insurance regulation to analyze the default risk of insurance sectors
in different countries. Similar to the work of Barth et al. (2004, 2005, 2013) on bank-
ing regulation, they derive indexes for, e.g., capital requirements or supervisory power
standards in a given country and use these indicators to explain the z-score of an in-
surance company from 2005 to 2007. Related to this issue, Altuntas et al. (2015) de-
compose insurers’ capital structure into idiosyncratic and country-specific factors and
find that the capital structure of insurers is not homogenous across countries but rather
driven by institutional environments.73 Additionally, financial distress in a given year
or insurance firm might simply be the result of current economic downturns or in-
creased market competition.
Instead of identifying factors to explain idiosyncratic default risk of insurers, recent
studies have shifted their attention towards the determinants of the systemic risk and
the systemic relevance of the insurance sector. While some of the authors concentrate
on the interconnectedness of the insurance sector with the global financial network
and consequently its contribution to or relevance for systemic (in-)stability (see, e.g.,
Baluch et al., 2011, Billio et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2014, Cummins and Weiss, 2014),
other contributions focus on the determinants of proposed measures of systemic risk
(see, e.g., Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel, 2014, 2015, Bierth et al., 2015).74 Moreover, one of
the more recent analyses given by Rauch et al. (2014) reveals that idiosyncratic default
risk is a significant driver of systemic risk measures for banks and insurers.75
To answer our main question concerning the relation between an insurer’s solvency
and its default risk, we pursue two approaches. As a first step, we run dynamic panel
regressions of an insurer’s inverse z-score on idiosyncratic characteristics and country-
effects. As independent variables, we employ different measures of short-term and
73Also, e.g., U.S. regulators rely more heavily on a free-market and competition to discipline insurers in
comparison to other country environments.
74Eling and Pankoke (2014) provide an overview of the recent work on systemic risk in the insurance
sector.
75For the discussion on such measures see, e.g., Acharya et al. (2010), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015),
Brownlees and Engle (2015) or Benoit et al. (2013). Other proposed indicators of systemic relevance
are given by the IAIS (2011, 2013).
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long-term solvency as well as control variables that proxy for, e.g., the insurers’ effi-
ciency or quality of its risk portfolio. As our main result, we find long-term capital to
be significantly negatively related to the default risk of insurers. In a second step, we
decompose a non-life insurer’s inverse z-score to determine to which extent individual
insurer characteristics explain the variance in default risk. In order to compare indi-
vidual and country- and time-specific effects on default risk, we perform a standard
analysis of covariance.
Based on an international sample of 308 non-life insurers, we find that long-term
solvency significantly reduces default risk across all countries in our sample. Short-
term solvency does not play a significant role in most of our regressions. Furthermore,
we observe that operating efficiency and an insurer’s loss ratio are suitable indicators
of financial distress for non-life insurance companies. However, compared to country-
specific effects, the explanatory power of idiosyncratic indicators of financial distress
is small. Supporting the findings in Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013), we find that differ-
ences across countries and thus, regulatory environments play an important role for the
financial soundness of insurance companies. As our main policy implication, we find
that capital requirements related to an insurer’s long-term solvency are well suited for
increasing the financial soundness of insurers. Furthermore, we find that the regula-
tory environment of insurers is more important for reducing the default risk of non-life
insurers.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 5.2 explains the con-
struction of the data set. The subsequent section 5.3 explains the methodology and
variables used in our empirical study. Section 5.4 presents the results of our analysis
on the determinants of non-life insurers’ default risk. Concluding remarks are given in
Section 5.5.
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5.2 Data and variables
This section presents the construction of our data sample. Our empirical study focuses
on a panel of non-life insurance companies around the world. Thus, we begin to con-
struct our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed international insurers from
the dead and active firm lists in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream from 2000 to
2013. As a next step, we exclude all secondary listings and non-primary issues from
our sample. The industry classification of insurance companies in Datastream is, in
parts, inconclusive76 and therefore, we use the following method in order to identify
non-life insurers. The classification given in Datastream is cross-checked with the
firms’ SIC codes (Worldscope data item WC07021, SIC codes 6311, 6321, 6331) and
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) code (Worldscope data item WC07040,
ICB supersector 8500) to exclude firms which cannot be clearly classified as non-life
insurance companies.77 Next, we match the classification of Datastream and ICB. If
these classifications match, an insurance company is clearly identified as a non-life in-
surer. Otherwise the company is excluded from our sample. Additionally, all company
names are manually screened for companies with a non-insurance focus in their line of
business. For our initial list of non-life insurers, we obtain balance sheet and income
statement data from the Thomson Worldscope database. All stock market and account-
ing data are collected in U.S. dollars to minimize a possible bias due to currency risk.
The names of the 308 non-life insurance firms included in our final sample are listed
in Appendix D.1.
In the following section, we introduce and discuss our empirical strategy as well as
the dependent and independent variables used in our model.
76For example, several medical service plans and medical wholesale companies are listed as life insur-
ance companies in Datastream’s company lists.
77Consequently, HMOs, managed care, and title insurance companies are not included in the final sam-
ple.
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5.3 Empirical strategy
In our empirical study, we focus on the determinants of default risk for an interna-
tional sample of 308 non-life insurers for the period from 2000 to 2013. As a proxy
for default risk, we employ an insurer’s inverse z-score defined as the standard devi-
ation of an insurer’s return on assets from the previous five years over the sum of the
equity ratio and return on assets.78 Qualitatively, the z-score measures by how many
standard deviations profits have to decrease below the mean profits in order to equal a
firm’s equity. Measuring the financial default risk of financial institutions using the z-
score methodology is widely utilized in the finance literature (see, e.g., Anginer et al.,
2014b).79 Additionally, the z-score of an insurer could also be calculated by using
(stock) market data or a combination of accounting and stock market data. In theory,
the calculation of a firm’s z-score based on accounting variables should be equivalent
to using the average of stock returns and stock return volatility (see, e.g., Scha¨fer et al.,
2015). In our study, we use the approach based on balance-sheet data as it does not re-
duce our sample size due to problems with data availability (see also, e.g., Boyd et al.,
2006, Tykvova and Borell, 2012). For the sake of an easier interpretation, we employ
the inverse of a firm’s z-score as our main dependent variable, where higher values
of the inverse z-score indicate a greater degree of financial distress of the insurance
company. The following subsections describe our empirical model and introduce the
explanatory variables.
5.3.1 Econometric design
In our empirical study, we investigate the relation between an insurer’s default risk,
measured by the inverse of the z-score, and firm characteristics with a focus on mea-
78Using a five-year rolling window for the estimation of the standard deviation provides more variation
and thus, the z-score calculation is not entirely dependent on the equity ratio and annual return on
assets. However, some studies employ only, e.g., three-year rolling windows in order to minimize a
possible loss of observations due to a lack of data availability (see, e.g., Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013,
Schaeck et al., 2012).
79The first multivariate insolvency measure based on accounting data is introduced in Altman (1968).
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sures of the insurer’s solvency. To do so, we analyze annual data for an international
panel of non-life insurers for the time period from 2000 to 2013. We include one-year
lags of our dependent variable to account for persistence of an insurer’s default risk in
our analysis. To model such persistence in insurers’ default risk, we estimate dynamic
panel regressions of the following type:
DEFAULT RISKit “ αi ` νt ` β1 ˆ DEFAULT RISKit´1 (5.1)
` β2 ˆ SOLVENCYit ` Θˆ CONTROLSit ` εit
where DEFAULT RISKit is the inverse z-score of insurer i in year t, SOLVENCYit is one
of our respective solvency measures and CONTROLSit are firm characteristics. Further,
we run all regressions using the (one-step) GMM estimator (see Blundell and Bond,
1998) and employ double-lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments. We
include insurer-fixed effects αi and year-dummies νt to capture unobserved heterogene-
ity across our sample.
5.3.2 Explanatory variables
We include various idiosyncratic and country-specific explanatory variables as controls
in our regressions. An overview of all variables and their definitions and data sources
is given in Appendix D.2. Our main variables of interest proxy for the solvency of
insurance companies. Naturally, we would expect that the ability to pay short-term
and long-term liabilities is most vital to the default probability of a firm. However,
especially insurance companies are inclined to reserve enough capital to cover the
risk arising from future claims with stochastic occurrence (both short-term and long-
term).80 The non-life insurance business is rather short-term orientated compared to
the life insurance business where contracts have a longer maturity. Therefore, we
80Also, short-term and long-term solvency have been proposed by IAIS (2007) to be key indicators for
an insurer’s default risk.
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assume that non-life insurers’ default risk depends on short-term rather than long-term
solvency.
There are several ways to measure different facets of solvency for an insurance com-
pany. For example, the solvency ratio of an insurer describes the size of its capital
relative to the premiums written, and measures an insurer’s risk of experiencing un-
covered claims. Other solvency ratios include debt to equity, total debt to total assets,
and interest coverage ratios. Further, the solvency of an insurance company could be
assessed using regulatory capital, which is often determined using prescribed rules by,
e.g., regulators. In practice, insurance companies hold higher levels of capital and eco-
nomic capital is assessed using risk-based models. Alternative methods to determine
regulatory and economic capital have been proposed to capture the insurance default
risk adequately.81
In our study, we include two different proxies for the solvency of a non-life insurance
company. We calculate the current solvency by the insurer’s net income divided by
the sum of short-term debt and portion of long-term debt. Furthermore, to estimate
the solvency for a longer time frame, we calculate an insurer’s long-term solvency
by taking its total long-term insurance reserves divided by its total liabilities. For a
longer time frame, we focus on the insurers’ capital which includes technical reserves,
accounting provisions, and capital for losses in asset positions. Higher values of each
of the two proxies indicate better an improved ability of an insurer to pay back its
liabilities and thus, are expected to decrease the level of default risk of an insurance
company.
While the two variables above proxy for an insurer’s active operating cash flow and
solvency, we are also interested in whether the sheer size of capital buffers against
unexpected high losses is relevant in determining default risk. We include the natural
logarithm of capital surplus as an additional explanatory variable in our analysis and
expect it to be negatively related to the inverse z-score (see also, e.g., Carson and Hoyt,
81For example, Mayers and Smith (2010) calculate solvency ratios by the insurers’ market value and
price of the insurance contracts written. Other authors use different methods based on the economic
value of the balance sheet to measure the allocation of solvency capital (see, e.g., Cummins, 2000).
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2000).
In addition to our measures of insurer solvency, we employ several other insurer-
specific characteristics that may be significant drivers of individual default risk. We in-
clude the variable debt maturity which is defined as the ratio of total long-term debt to
total debt. It exists a wide consensus among economists and regulators that the depen-
dence of certain banks and insurers on short-term funding exposed these institutions
to liquidity distress during the financial crisis (see, e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009, Cummins and Weiss, 2014, Fahlenbrach et al., 2012).82 In our analysis, we as-
sume that the variable debt maturity not only influences an insurer’s systemic relevance
(see, e.g., Bierth et al., 2015), but also the idiosyncratic default risk.
To characterize the quality of the risk portfolio, we obtain information on the insur-
ers’ loss ratio by employing the sum of claim and loss expenses and long-term insur-
ance reserves dividing by premiums earned. In the absence of non-traditional business
activities of insurers, the composition of their risk portfolio should be the determining
factor for the probability of default. Whenever the claim and loss expenses exceed
the earned premiums by a large magnitude, it is an indicator of either poor risk man-
agement or underwriting abilities and reflect the overall profitability and soundness of
the insurance firm. Thus, we expect that higher loss ratios are associated with higher
default risk and therefore should enter our regression analyses with a positive signed
coefficient.
Next, we are interested in whether the quality and efficiency of an insurer’s man-
agement affects its overall default risk. In order to proxy for such inefficiencies, we
calculate an insurer’s operating expense ratio given by the ratio of operating expenses
to total assets. Higher values of the operating expense ratio express a less efficient
management of the insurance company and thus, is very likely to decrease the overall
soundness of the insurer.
Also, we proxy for an insurer’s leverage by taking the sum of earned and unearned
82Also, the (IAIS) includes the ratio of the absolute sum of short-term borrowing to total assets in its
methodological framework as a key indicator of systemic relevance of an insurance company (see
IAIS, 2011, 2013).
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premiums divided by capital surplus. Many studies argue that high leverage may in-
crease the overall risk of a firm if the leverage ratio has reached values beyond a certain
optimum, after which it decreases firm value (see, e.g., Carson and Hoyt, 2000).
As another idiosyncratic variable, we employ an insurer’s annual premium growth
(in percent) in booked premiums. A positive and higher growth rate increases the
insurers’ leverage in case of constant equity and thus, can be risky beyond a certain
optimum. On the other hand, a strong growth in booked premiums might also indi-
cate that an insurer’s business is in demand. Thus, we argue that premium growth
could have both, a positive and negative impact on default risk. Therefore, we have no
expectations regarding the sign of its coefficient in our regressions.
Finally, to control for country-specific factors (such as the business climate) that
generally influence the well-being of an insurance company in different countries, we
also include a country’s annual real GDP growth rate (in %) and the log of the annual
change of the GDP deflator.
5.3.3 Descriptive statistics
We start our empirical analysis by presenting selected descriptive statistics for both full
sample and sub-samples. To minimize possible biases stemming from extremely high
or low values in our data, we winsorize each of our variables at the 1% and 99% level.
To describe our data sample in more detail, Table 5.1 shows the number of observa-
tions for our main independent variables of insurer solvency for each country.
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Table 5.1: Number of observations per country.
The table presents the number of observations of the two variables that describe a non-life insurer’s solvency per country. The sample consists of 308 international non-life
insurers and runs from 2000 to 2013. Solvency is an insurer’s net income divided by the sum of short-term debt and portion of long-term debt. Long-term solvency is defined
as the total long-term insurance reserves divided by total liabilities. Data sources are given in Appendix D.2.
Country Solvency Long-term solvency Country Solvency Long-term solvency
AUSTRALIA 30 10 MALAYSIA 19 26
AUSTRIA 0 19 MALTA 0 8
BAHRAIN 4 13 MEXICO 0 11
BERMUDA 60 108 NIGERIA 9 20
BRAZIL 19 14 NORWAY 3 4
CANADA 37 49 OMAN 13 15
CAYMAN ISLANDS 1 8 PAKISTAN 26 94
CHINA 15 5 PERU 3 14
CROATIA 4 16 POLAND 13 18
CYPRUS 4 7 QATAR 19 18
DENMARK 26 43 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 0 8
EGYPT 2 0 SAUDI ARABIA 0 53
FINLAND 9 22 SINGAPORE 0 5
FRANCE 20 21 SOUTH AFRICA 6 0
GERMANY 19 62 SPAIN 0 18
GREECE 4 24 SWITZERLAND 28 68
HONG KONG 17 5 TAIWAN 5 30
INDONESIA 5 80 THAILAND 118 27
IRELAND 17 13 TUNISIA 0 17
ISRAEL 20 18 TURKEY 9 41
ITALY 57 143 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 56 103
JAPAN 62 165 UNITED KINGDOM 76 64
JORDAN 13 72 UNITED STATES 585 479
SOUTH KOREA 35 129 VIETNAM 2 24
KUWAIT 14 30
LUXEMBOURG 15 14
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First, we notice that the number of observations differs substantially for long-term
solvency and for the solvency variable. We find more data points for the insurers’
long-term solvency than for the solvency variable in the whole sample. Second, the
maximum number of available observations per country for both variables is given by
479 for the United States, followed by 165 for Japan. We later address this finding by
performing analyses that compare the impact of idiosyncratic variables on the default
risk of U.S. and non-U.S. non-life insurers. Overall, we include non-life insurers from
50 different countries.
Next, we turn to the more detailed description of our sample by reporting relevant
statistics for selected variables. Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics for the main
variables used in our empirical study.
Summary statistics for data values used in our baseline regressions are given sep-
arately in two panels for our full sample and for the sub-sample of large insurers,
respectively. Since data availability for the solvency and long-term solvency variables
differs across countries, it is reasonable to report descriptive statistics for both samples
used in the regressions.
First, we notice that the mean of the annual default risk variable is higher for the
samples with long-term solvency and the standard deviation is almost twice as high.
For the panel of large non-life insurers, we find qualitatively the same relation. Turn-
ing to the solvency variable, we observe a maximum of 2,755.96, which is significantly
higher as the average value of 116.96 indicating the presence of few outliers. As ex-
pected, large insurers have a significantly higher average solvency ratio.
For the long-term solvency, we find no relevant differences for the mean and stan-
dard deviation besides that a maximum value of 0.853 can be found among the smaller
and medium sized insurers. The average loss ratio of large insurers is similar for both
samples and we find a lower quality of the insurers’ risk portfolio among the full
sample. Since the operating expense ratio for large insurers is significantly smaller,
we argue that larger insurers might in fact have a more efficient management than
their smaller counterparts (this is in line with larger insurers being able to generate
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of the full sample.
The table presents descriptive statistics of the inverse z-score and the main explanatory variables for a sample of 308 international non-life insurers (corresponding to our
baseline regressions including the variables solvency and long-term solvency). The sample period runs from 2000 to 2013. Additionally, the table presents descriptive
statistics for our set of explanatory variables for non-life insurers in the fourth quartile of total assets (large). We report the number of observations N, minimum and
maximum values, mean and standard deviation. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix D.2.
Sample Full Full
N=790 Mean St. Dev. Min Max N=720 Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Inverse z-score 0.728 1.204 0.034 15.864 1.084 2.226 0.034 15.864
Solvency 116.957 411.821 0.028 2755.960 - - - -
Long-term solvency - - - - 0.036 0.071 0.000 0.853
Loss ratio 67.991 17.483 4.501 128.617 70.200 15.878 4.501 128.617
Operating efficiency 0.282 0.160 0.015 0.957 0.285 0.138 0.038 0.810
Debt maturity 0.545 0.391 0.000 1.000 0.728 0.375 0.000 1.000
Sample Large Large
N=364 Mean St. Dev. Min Max N=338 Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Default risk 0.732 1.168 0.034 9.979 0.952 2.050 0.034 15.864
Solvency 157.395 496.694 0.028 2755.960 - - - -
Long-term solvency - - - - 0.039 0.061 0.000 0.284
Loss ratio 75.956 14.469 14.950 128.617 75.570 14.889 14.950 128.617
Operating efficiency 0.247 0.124 0.048 0.692 0.247 0.114 0.038 0.599
Debt maturity 0.715 0.326 0.000 1.000 0.780 0.331 0.000 1.000
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economies of scale).
In addition to the summary statistics for our full sample, we also present descrip-
tive statistics separately for samples in which the insurers are either above and below
the median values of the respective solvency measure. The descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 5.3.
Panel A of Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics for the observations above and
below of the median value of the solvency variable. For the values of default risk with
observations below the median of solvency, we find a higher mean (1.19) and standard
deviation (2.19) than in the sample with values above the median solvency (0.68 and
1.23). Also, the t-test of the equality of means is highly significant for every variable
except size. Furthermore, higher solvency is associated with a lower mean in operating
expense ratio and thus, higher operating efficiency.
Turning to the statistics for observations above and below the median values of our
long-term solvency variable (Panel B), we find a statistically significant difference in
the means of the inverse z-score for the two samples. Less long-term solvency is
associated with a higher value of the inverse z-score and thus, a higher probability of
default for the firm, which is intuitive. Looking at the loss ratio of non-life insurers, we
find that more long-term solvency, on average, is associated with lower loss ratios and
thus, a higher quality of the the company’s risk portfolio. Although this is intuitive,
we find the reverse relation in Panel A, where short-term solvency is associated with
higher loss ratios. Thus, we find slight differences between the dynamics of solvency
and long-term solvency.83
In Panel C, we present descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest with
our sample being split up using the median value of capital surplus as the cut-off.
Obviously, the overall number of observations is higher for capital surplus than for the
other two variables, mainly due to data availability. Splitting the full sample according
to this variable, however, does not reveal any significant differences in default risk.
The findings for the loss ratios are similar to those in Panel B. In contrast to the other
83Also, note that the number and distribution of observations for these two variables differ substantially.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for observations above and below the median values of solvency measures.
The table compares the characteristics of an international sample of non-life insurers for the time period from 2000 to 2013 for observations that are above or below the
median values for three different solvency measures. We report the number of observations, minimum, maximum, mean, median, and the standard deviation of an insurer’s
inverse z-score and selected control variables. We test the equality of means of the two samples using Welch’s t-test for unequal sample sizes. ***,**,* denote estimates that
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix D.2.
Panel A: Solvency Above Below t-value
N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
Inverse z-score 527 1.19 2.19 0.52 0.04 17.59 539 0.68 1.23 0.35 0.04 17.59 4.73 ***
Size 577 21.77 2.73 21.86 15.63 26.61 577 21.66 2.47 21.88 15.63 26.61 0.72
Loss ratio 533 70.39 18.31 70.36 2.20 129.25 561 64.58 19.71 67.48 2.20 129.25 5.05 ***
Operating efficiency 519 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.01 0.91 548 0.30 0.18 0.26 0.01 0.96 -3.38 ***
Panel B: Long-term solvency Above Below
N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
Inverse z-score 776 1.11 2.45 0.46 0.04 17.59 676 1.45 2.89 0.42 0.04 17.59 -2.37 **
Size 947 21.17 2.37 21.33 15.63 26.61 947 20.48 2.69 19.99 15.63 26.61 5.90 ***
Loss ratio 939 63.11 20.42 64.28 2.20 129.25 946 73.46 22.77 76.55 2.20 129.25 -10.39 ***
Operating efficiency 919 0.29 0.16 0.26 0.01 0.96 589 0.38 0.20 0.32 0.04 0.96 -8.43 ***
Panel C: Capital surplus Above Below
N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
Inverse z-score 919 1.23 2.76 0.39 0.04 17.59 949 1.02 2.16 0.43 0.04 17.59 1.78 *
Size 1,116 19.73 1.94 19.77 15.63 25.99 1,116 22.89 1.75 22.81 17.85 26.61 -40.48 ***
Loss ratio 1,070 63.72 19.94 65.23 2.20 129.25 1,068 70.24 17.56 70.13 2.20 129.25 -8.03 ***
Operating efficiency 1,116 0.37 0.21 0.32 0.01 0.96 1,106 0.26 0.14 0.24 0.01 0.96 15.36 ***
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solvency ratios, we find lower operating efficiency for observations above the median
of capital surplus.
5.4 Empirical results
In this section, we investigate which factors determine a non-life insurer’s default risk.
First, we comment on the evolution of the idiosyncratic default risk of insurers in our
data during the sample period. Then, we discuss the results of our baseline panel
regressions. Subsequently, we report and comment on further results of additional
multivariate analyses.
5.4.1 Insurer default risk
The following Figure 5.1 presents the time evolution of insures’ default risk. More
precisely, the figure plots the time evolution of the mean, the 10%- and 90%-quantile
of the inverse z-score of the international sample of non-life insurer, outside of the
United States, as well as for the sample of U.S. non-life insurers for the sample period
from 2000 to 2013.
The first panel shows the time evolution of the U.S. non-life insurers. As shown
in the figure, U.S. non-life insurers’ average default risk (grey-shaded area) increased
immensely during the dot-com crisis in 2002 and during the years 2010 and 2012.84
Interestingly, the mean of the inverse z-score in 2011 and 2012 is above the 90%-
quantile, probably due to outliers in that year. Before the recent financial crisis, the
default risk of U.S. non-life insurers declined over the years but stayed on a relatively
low level.
Turning to the time evolution of the non-U.S. non-life insurers illustrated in the
second panel, it is not surprising that the average default risk increased steeply during
the financial crisis. In contrast to the U.S. sub-sample, the level of default risk for the
84Since we calculate the z-score using balance sheet data, we can see an effect of variation in balance
sheet data due to the recent financial crisis in 2010 up to 2012.
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Figure 5.1: Time evolution of insurers’ default risk for the period from 2000 to 2013.
The figure illustrates the time evolution of U.S. and non-U.S. non-life insurers’ inverse z-score. Z-score
is defined as the sum of an insurer’s equity ratio and its return on assets over the standard deviation of
return on assets during the previous five years. White areas present the values of the 10%-quantile and
black bars present the 90%-quantile of insurer’s inverse z-score per year. Grey shaded areas indicate the
mean values of inverse z-score per year.
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time period from 2000 to 2010 is considerably higher. However, we find no evidence
for such high statistical outliers in 2011 and 2012 as for the other sample. The evolution
of the inverse z-score values before the crisis period is comparable to those found for
the U.S. sample. Finally, we notice that the level of default risk in the U.S. is lower in
comparison with the non-U.S. non-life insurers.
5.4.2 Determinants of insurers’ default risk
Following our univariate investigation of insurers’ default risk, we now describe the
results of our multivariate analyses. First, we run panel regressions for the time period
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from 2000 to 2013 using firm-fixed effects and year dummies. The estimates resulting
from the (one-step) GMM-sys approach are given in Table 5.4.
Columns (1) - (6) present the results of regressions using the full sample of non-
life insurers while (7) - (12) show analyses with observations in the fourth quartile of
insurers’ total assets.
In the first three regressions, we include the variable solvency among other idiosyn-
cratic factors and a country’s GDP growth and inflation rate. Most strikingly, we ob-
serve that the solvency measure does not seem to play a significant role in any of these
regressions. Thus, the short-term ability to pay off debt is not the determining factor
when assessing an insurer’s default risk. The same conclusion is valid for the regres-
sions of default risk on solvency for the sample of large insurers in (7) - (9).
In contrast to these results, we find a strong negative relation between our measure of
long-term solvency and an insurer’s inverse z-score. The larger the ratio of long-term
insurance reserves and total liabilities in a non-life insurance company, the lower is its
default risk as measured by the inverse z-score. Although the non-life insurance busi-
ness is more volatile than, e.g., the business of life insurance contracts, the ability to
meet long-term liabilities is nonetheless an essential component to preserve firm stabil-
ity. It equips the insurance company with sufficient buffers to compensate unexpected
high losses in the future. We conclude that although we would expect short-term sol-
vency to be the determining factor of non-life insurers’ default risk (since their claims
are rather short-term and more volatile), long-term solvency significantly reduces de-
fault risk over the full sample. The effect of long-term solvency is also economically
significant with a one standard deviation increase of the insurers long-term solvency
being associated with a minus 43.35% p´6.108 ˆ 0.071q decrease of the insurers’
inverse z-score.
However, when we restrict our sample to large insurers, this significance vanishes.
One explanation for this might be the higher level of long-term solvency of larger
non-life insurers in general. Thus, the effect of this variable is not relevant for the
sample of large insurers. Our observations from Table 5.2 support this view in the
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Table 5.4: Panel regressions of non-life insurers’ default risk (2000-2013).
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of the inverse z-score on solvency measures of insurers and control variables. Regressors are defined in
Appendix D.2. The lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions. We employ double-lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments. P-values are given
in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Sample Full Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Inverse z-scoret´1 0.106*** 0.113*** 0.164*** -0.058 -0.067* -0.044 0.215*** 0.201*** 0.212*** 0.147** 0.116** 0.147**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.066) (0.249) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012)
Solvency 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.188) (0.159) (0.247) (0.313) (0.412) (0.455)
Long-term solvency -6.098*** -6.108*** -6.443** -4.133 -2.756 -4.063
(0.001) (0.000) (0.024) (0.297) (0.408) (0.347)
Loss ratio 0.010*** 0.009** 0.017*** 0.019** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.023** 0.023*** 0.026**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.007) (0.020)
Operating efficiency 0.897* 0.573 0.601 8.518*** 7.248*** 7.871*** 1.163* 1.260** 1.783** 4.518** 2.897 4.782**
(0.072) (0.214) (0.254) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.036) (0.017) (0.039) (0.112) (0.042)
Debt maturity 0.171 0.205 -0.063 0.470 0.377 0.444 0.219 0.278 0.246 -0.149 -0.203 -0.305
(0.342) (0.230) (0.711) (0.175) (0.285) (0.254) (0.333) (0.183) (0.323) (0.739) (0.615) (0.521)
Premium growth 0.036 0.240 0.114 0.376
(0.798) (0.401) (0.531) (0.263)
GDP growth -0.045 0.140** -0.033 -0.031
(0.114) (0.041) (0.341) (0.749)
Inflation 0.016 0.099 -0.001 0.087
(0.544) (0.133) (0.972) (0.309)
Observations 790 725 590 720 677 628 364 324 328 338 312 322
Wald 250.64 310.66 296.14 255.19 299.93 280.10 230.47 284.63 230.5 143.38 166.26 139.61
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
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way that large insurers have a slightly higher average value of long-term solvency, but
also less dispersion. In this case, it shows that there is less variation in the values of
solvency among the sub-sample of large non-life insurers and thus, these variables do
not play a significant role in this specific analysis. Another reason might be that the
observations in the fourth quartile of insurers’ total assets are those tied to a specific
group of countries. For example, U.S. non-life insurers are on average larger in size
and make up the largest part of our sample. To understand this finding in detail, we
run additional analyses that are concerned with the question whether insurers’ default
risk is driven by country-specific differences rather than idiosyncratic ones. Before
we turn to these analyses, we highlight a few more findings from Table 5.4. First,
we find that a non-life insurer’s loss ratio, as a proxy for the quality of an insurer’s
risk portfolio, is positively related to its inverse z-score. Second, the less efficient the
insurance company operates, the higher its default risk. The effect of the proportion of
long-term debt on an insurer’s default risk, however, is insignificant.
As a first step towards a cross-country analysis of insurers’ default risk, we include
a country’s respective GDP growth and inflation rate in regressions (3) and (6). While
we find a significant positive relation between GDP growth and default risk in (6),
this effect vanishes in (3), where we have other restrictions on our observations due to
differences in data availability for the two solvency measures.
To further investigate possible differences in default risk across our sample insurers
due to country-specific effects, we split our sample into U.S. and non-U.S. insurers.
U.S. insurers are different in the way that regulation does not require them to maintain
higher solvency capital standards in contrast to what, e.g., the Solvency II framework
in the European Union demands of European insurers.85 We repeat our baseline re-
gressions for these two separate samples. The results are shown in Table 5.5.
85Further, one of the main key differences between the two systems is that Solvency II has a stricter
approach than the U.S. regulatory system.
In an effort to protect the interests of all stakeholders, the EU prescribes a strict provision for capital
adequacy that may require a higher level of capitalization than in the United States. In contrast, the
U.S. regulation focuses on free-markets and competition to discipline insurers.
5
.4
.
EM
PIR
ICA
L
R
ESU
LTS
147
Table 5.5: Panel regressions of default risk: U.S. and non-U.S. non-life insurers.
The table shows the results of the (one-step) GMM-sys estimation of the inverse z-score on solvency measures of insurers and control variables for U.S.-based and insurers
outside of the United States. Regressors are defined in Appendix D.2. The lagged dependent variable is included in the regressions and we employ double-lagged values of
the dependent variable as instruments. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Sample U.S. Non-U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inverse z-scoret´1 0.0018 0.0133 -0.1861*** -0.1474*** 0.2577*** 0.2723*** 0.1310*** 0.1303***
(0.892) (0.283) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Solvency -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.428) (0.224) (0.281) (0.390)
Long-term solvency -5.7025 -5.1100 -4.0805*** -4.2808***
(0.498) (0.516) (0.006) (0.004)
Loss ratio 0.0087*** 0.0126*** 0.0488*** 0.0530*** 0.0053 0.0067* 0.0114* 0.0140**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.152) (0.063) (0.057) (0.017)
Operating efficiency 0.1644 0.5262** 4.5160*** 5.1076*** 2.3139*** 1.9488*** 7.5607*** 6.7316***
(0.574) (0.031) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt maturity -0.0171 0.0473 0.7247 0.1578 -0.0441 0.0005 -0.1611 -0.2213
(0.856) (0.548) (0.136) (0.727) (0.811) (0.998) (0.562) (0.426)
Premium growth 0.0940 0.1325 -0.5102*** -0.3446
(0.112) (0.717) (0.003) (0.145)
Observations 446 394 288 260 613 569 664 630
Wald 514.48 666.95 176.44 141.47 453.27 466.1 292.22 324.8
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
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First, we notice that in the case of U.S. non-life insurers, none of the two measures
of solvency enters the regressions with a statistically significant coefficient. For non-
U.S. insurers, however, we find similar results as in our baseline regressions. Different
from the findings in the regressions using the U.S. sample, we find that the loss ra-
tio is a less significant factor when explaining default risk of non-U.S. insurers. We
conclude that U.S. non-life insurers’ default risk is not as dependent on the level of
long-term and short-term solvency as for their non-U.S. counterparts. This substan-
tial difference in the decomposition of insurers’ default risk underlines the findings in
Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013), who reveal that institutional differences across coun-
tries significantly drive differences in insurers’ z-score.
5.4.3 Country effects and further analyses
As our next step, we disaggregate effects in our analysis that are due to differences
in idiosyncratic and economic or regulatory environments in the home countries of
insurers in our sample. Fundamental distress could be caused by current economic
downturns or could be systematically influenced by, e.g., a stricter regulation of busi-
ness activities or capital requirements.
Having pointed out that there are indeed differences in the non-life insurers’ de-
fault risk across countries (see Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013), we are interested in the
explanatory power of such country effects. In order to do so, we estimate additional
pooled OLS regressions using country dummies instead of firm-level effects and run
standard analyses of covariances. The estimates for the pooled OLS regressions (with
clustered standard errors on the country-level) are given in Table 5.6.
In columns (1) - (5), we report the OLS estimates for the regressions that include
single variables and which are estimated with country-fixed and time-fixed effects.
First, we include an insurer’s natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for its size.
We observe a negative relation to the inverse z-score and thus, a decreasing effect on
default risk86. Similar to the results above, an insurer’s loss ratio and its operating
86Note that we do not report regressions with an insurer’s size in our baseline regression since it is highly
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Table 5.6: Pooled OLS regressions of non-life insurers’ default risk on country
dummies (2000-2013).
The table shows the results of pooled OLS regressions of the inverse z-score on solvency measures of
insurers, country dummy variables, and control variables. Results for selected country dummy variables
are reported in the table while the other dummies are suppressed. Regressors are defined in Appendix
D.2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering on the firm level, p-values are given in parentheses, and
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size -0.1433***
(0.007)
Leverage 0.0000
(0.805)
Surplus -0.0151
(0.718)
Loss ratio 0.0184*** 0.0091 0.0266**
(0.001) (0.152) (0.036)
Operating efficiency 0.8472** 1.3080* 3.6157***
(0.031) (0.060) (0.001)
Solvency -0.0001**
(0.029)
Long-term solvency -6.4534*
(0.062)
Debt maturity -0.0424 0.2308
(0.826) (0.378)
Constant 4.5404*** 1.4625*** 1.5501*** 0.1657 1.1710*** -0.3954 -1.3675
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.707) (0.000) (0.462) (0.121)
Country-fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time-fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,684 1,650 1,786 2,514 2,360 933 859
R2 0.1241 0.1022 0.1156 0.1347 0.118 0.2034 0.1798
expense ratio enter the respective regressions with a statistically significant positive
sign.87
Additionally, we estimate pooled OLS regressions employing the two additional
variables capital surplus and leverage. Beyond a certain optimal point, high leverage
is expected to increase the likelihood of a firm’s default and thus, we assume that our
variable leverage enters the regressions with a positive sign. While this is the case in
our sample, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Similarly, we find an intuitive
negative relation of the logarithm of capital surplus and an insurer’s inverse z-score,
but no statistical significance.
correlated with some of our main variables and would bias the estimates. Instead, we opted for more
granular insurer characteristics than size.
87Note that the number of observations in these regressions is reasonably higher than in our baseline
regressions due to data availability for other variables.
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Columns (6) and (7) report estimates using our baseline model (without the lagged
dependent variable). For long-term solvency, we find qualitatively similar results as in
our previous analyses with the difference that the estimate of the coefficient of long-
term solvency is only statistically significant at the 10% level. In the absence of firm-
fixed effects, which capture unobserved heterogeneity in our sample, our measure for
short-term solvency becomes a significant driver for an insurer’s default risk. The
coefficient enters the regression with a statistically significant negative sign and thus,
reduces the default risk in this model.
Finally, we analyze the decomposition of our default risk measure by employing
a standard analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) (see, e.g., Altuntas et al., 2015). We
include several firm-level determinants as well as country and year dummies to explore
the degree to which each factor contributes to the variance of insurers’ inverse z-score.
For each variable, we calculate the ratio of the Type III partial sum of squares and the
sum across all effects (times 100) in the model. The results are given in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Variance decomposition of non-life insurer default risk (2000-2013).
The table shows the variance decomposition of insurers’ inverse z-score obtained from an analysis
of covariance. Numbers represent the partial sum of squares for each variable in the model divided
by the sum of squares of all effects (the total sum is 100). Explanatory variables include firm-level
determinants, country dummies, and time dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix D.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Size - 5.40 - - - - - - -
Leverage - - 0.02 - - - - - -
Surplus - - - 0.10 - - - - -
Loss ratio - - - - 10.16 2.63 8.86 0.88 9.00
Operating efficiency - - - - - 3.98 9.40 2.25 7.87
Debt maturity - - - - - 0.03 0.44 0.96 4.89
Solvency - - - - - 0.53 - 0.40 -
Long-term solvency - - - - - - 4.06 - 1.71
Inverse z-scoret´1 - - - - - - - 24.47 5.10
Country-fixed effects 76.41 72.10 67.55 73.56 71.17 82.00 56.52 57.57 41.79
Time-fixed effects 23.59 22.51 32.43 26.34 18.67 10.83 20.71 13.48 29.63
Observations 2,684 2,684 1,650 1,786 2,514 933 859 790 720
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.28 0.08
In column (1), we include year dummy variables and country-fixed effects and ob-
serve that in this simple setting the country effects account for over 75% of the vari-
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ation of an insurer’s inverse z-score. We continue like in our pooled OLS regressions
by including single variables in our models to see what fraction is determined by id-
iosyncratic factors. The size of an insurance company explains about 5.4% of the
dependent variable’s variance while the capital surplus and leverage variables, which
were insignificant in the OLS regressions, account for less than one percent. When we
employ a non-life insurer’s loss ratio as the only idiosyncratic variable in the model,
we find that it determines almost twice as much of the fraction than the proxy for an
insurer’s size.
Next, we include all variables from our baseline analyses (which also significantly
reduces the sample size in these models) and run separate analyses with and without
one lag of inverse z-score. The results are reported in columns (6) - (9). For the models
including our long-term solvency variable, we observe that the loss ratio and operating
expense ratio both account for a little less than 10% of the variation in default risk
and thus, possess a relatively high explanatory power compared to other firm-specific
factors. Interestingly, we find that the lag of inverse z-score explains a relatively high
proportion of the variance in these models. Still, we find that country effects and also
time dummies explain most of the variations in our settings. In terms to the previous
analysis we find that the long-term solvency capital endowment is the main buffer to
reduce financial distress. Additionally we find no evidence in our study for the U.S.
non-life insurance industry with the respective as a low stands regulatory guidelines
for a reducing effect of financial distress in interaction with long-term solvency.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of default risk of 308 international non-life
insurers in the period from 2000 to 2013. As our main result, we find that default risk
as measured by the inverse z-score is negatively related to non-life insurers’ long-term
solvency and positively related to the insurers’ loss ratios. Interestingly, we find only
little evidence that higher short-term solvency is associated with lower default risk.
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Restricting our sample to only large insurers (with total assets in the fourth quartile
of the full sample) reveals that none of the solvency measures is a significant driver
of the default risk in that sub-sample. Also, when we compare the samples of U.S.
and non-U.S. non-life insurers, we find that there are differences in the determinants
of default risk across countries. While we confirm the results of our full sample anal-
ysis for non-U.S. insurers, we find no significant relation of any solvency measure for
the insurers from the United States. One Reason might be for example the European
Union with it’s new insurer regulation system Solvency II and the corresponding cap-
ital requirement rules. The country specific regulation systems and the corresponding
requirements affect the model of insurer business in different ways including the re-
spective government specific intention.
Further, we explore the explanatory power of single indicators of distress in compar-
ison to country effects and find that default risk is to a large extent driven by country-
specific factors. The fraction of the variance of the inverse z-score explained by two
different measures of solvency is small compared to other variables. Of all idiosyn-
cratic insurer characteristics used in this study, we observe that an insurer’s loss ratio
and operating expense ratio are among the best predictors of a firm’s financial distress.
Our study contributes to the discussion on solvency capital requirements in the in-
surance sector and stresses the importance of an insurer’s regulatory environment for
its default risk. Most importantly, regulation aiming at increasing an insurer’s mid-
and long-term solvency appear to be a powerful tool for significantly decreasing an
insurer’s default risk.
153
Chapter 6
Derivatives Usage and Default Risk in
the U.S. Insurance Sector
6.1 Introduction
Financial and non-financial companies employ derivative instruments for a variety of
reasons. Most obviously, companies use derivatives for hedging risky positions on
their balance sheet. In contrast, companies could also use financial derivatives for other
reasons, like lowering their expected costs of defaulting, lowering expected taxes, or
reducing the volatility of executive compensations (see, e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985,
Froot et al., 1993, DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). Finally, some firms might simply be
using financial derivatives in their trading business, thereby increasing rather than de-
creasing their total firm risk. For insurance companies, which are by definition exposed
to a variety of risks, hedging should be the prime motive for using derivative instru-
ments. However, the literature still lacks an empirical investigation into the effects the
usage of derivatives by insurers has on the institutions’ default and systemic risk.
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and mainly due to the near-collapse
of American International Group (AIG), regulators have become increasingly careful
not to rule out a destabilizing effect of individual systemically important insurers on the
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financial sector.88 In the context of regulators’ endeavour to implement a macropruden-
tial regulatory regime for insurers (see, e.g., IAIS, 2013), especially derivatives trading
and usage have been named as a potential source of systemic risk. The allegedly ad-
verse effect of derivatives usage on an insurer’s firm risk, however, is not as obvious as
regulators sometimes claim it to be. While derivatives trading for risk-taking should
obviously increase firm risk, the use of derivatives for hedging purposes should (at
least in theory) have a decreasing effect on an insurer’s default risk. Insurers often em-
ploy derivatives to hedge various risks stemming from both sides of the balance sheet.
For example, insurers are exposed to interest rate risk (due to guarantees for their poli-
cies) and via their debt financing. Also, insurers are often considerably exposed to
foreign currency and market risk on their investments and liabilities. Derivatives may
also substitute assets as part of an insurer’s asset-liability-management (ALM).89 On
the other hand, some insurers could engage in derivatives trading simply for generating
profit, a possibility which has been heavily criticized by, e.g., the IAIS (2011, 2013).
An empirical test of the unknown relation between an insurer’s derivatives usage (and
its intended purpose) on the insurer’s default risk and systemic risk exposure, however,
has not yet been executed in the literature.
Motivated by the view of the IAIS (2013) that derivative usage and trading con-
stitute a source of systemic risk in the insurance industry, this paper investigates the
relation between the individual default risk of insurance companies and their disclosed
information on derivatives usage. More precisely, we evaluate the 10-K filings of U.S.
insurance companies to obtain information on the firms’ disclosed derivatives usage,
the intended purpose, and the variety of derivatives used in the insurers’ risk manage-
ment. For a sample of 171 U.S. insurers for the period from 1999 to 2014, we then
perform panel regressions of quarterly default risk estimates on a set of variables that
88Several discussions on measuring systemic risk are given in, e.g., Acharya et al. (2010),
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015), Brownlees and Engle (2015), or Benoit et al. (2013). An overview
of the recent literature on systemic risk and systemic relevance in the insurance industry is given in
Eling and Pankoke (2014).
89For instance, insurers may use simple interest rate swaps to lengthen their assets’ duration and match
it with the duration of their liabilities.
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proxy for the insurers’ use of derivatives and a set of control variables taken from the
literature (see, e.g., Bartram et al., 2011, Cummins et al., 1997, 2001). To control for
the endogenous nature of an insurer’s decision to use derivatives, we match derivative
users with a control group of non-users using nearest neighbor matching based on the
insurers’ size and market-to-book ratios.
The main result in our empirical study is that insurers that employ financial deriva-
tives have a significantly lower risk of defaulting than matched non-using insurers.
We also find empirical evidence that the decreasing effect of derivatives usage on de-
fault risk is reversed in case insurers use derivatives for risk-taking and non-hedging
purposes. Moreover, we find a more pronounced use of derivatives to increase an
insurer’s exposure to systemic market shocks as proxied by the insurer’s Marginal Ex-
pected Shortfall. Our results thus corroborate current views by insurance regulators
that derivatives usage for trading negatively affects financial stability. However, our
findings also underline the risk-reducing and thereby stabilizing effect of using deriva-
tives for hedging purposes.
This paper is related to, and complements several previous studies in the empirical
financial economics literature. In the classical work of Modigliani and Miller (1958),
hedging should not add value to a firm in case capital markets are perfect. In the
presence of market frictions, however, risk management can have a beneficial effect
on firms as shown, e.g., in the studies of Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al. (1993),
Nance et al. (1993), Leland (1998), and Whidbee and Wohar (1999). Not surprisingly,
the empirical results in this literature (see, e.g., Mian, 1996) are also ambiguous with
the expected effects of (and motives for) using financial derivatives still being unclear.
For example, Bartram et al. (2011) find empirical evidence that the use of financial
derivatives significantly reduces both total firm risk and systematic risk. Yet at the
same time, several studies have also stressed the finding that derivatives usage does not
significantly lower firm risk even if it is used for hedging purposes (see, e.g., Tufano,
1996, Allayannis and Weston, 2001, Graham and Rogers, 2002). Guay (1999) also
finds that systematic risk is unaffected by the use of derivatives. Underlining this result,
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Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find that derivative usage is not significantly related to a
firm’s stock return volatility. In addition, the results by Guay and Kothari (2003) and
Jin and Jorion (2006) further reveal that firm market values are relatively unaffected
by hedging activities. For banks during the financial crisis, Trapp and Weiß (2014)
even find an increasing effect of derivatives usage by U.S. banks on the institutions’
systemic equity tail risk.90
Our paper is also related to several studies in the risk management and insurance
literature. To start with, the study by Bartram (2015) finds that derivative users have
higher gross exposures to financial risks compared to non-users. There is no evidence
of speculation with derivatives for sub-samples of firms in individual countries or for
different types of derivatives. Firms use derivatives for hedging independent of access
to derivatives or country-level governance. However, users have larger reductions in
risk compared to non-users if shareholder rights are strong, creditor rights are weak,
and if derivatives are readily available. Further, Cummins and Danzon (1997) find
that insurers use derivatives to hedge their costs of financial distress and interest rate,
liquidity, and exchange rate risks. Cummins et al. (2001) analyze the derivatives hold-
ings of U.S. insurers to explain why widely held, value-maximizing firms engage in
risk management. They suggest that although measures of risk and illiquidity will be
positively associated with an insurer’s decision to engage in risk management. The
same measures of risk will be negatively related to the volume of hedging for the set of
firms, who choose to hedge using derivatives.91 Cummins and Song Drechsler (2008)
study the usage of two common hedging tools, reinsurance and derivatives. In a simple
mean-variance efficient optimization model, the two hedging tools display substitutive
effects when assets and liabilities do not display strong natural hedging.
Furthermore, Pere´z-Gonza´lez and Yun (2013) show that active risk management
policies lead to an increase in firm value. To identify the effect of hedging, they exploit
the introduction of weather derivatives as an exogenous shock to firms’ ability to hedge
90The effects of derivatives usage by banks is also studied, e.g., by Ge´czy et al. (1997).
91A related study in this respect is the work of Colquitt and Hoyt (1997).
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weather risks. Their main result is that risk management has real consequences on firm
outcomes. Cummins et al. (1995) develop a model of price determination in insurance
markets. They find that the price may increase or decrease following a loss shock that
depletes the insurer’s capital, depending on factors such as the effect of the shock on
the price elasticity of demand. Also, their study shows that the price of insurance is
inversely related to insurer default risk.92 Finally, there also exist several studies in the
literature that analyze the use of reinsurance for risk management as an alternative to
derivatives (see, e.g., Cole and McCullough, 2006, Garven et al., 2014). However, no
study has analyzed the effects of derivatives usage on the default risk of insurers so far.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
construction of our data sample. The following Section 6.3 describes the econometric
methodology and the main variables used in our empirical study. Section 6.4 presents
the results of our empirical analysis. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.5.
6.2 Data sources and sample construction
This section describes the construction of our data sample, which is constructed from
data taken from the Morningstar Document Research, the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP), and the Compustat databases, respectively.
We start the construction of our data sample by first selecting all publicly listed U.S.
insurance companies with SIC codes 6311, 6321, 6331 from the dead and active lists
in CRSP for the time period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014.
Financial market data are retrieved from CRSP, while accounting data are collected
from Compustat. We then collect the 10-K filings for all firms in our sample from the
Morningstar Document Research database. Information on the insurers’ risk manage-
ment, hedging activities, as well as their usage of financial derivatives are collected
manually from the insurers’ respective 10-K filings. In addition to these qualitative
variables concerning the insurers’ risk management, we also extract from the 10-K
92They also provide evidence that prices declined in response to the loss shocks of the mid-1980s.
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filings for each insurance company the fair value gains and losses on derivatives po-
sitions. In our process of screening the insurers’ 10-K filings, we include only those
insurance companies in our final sample, for which at least one 10-K filing is available
during the course of our sample period. Furthermore, we manually screen the 10-K
filings for clear identification of the firms as an insurance company and exclude a re-
spective firm from our sample if its 10-K filing indicates a non-insurance business or
if the filing identifies it as a secondary listing.
Finally, we end up with a full sample of 171 U.S. insurers. For increased trans-
parency, the names of all insurers in our final sample are listed in Appendix E.1. In the
next section, we define and discuss the different dependent and independent variables
that we use in our empirical study. In this discussion, emphasis is given to the vari-
ables constructed from the insurers’ 10-K filings which we use to proxy for the firms’
derivatives usage. An overview of all variable definitions and data sources is given in
Appendix E.2.
6.3 Empirical strategy
In this section, we describe the setup of our empirical analysis. First, we introduce
our main dependent variable, with which we try to capture the financial distress of an
insurer. Next, we describe our main independent variables that are used to proxy for
an insurer’s derivatives usage. We continue by discussing our set of insurer-specific
control variables as well as the econometric setup of our analysis. We conclude this
section by presenting selected descriptive statistics on our variables.
6.3.1 Dependent variable
The goal of our empirical analysis is an investigation of the relation between an in-
surer’s default risk and its use of financial derivatives. As a proxy for an insurer’s
default risk, we use the inverse z-score calculated on the basis of the insurer’s stock
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returns.93 In the literature, the z-score is regularly used to proxy for the default risk of
firms and has been discussed in several previous papers (see, e.g., Boyd et al., 2006,
Berger et al., 2009, Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009, Laeven and Levine, 2009, De Nicolo,
2001, Anginer et al., 2014b). As our dependent variable, we employ the insurers’ in-
verse z-scores, which are defined as one divided by the average quarterly stock return
divided by the respective insurer’s stock return volatility over the last five quarters.
Theoretically, the calculation of the z-score based on accounting variables should
be equivalent to using average stock returns and stock return volatilities (see, e.g.,
Scha¨fer et al., 2015). To capture an insurer’s default risk in a more comprehensive
way, we use the stock based version of the inverse z-score in our empirical analyses.
Since we employ the inverse of the z-score, higher values will indicate a higher degree
of financial distress for a respective insurance company.
6.3.2 Main explanatory variables on an insurer’s derivatives usage
We are interested in the effects of the usage of derivative contracts on our sample insur-
ers’ default risk. To obtain information on the disclosure of derivatives usage of insur-
ance companies, we use their respective (quarterly) 10-K filings. For each firm with an
available 10-K filing in a given quarter, we manually screen the filing for disclosures
on the insurer’s derivatives usage. If an insurer discloses information on derivatives,
we define the firm as a “derivatives-user”. Consequently, we define our first variable
Derivatives-user as a dummy variable, that is one for derivatives users, and zero oth-
erwise. Since insurers can have different motives for using financial derivatives in turn
leading to different risk exposures stemming from the insurers’ derivatives positions,
we have no expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient in our regressions. Next,
we test whether insurers simply use derivatives as an instrument for hedging, or alter-
natively, for taking on additional risks. When hedging is the only purpose of derivatives
93There exist other methods for capturing the financial distress of firms like, e.g., using Merton’s
distance-to-default. In our analysis, we opted to use the z-score measure because of its fewer data
requirements. As a consequence, our sample size is not unnecessarily reduced due to missing data for
our sample insurers.
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usage, it should have a decreasing effect on a firm’s default probability since it is em-
ployed to reduce remaining risks. We include in our analysis a more nuanced dummy
variable Hedging that is one, when derivatives are used for hedging purposes (as stated
by the insurer’s disclosed information on the firm’s risk management activities), and
zero otherwise.94 For our variable Hedging, the relation between the insurer’s motive
to use derivatives for hedging purposes and its default risk should consistently be a
negative one. To get a clearer picture of the differential effects of the various types
of financial derivatives on an insurer’s default risk, we also employ dummy variables
that indicate whether an insurer uses options, swaps, forwards, and/or futures. The
corresponding dummy variables are set to one, if an insurer discloses the use of the
respective type of derivative in its 10-K filing, and zero otherwise. We argue that the
sign of the coefficient on these variables is unrestricted in our regressions and expect
different signs for the four different derivative types.
In addition to our dummy variables, we count the disclosed number of different
derivative types used by an insurer. The resulting number is the variable Derivatives
Intensity, which ranges from zero to four. This variable proxies for the intensity with
which an insurer uses derivative contracts (and should thus, have a similar effect on an
insurer’s default risk as our dummy variable Derivatives-user) (see also Bartram et al.,
2011, for a similar approach to measure the extent of a company’s derivatives usage).
Finally, we collect the net fair value gains and losses on the insurers’ derivatives
positions as disclosed in the insurers’ 10-K filings. By doing so, we attempt to measure
the actual exposure of an insurance firm to risks emanating from the firm’s derivatives
positions.
6.3.3 Control variables
In our regression analyses, in addition to the variables on an insurer’s derivatives usage,
we control for a variety of firm characteristics. We use proxies for the insurers’ size,
94If an insurer disclosed that it does not use any kind of financial derivative, we set the variable Hedging
to not available (NA).
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profitability, solvency, capital structure, and liabilities. In the following, we define the
control variables used in our empirical study. As a common measure of a firm’s size,
we employ the natural logarithm of the insurers’ total assets. We expect insurer size to
be an economically significant driver of an insurer’s default risk, although the expected
sign on the estimated coefficients in our regressions is unrestricted. On the one hand,
larger insurers are less likely to suffer from cumulative losses due to its broader range
of pooled risks and better risk diversification. On the other hand, larger insurers could
also be more complex, which in turn could increase its default probability.
Next, we include the variable Solvency in our regressions defined as the ratio of cap-
ital surplus and the insurers’ total assets. We expect an insurer’s solvency to have a
decreasing effect on the default risk of the respective insurer as a higher solvency im-
proves the firm’s ability to repay short-term liabilities and addresses a liquidity short-
age. Furthermore, we include the insurers’ return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for the
insurers’ profitability as an explanatory variable in our regressions. To be precise, we
calculate ROA by dividing an insurer’s pre-tax return by its total assets. We expect
ROA to have a decreasing effect on the default risk of insurance companies as higher
profits can shield insurers from the adverse effects of impending financial distress.
We also make use of the insurers’ market-to-book ratios, defined as the market val-
ues of common equity divided by the book values of common equity. Additionally,
we employ the insurers’ leverage, which we compute as total debt divided by total as-
sets, as a proxy for the insurers’ level of indebtedness and expect a positive impact of
leverage on our measure of an insurer’s financial distress.95 Finally, we also control for
an insurer’s debt maturity by taking the insurer’s ratio of total long-term debt to total
debt. Here, we expect a more fragile funding structure of an insurer to be positively
correlated with the probability of the insurer defaulting.
95In our robustness checks, we alternatively employ an insurer’s (log) total liabilities as a proxy for its
extent of financial leverage.
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6.3.4 Econometric design
After the discussion of the variables used in our empirical analysis, we now shortly
comment on the econometric design employed in our regressions.
In our empirical study, we investigate the relation between an insurer’s default risk,
measured by the inverse of the z-score, and its derivatives usage. We employ a panel
data sample with quarterly observations for our sample of U.S. insurers over the time
frame from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014. To account for possible persistence in our dependent
variable, we estimate dynamic panel regressions that include the first lag of the inverse
z-score as an independent variable. As our main independent variables of interests, we
include regressors that reflect information on the insurers’ use of derivative contracts in
the previous quarter. In particular, panel regressions are estimated using the (one-step)
GMM-sys estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) (with double-lagged
values of the dependent variable as instruments). The estimated baseline model is
INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t “ αi ` µt ` β1 ˆ INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t´1 (6.1)
` β2 ˆ DERIVATIVE-USERi,t´1 ` βˆ CONTROLSi,t ` εi,t
where DERIVATIVE-USERi,t is a dummy variable that is one when insurer i uses
derivatives contracts (options, swaps, futures, forwards) in quarter t, αi and µt are
insurer-fixed and quarter-fixed effects that capture unobserved heterogeneity across
our sample insurers and across time, CONTROLSi,t is the vector of control variables,
where εi,t are the model residuals.
6.3.5 Descriptive statistics
In this subsection, we present selected descriptive statistics for the dependent and inde-
pendent variables used in our empirical analysis. Table 6.1 provides summary statistics
for the full sample.
First, we comment on the distribution of our dependent variable in our data sample.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics (full sample).
The table presents descriptive statistics of the quarterly values of the inverse z-score and control
variables for firm-quarter observations with available information on derivative use. The sample
includes the 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix E.1 and the sample period runs from Q1 1999 to Q3
2014. We report the number of observations, minimum and maximum values, first and fourth quartile,
mean and median values. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix E.2 and all variables
except for Derivatives intensity are winsorized at the 5% level.
N Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max
Inverse z-score 4,308 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.027 0.078
Derivatives intensity 3,745 0.000 1.000 2.000 2.313 4.000 4.000
Gains/losses (in million US-$) 1,840 -767.500 -14.440 -0.100 -14.060 8.129 645.200
Debt maturity 5,656 0.000 0.023 0.054 0.086 0.101 0.587
Leverage 3,699 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.440 0.008 5.747
Market-to-book ratio 3,152 0.278 0.732 0.951 1.038 1.244 2.511
ROE 4,193 -0.447 -0.062 0.016 0.007 0.097 0.337
Total assets (in million US-$) 6,114 98.600 1,210.000 5,562.000 31,900.000 21,190.000 356,500.000
Solvency 3,693 0.000 0.031 0.105 0.411 0.315 4.838
Volatility 4,314 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.027 0.077
Insurers in our sample have an average inverse z-score of approximately 0.023 and a
median inverse z-score of 0.018. Estimates for our proxy of the insurers’ default risk
range from a minimum value of 0.008 to the maximum of 0.078.
On average, an insurer disclosed the use of at least two different types of financial
derivatives as can be seen from the mean and median values of our variable Derivatives
intensity. Moreover, we can see from Table 6.1 that our sample includes both insurers,
which do not use derivatives at all, as well as insurers for which Derivatives intensity
takes on the maximum value of four.
Looking at the duration of an insurers’ liabilities, the variable Debt maturity ranges
from the minimum value of 0.000 to a maximum value of 0.587. However, the first
and last quartile are 0.023 and 0.101, respectively. Thus, it appears as if the maximum
value constitutes an outlier in our sample. Consequently, we find that most of the
insurance firms in our sample do not rely too heavily on long-term debt in their capital
structure.
The insurers in our sample have a mean leverage of around 44%. In contrast, the
median value is only around 0.2%. In addition, few insurance companies are highly
levered with values of up to 574.7% for our variable Leverage. Moreover, the firms
in our sample have a mean market-to-book ratio of 1.024 with the median ratio being
6.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 164
0.945. Looking at the firm size of our sample insurers, we can see that our sample is
composed of both small and large insurers with the median firm size being approx. $
5.562 billion. Firms in the first quartile of size have total assets between $ 98.6 million
and $ 1.15 billion. Firm size between the first and third quartile is quite homogeneous
across insurers. In contrast, the largest insurers in our sample have total assets between
$ 21.190 and $ 356.500 billion.
The proxy for the insurers’ solvency has an average value of approx. 0.411 with the
median solvency ratio being 0.105 and the maximum value being 4.838. As a result,
the summary statistics indicate only a medium level of solvency at the vast majority of
insurers with only a few institutions having higher, ample levels of solvency. Turning
to our measure of an insurer’s idiosyncratic equity volatility, we find the volatility of
the insurers’ stock returns to be low, on average, with the mean and median values
for our variable Volatility being 2.3% and 1.8%, respectively. With 7.7%, even the
maximum value of the insurers’ stock volatility is quite low and 75% of our sample
insurers have an equity volatility that is lower than 2.7%.
After this first discussion of the composition and the main characteristics of our
data sample, we now turn to an univariate analysis of the disclosed information on the
insurers’ derivatives usage. In Panel A of the following Table 6.2, we present summary
statistics for the two sub-samples of derivative-users and -non-users. In Panel B, we
present similar summary statistics for the two sub-samples of insurers that employ
derivatives (predominantly) for hedging or non-hedging purposes.
As can be seen from Panel A in Table 6.2, insurance companies that employ finan-
cial derivatives have, on average, a statistically lower default risk than non-users of
derivatives (mean inverse z-scores of 0.020 vs. 0.026). In addition, derivatives users
also have a shorter debt maturity, a considerably higher leverage, and a higher market-
to-book ratio on average. Non-users of derivatives are also, on average, significantly
smaller than derivatives users. Interestingly, non-users appear to have a better mean
solvency than insurers, which employ derivatives.
Turning to Panel B of Table 6.2, we find that insurers that employ derivatives primar-
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ily for hedging purposes possess lower mean default risk than insurers that presumably
use financial derivatives for risk-taking. This difference, however, is not statistically
significant. Interestingly, we find the stock return volatility of hedging insurers to be
statistically significantly lower than the volatility of insurers that use derivatives for
non-hedging purposes. Thus, it appears as if either the use of derivatives for hedg-
ing exerts a stabilizing effect on the insurers’ stock volatility and/or that the use of
derivatives for speculation significantly increases an insurer’s stock volatility.
Next, we turn to an analysis of the question whether insurers that report high gains
in fair values of derivative positions differ significantly from their peers that report
low fair value gains or even losses on derivatives. To this end, Table 6.3 reports sum-
mary statistics for insurers in the top and bottom quartiles of fair value gains/losses on
derivative positions.
The statistics presented in Table 6.3 show that insurers that report the highest gains
on their derivative positions are, on average, smaller and employ fewer types of fi-
nancial derivatives than insurers in the bottom quartile of gains/losses on derivatives.
Apart from these two results, however, insurers in both quartiles do not appear to differ
significantly with respect to their balance sheet and income statement variables.
In the following section 6.4, we perform a deeper empirical analysis and present the
results on the nexus between the default risk and derivatives usage of insurers.
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for users versus non-users of derivatives.
The table presents descriptive statistics of the quarterly values of the inverse z-score and control variables used in this study for sub-samples of derivative-users and
-non-users (Panel A). In Panel B, summary statistics are shown for the two sub-samples of insurers that use derivatives for hedging or non-hedging purposes. The sample
includes the 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix E.1 and the sample period runs from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014. We report the number of observations, minimum and maximum
values, first and fourth quartile, mean and median values. The equality of means of the different variables is tested using Welch’s t-test for unequal sample sizes and
possibly unequal variances of the two samples (t-statistics and p-values are reported). All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix E.2 and all variables except
for Derivatives intensity are winsorized at the 5% level. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Derivatives usage No derivatives usage
N Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max t-value p-value
Inverse z-score 2,368 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.078 1,940 0.008 0.015 0.021 0.026 0.031 0.078 -11.754 0.000***
Debt maturity 3,323 0.000 0.030 0.057 0.095 0.101 0.587 2,333 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.073 0.101 0.587 7.203 0.000***
Leverage 2,245 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.124 0.004 5.747 1,454 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.929 1.227 5.747 -18.868 0.000***
Market-to-book ratio 1,958 0.278 0.713 0.917 0.996 1.196 2.511 1,194 0.278 0.759 1.005 1.109 1.322 2.511 -6.404 0.000***
ROE 2,315 -0.447 -0.058 0.018 0.008 0.094 0.337 1,878 -0.447 -0.072 0.015 0.005 0.103 0.337 0.788 0.431
Total assets (in million US-$) 3,488 103.000 6,054.000 16,650.000 53,650.000 50,450.000 356,500.000 2,626 98.570 392.200 1,209.000 3,002.000 35,69.000 52,180.000 33.579 0.000***
Solvency 2,239 0.000 0.028 0.092 0.335 0.234 4.838 1,454 0.000 0.043 0.139 0.528 0.440 4.838 -5.868 0.000***
Volatility 2,429 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.023 0.027 0.077 1,885 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.023 0.027 0.077 -0.163 0.871
Panel B: Hedging Non-hedging purpose
N Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max t-value p-value
Inverse z-score 2,229 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.078 155 0.008 0.011 0.016 0.022 0.024 0.078 -1.138 0.257
Debt maturity 3,151 0.000 0.030 0.056 0.093 0.098 0.587 188 0.000 0.025 0.083 0.121 0.144 0.587 -2.493 0.013**
Leverage 2,145 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.102 0.004 5.747 116 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.497 0.002 5.747 -2.624 0.010**
Market-to-book ratio 1817 0.278 0.707 0.898 0.988 1.187 2.511 158 0.278 0.932 1.078 1.082 1.246 2.511 -3.168 0.002***
ROE 2,179 -0.447 -0.058 0.018 0.008 0.093 0.337 152 -0.447 -0.060 0.021 0.016 0.098 0.337 -0.649 0.517
Total assets (in million US-$) 3,294 103.000 6,532.000 17,490.000 56,150.000 53,310.000 356,500.000 210 196.200 1,866.000 6,048.000 10,950.000 16,810.000 52,170.000 24.862 0.000***
Solvency 2,139 0.000 0.029 0.091 0.333 0.227 4.838 116 0.000 0.009 0.208 0.363 0.335 3.936 -0.462 0.645
Volatility 2,294 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.022 0.027 0.077 135 0.008 0.016 0.021 0.028 0.034 0.077 -3.678 0.000***
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for insurers in the top and bottom quartiles of fair value gains/losses on derivative positions.
The table compares descriptive statistics of insurers whose gains/losses on derivatives positions were in the bottom quartile with the characteristics of insurers whose
gains/losses on derivatives positions were in the top quartile. The sample includes the 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix E.1 and the sample period runs from Q1 1999 to
Q3 2014. We report the number of observations, minimum and maximum values, first and fourth quartile, mean and median values. The equality of means of the different
variables is tested using Welch’s t-test for unequal sample sizes and possibly unequal variances of the two samples (t-statistics and p-values are reported). All variables and
data sources are defined in Appendix E.2 and all variables except for Derivatives intensity are winsorized at the 5% level. P-values are given in parentheses and *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
1st quartile of net derivative gains and losses 4th quartile of net derivative gains and losses
N Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N Min. 1st Median Mean 3rd Max. t-value p-value
Inverse z-score 262 0.008 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.030 0.078 270 0.008 0.011 0.016 0.023 0.026 0.078 1.646 0.100
Derivatives intensity 445 1.000 2.000 4.000 3.115 4.000 4.000 453 1.000 2.000 3.000 2.932 4.000 4.000 2.391 0.017**
Debt maturity 375 0.000 0.030 0.048 0.088 0.078 0.587 394 0.000 0.029 0.051 0.085 0.079 0.587 0.270 0.788
Leverage 308 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.047 330 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.023 1.174 0.241
Market-to-book ratio 319 0.278 0.619 0.840 0.908 1.064 2.511 328 0.278 0.599 0.811 0.911 1.050 2.511 -0.081 0.935
Total assets (in million US-$) 406 2,285.000 21,620.000 56,580.000 109,100.000 156,600.000 356,500.000 421 1,624.000 16,290.000 40,240.000 93,150.000 127,900.000 356,500.000 1.990 0.047**
Solvency 308 0.000 0.029 0.066 0.200 0.164 4.777 330 0.000 0.027 0.064 0.166 0.158 1.832 1.115 0.265
Volatility 281 0.007 0.012 0.018 0.025 0.031 0.077 283 0.007 0.012 0.018 0.025 0.032 0.077 0.295 0.768
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6.4 Empirical results
In this section, we report the results from our empirical analyses to answer the question
whether derivatives usage is a significant driver of an insurer’s default risk. We start our
empirical analysis by first commenting on the time evolution of our major dependent
and independent variables. We then address the endogenous nature of an insurer’s
decision to use financial derivatives. We follow Bartram et al. (2011) and control for
endogeneity by matching users and non-users of derivatives based on variables known
from the literature to drive the decision to employ derivatives. After matching users
and non-users of derivatives, we perform several panel regressions of the insurer’s
inverse z-score on various variables related to derivatives usage.
6.4.1 Default risk
First, we analyze how the values of our main dependent variable evolve for our sample
of insurers over time. Figure 6.1 illustrates the time evolution of the U.S. insurers’
mean default risk (and respective quantiles) over the full sample period.
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Figure 6.1: Time evolution of U.S. insurers’ default risk for the period from 1999 to 2014.
This figure plots the time evolution of U.S. insurers’ default risk over our full sample period from 1999 to 2014. The sample consists of 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix
E.1. In each plot, the mean of the respective risk measure (grey area) is plotted against the corresponding 10% and 90% percent quantiles (white and black areas).
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The time evolution of default risk is characterized by a short peak during the dotcom-
crisis in 2001. Further, we notice a high peak during the recent financial crisis, which
underlines that the inverse z-score is a suitable proxy for an insurer’s degree of financial
distress. After the crisis, average default risk in the U.S. insurance sector returns to its
pre-crisis level. Looking at the 90%-quantiles, we can again see the extreme surge in
our sample insurers’ default risk after the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. Next,
we shortly comment on the time evolution of derivatives usage in the U.S. insurance
sector.
6.4.2 Derivatives usage
As a first step, we analyze the structure of the derivatives usage in the U.S. insurance
sector by looking at the annual derivative reports of the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC).96 Figure 6.2 presents the percentage of each of the four
(major) derivative types used in the U.S. insurance sector (option, swaps, forwards,
and futures) for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013.
The plots in Figure 6.2 show that forwards and futures are used only to a negligible
extent by insurers. Moreover, as can be seen from the lower panel, the percentages of
both futures and forwards do not vary much over time. In contrast, the total notional
value of the derivatives used by insurers is primarily composed of options and swaps.
We see a strong increase in the use of options over the short time period from 2011 to
2013, which drives the overall trend of increased derivatives usage by insurers. The
volume of options used in the U.S. insurance industry increases by over 10% from
2011 to 2013. Furthermore, the fraction of swaps in the derivative portfolio decreases
by more than 10% during this period. This shows a clear trend towards the use of
options instead of swaps by U.S. insurers.
However, as revealed by both the disclosed information in the insurers’ 10-K filings
and the NAIC reports, the majority of insurers states hedging rather than risk-taking
96The used reports are published and available on the following web-page:
http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/131023.htm.
6.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 171
Figure 6.2: Structure of the derivative usage in the U.S. insurance sector.
The figure plots the notional values of the types of derivatives (option, swaps, forwards, futures) used in
the U.S. insurance sector for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013. The data are received from the disclosed
NAIC derivative reports for the respective years. The upper panel shows the total sum of the notional
value of all derivative types. The lower panel illustrates the relative distribution of the notional values
across the four types of derivatives.
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as the main reason for using derivatives. Next, we contrast the findings taken from the
NAIC reports with the data from our sample. The upper panel in Figure 6.3 displays
the time evolution of the number of insurers in our sample using derivatives, while
the lower panel shows the time evolution of the number of sample insurers that use
derivatives for hedging purposes.
Figure 6.3: Number of derivatives users.
The figure shows the number of insurers using derivatives over our full sample period from 1999 to
2014. The sample consists of 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix E.1. The upper panel shows the
total number of derivatives users while the lower panel focuses on the number of insurers that employ
derivatives for hedging purposes.
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On average, around 35% of our sample insurers use derivatives. The number of
insurers that employ derivatives increases slowly over time until 2003, from where it
remains on a high level until the onset of the recent financial crisis. After the crisis,
the number of derivatives users decreases significantly to pre-crisis levels. The second
panel focuses on the number of insurers that use derivatives for hedging purposes.
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Here, we find that around 30% of our sample insurers use derivatives for hedging. The
number increases until 2004, from when it continues to exhibit a similar pattern as the
total number of derivatives users shown in the upper panel. It appears that most of
our sample insurers use derivatives for hedging purposes rather than for other reasons.
Similarly, we plot the time evolution of the number of derivative users for each of the
four derivative types. The plots are shown in Figure 6.4 and 6.5.
Figure 6.4: Number of swap and option derivatives users.
The figure shows the number of insurers using swaps (upper panel) and options (lower panel) over our
full sample period from 1999 to 2014. The sample consists of 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix
E.1.
Time evolution of number of insurers using swaps
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Figure 6.4 shows the number of insurers using swaps (first panel) and options (sec-
ond panel) during our sample period while Figure 6.5 shows the usage of forwards
and futures, respectively. As before, the number of swap users increases until the
beginning of the financial crisis and then decreases slowly, which is in line with the
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Figure 6.5: Number of futures and forwards derivatives users.
The figure shows the number of insurers using futures (upper panel) and forwards (lower panel) over
our full sample period from 1999 to 2014. The sample consists of 171 U.S. insurers shown in Appendix
E.1.
Time evolution of number of insurers using futures
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generally decreasing use of swaps observed above in Figure 6.2. Note that not all of
the insurance companies in our sample use swaps, since the number of swap users is
significantly lower than the total number of derivative users. The number of option
users is even lower but remains relatively constant over time. Compared to the number
of users of options and swaps, the number of insurers that use forwards and futures is
significantly lower. However, the number of insurers using forwards and futures has
increased steadily over time.
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6.4.3 Matching of derivatives users and non-users
In this part of our analysis, we address the endogeneous nature of the relation between
derivatives usage and default risk and match users of derivatives with non-using in-
surers. We compare the mean values of the inverse z-score for a group of derivatives
users (treatment group) with corresponding mean values of non-users (control group).
In each quarter from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010, we perform nearest neighbor propensity
score matching procedures based on the insurers’ size and market-to-book ratios.97
We match users and non-users on the insurers’ size and market-to-book ratio as these
firm characteristics are known to drive a firm’s decision to employ financial deriva-
tives (see also Bartram et al., 2011). After matching, we run t-tests and Wilcoxon tests
on the equality of the mean values for the two groups. The results of our matching
analyses are shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Matching of derivatives users and non-users.
This table reports mean values for the inverse z-score of insurers that use derivatives in a given quarter
matched with non-users from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010. Nearest neighbor matching (with replacement)
of derivative users and non-users is performed on the insurers’ size and market-to-book ratios. The
columns “Yes” and “No” report average values for the user and non-user group and “Difference” is
their difference. The statistical significance of the difference of mean values is tested with t-tests and
Wilcoxon tests, for which corresponding t-statistics and p-values are reported. Bolded values indicate a
statistical significance at the 10% level.
Inverse z-score
Time Yes No Difference t-stat Wilcoxon
Q1 2006 0.014 0.017 -0.003 -0.938 0.268
Q2 2006 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.079 0.696
Q3 2006 0.015 0.012 0.003 1.464 0.317
Q4 2006 0.015 0.012 0.003 1.453 0.354
Q1 2007 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.514 0.788
Q2 2007 0.013 0.019 -0.007 -0.790 0.893
Q3 2007 0.026 0.023 0.003 0.895 0.732
Q4 2007 0.024 0.028 -0.004 -0.846 0.205
Q1 2008 0.026 0.033 -0.008 -1.624 0.026
Q2 2008 0.023 0.025 -0.002 -0.470 0.279
Q3 2008 0.051 0.046 0.005 0.414 0.510
Q4 2008 0.083 0.055 0.028 3.464 0.148
Q1 2009 0.063 0.048 0.015 1.480 0.324
Q2 2009 0.043 0.040 0.003 0.398 0.876
Q3 2009 0.031 0.025 0.006 1.127 0.743
Q4 2009 0.023 0.025 -0.002 -0.433 0.378
Q1 2010 0.019 0.015 0.004 0.971 0.551
Q2 2010 0.026 0.029 -0.004 -1.158 0.175
Q3 2010 0.020 0.021 -0.001 -0.235 0.940
Q4 2010 0.015 0.020 -0.005 -1.087 0.487
97Since the number of observations is relatively small for each quarter, the matching of users and non-
users is performed with replacements.
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Overall, we observe only little to no significant differences between users and non-
users. During the crisis (Q4 2008), however, we find that the treatment group of deriva-
tives users had a statistically significant larger inverse z-score . These estimates, how-
ever, have to be taken with care, since the number of observations in each quarter is
quite low.
Next, we analyze whether we can find significant differences in the default risk of
users of options and swaps vs. non-users. To this end, we perform further matchings
of users and non-users with swap and option users forming the treatment groups. The
results of these two analyses are reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.
Table 6.5: Matching of swap users and non-users.
This table reports mean values for the inverse z-score of insurers that use swaps in a given quarter
matched with non-users from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010. Nearest neighbor matching (with replacement) of
swap users and non-users is performed on the insurers’ size and market-to-book ratios. The columns
“Yes” and “No” report average values for the user and non-user group and “Difference” is their
difference. The statistical significance of the difference of mean values is tested with t-tests and
Wilcoxon tests, for which corresponding t-statistics and p-values are reported. Bolded values indicate a
statistical significance at the 10% level.
Inverse z-score
Time Yes No Difference t-stat Wilcoxon
Q1 2006 0.012 0.010 0.002 1.464 0.322
Q2 2006 0.013 0.010 0.003 2.711 0.071
Q3 2006 0.012 0.018 -0.007 -0.899 0.767
Q4 2006 0.011 0.013 -0.002 -0.500 0.862
Q1 2007 0.012 0.015 -0.004 -0.616 0.705
Q2 2007 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.464 0.900
Q3 2007 0.025 0.018 0.007 2.232 0.157
Q4 2007 0.022 0.034 -0.012 -0.858 0.631
Q1 2008 0.025 0.024 0.001 0.354 0.336
Q2 2008 0.021 0.031 -0.011 -1.574 0.112
Q3 2008 0.050 0.042 0.008 0.740 0.589
Q4 2008 0.081 0.081 -0.001 -0.031 0.942
Q1 2009 0.063 0.044 0.019 1.912 0.139
Q2 2009 0.039 0.048 -0.008 -0.498 0.959
Q3 2009 0.031 0.022 0.009 1.216 0.431
Q4 2009 0.020 0.033 -0.013 -1.192 0.254
Q1 2010 0.016 0.018 -0.002 -0.269 0.767
Q2 2010 0.024 0.020 0.004 0.967 0.600
Q3 2010 0.020 0.016 0.004 1.131 0.547
Q4 2010 0.017 0.011 0.005 2.184 0.280
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Table 6.6: Matching of option users and non-users.
This table reports mean values for the inverse z-score of insurers that use options in a given quarter
matched with non-users from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010. Nearest neighbor matching (with replacement)
of option users and non-users is performed on the insurers’ size and market-to-book ratios. The
columns “Yes” and “No” report average values for the user and non-user group and “Difference” is
their difference. The statistical significance of the difference of mean values is tested with t-tests and
Wilcoxon tests, for which corresponding t-statistics and p-values are reported. Bolded values indicate a
statistical significance at the 10% level.
Inverse z-score
Time Yes No Difference t-stat Wilcoxon
Q1 2006 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.402 0.978
Q2 2006 0.013 0.011 0.002 1.604 0.640
Q3 2006 0.013 0.011 0.003 1.346 0.314
Q4 2006 0.012 0.010 0.002 1.150 0.365
Q1 2007 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.138 0.705
Q2 2007 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.068 0.753
Q3 2007 0.025 0.018 0.007 2.232 0.374
Q4 2007 0.027 0.015 0.012 2.361 0.039
Q1 2008 0.026 0.022 0.004 0.915 0.527
Q2 2008 0.025 0.016 0.010 2.078 0.091
Q3 2008 0.050 0.040 0.010 0.944 0.880
Q4 2008 0.087 0.057 0.030 3.352 0.027
Q1 2009 0.061 0.046 0.015 1.407 0.575
Q2 2009 0.043 0.036 0.007 0.777 0.771
Q3 2009 0.030 0.025 0.005 0.839 0.650
Q4 2009 0.023 0.021 0.002 0.460 0.787
Q1 2010 0.018 0.010 0.008 2.837 0.096
Q2 2010 0.024 0.015 0.009 3.871 0.125
Q3 2010 0.020 0.013 0.008 2.925 0.125
Q4 2010 0.016 0.013 0.003 1.224 0.813
Again, we can see that the disclosed usage of swaps has no pervasive effect on
default risk over our sample period. Instead, the default risk of swap users appears
to be significantly higher only during selected quarters. In contrast, users of options
consistently had higher inverse z-scores than non-users during our sample period with
the differences being statistically significant especially during the crisis years from
Q3 2007 to Q4 2008. We thus find empirical evidence that particularly insurers that
employ options in their risk management, at times, have a significantly higher default
risk than comparable non-users. Even more surprising, however, is the fact that the
usage of financial derivatives does not exert a decreasing effect on the insurers’ default
risk.
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6.4.4 Panel regressions of default risk on derivative usage
We now turn to our multivariate analyses of default risk for our sample of U.S. insurers.
First, we perform several GMM-sys panel regressions (see Blundell and Bond, 1998)
of the inverse z-score on the various variables on the insurers’ derivatives usage. The
resulting estimates are shown in Table 6.7.
In the first column of Table 6.7, we only include our main dummy variable that is
one, if an insurer discloses the usage of derivatives in its 10-K filing, and zero oth-
erwise. Additionally, we employ insurer- and time-fixed effects and one lag of the
dependent variable as regressors. The sign of the coefficient of the derivative dummy
variable is negative and also statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast to the
cross-sectional matching analysis, we find a decreasing effect of derivatives usage on
the default risk of U.S. insurers. As a consequence, we find empirical evidence point-
ing at a beneficial effect of using financial derivatives on the average default probability
of an insurer. Next, we include the hedging dummy variable in regression (2) to test
whether the purpose of hedging has a significant effect on default risk. The hedging
dummy variable, however, is not significant in this regression specification (note that
the number of observations in this regression is considerably smaller than in the first
regression).
To get a more nuanced picture of the effects the different types of derivatives have on
default risk, we include the respective dummy variables one by one in our regressions
and report the results in columns (3) - (6). The dummy variables for options, futures,
and forwards are highly significant with a negative sign. Again, we find the result
that the use of the different derivatives significantly decreases the level of default risk.
The swap dummy variable, however, is not a statistically significant driver of default
risk. Using all four dummy variables simultaneously in regression (7) yields no reliable
results as all four dummies are highly correlated. Finally, in regression (8), we perform
a regression in which we interact the hedging dummy with the dummy for the usage
of derivatives. The latter is now statistically significant and positive, showing that
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the usage of derivatives for non-hedging purposes exerts a destabilizing effect on the
default risk of insurers.
6.4.5 Robustness and further analyses
To validate our main results, we perform additional panel regressions that include con-
trol variables and regressions on sub-samples. First, one could argue that the positive
effect of derivatives on an insurer’s default risk could change in times of crisis or
when derivative markets experience a downturn. Therefore, we repeat our baseline
regressions for a sub-sample of observations during the financial crisis. The results are
reported in Table 6.8.
In column (1) and (2), we observe that both the dummy variables on an insurer’s
derivatives use and hedging purpose have no significant impact on insurers’ default
risk. Consistent with our previous findings, we find a decreasing effect of the use
of future contracts on insurers’ default risk. This variable remains significant in all
settings of our analysis. Column (7) reports the estimation result of the regression in
which we use all dummy variables. The results underline our previous findings from
models (3)-(6). Finally, note that the use of swaps appears to significantly increase the
default risk of insurers.
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Table 6.7: GMM-sys regressions of default risk on derivative usage variables.
The table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly values of the inverse z-score for a sample of U.S. insurers on lagged indicators of derivative usage. All panel
regressions are estimated using the (one-step) GMM-sys estimator in Blundell and Bond (1998) (with double-lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments) and
include insurer- and quarter-fixed effects. The estimated model is
INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t “ αi ` µt ` β1 ˆ INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t´1 ` β2 ˆ DERIVATIVESi,t´1 ` εi,t.
The dependent variable is the inverse z-score (winsorized at the 5% level). DERIVATIVESi,t is a dummy variable that is one when insurer i uses derivatives contracts
(options, swaps, futures, forwards) in quarter t. αi and µt are insurer fixed- and quarter fixed effects. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 171 U.S. insurers
over the time period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014. P-values are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix.
***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inverse z-scoret´1 0.304˚˚˚ 0.394˚˚˚ 0.393˚˚˚ 0.386˚˚˚ 0.386˚˚˚ 0.385˚˚˚ 0.382˚˚˚ 0.394˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Derivatives -0.006˚˚˚ 0.025˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000)
Hedging -0.003 0.011
(0.303) (0.214)
Options -0.003˚˚ -0.001
(0.039) (0.609)
Swaps 0.002 0.002
(0.273) (0.147)
Futures -0.004˚˚˚ -0.002
(0.008) (0.256)
Forwards -0.004˚˚˚ -0.003
(0.008) (0.129)
Derivatives ˆ Hedge -0.014
(0.125)
N 4,242 2,343 2,309 2,317 2,297 2,318 2,261 2,343
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Table 6.8: GMM-sys regressions and derivative use during the crisis (2006-2010).
The table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly values of the inverse z-score for a sample of U.S. insurers on lagged indicators of derivative usage for the crisis
period (2006-2010). All panel regressions are estimated using the (one-step) GMM-sys estimator in Blundell and Bond (1998) (with double-lagged values of the dependent
variable as instruments) and include insurer- and quarter-fixed effects. The estimated model is
INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t “ αi ` µt ` β1 ˆ INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t´1 ` β2 ˆ DERIVATIVESi,t´1 ` εi,t.
The dependent variable is the inverse z-score (winsorized at the 5% level). DERIVATIVESi,t is a dummy variable that is one when insurer i uses derivatives contracts
(options, swaps, futures, forwards) in quarter t. αi and µt are insurer fixed- and quarter fixed effects. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 171 U.S. insurers
over the time period from Q1 2006 to Q4 2010. P-values are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix.
***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inverse z-scoret´1 0.441˚˚˚ 0.544˚˚˚ 0.545˚˚˚ 0.528˚˚˚ 0.526˚˚˚ 0.537˚˚˚ 0.498˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Derivatives 0.002
(0.507)
Hedging -0.007
(0.203)
Options -0.003 0.001
(0.435) (0.727)
Swaps 0.008˚ 0.009˚˚
(0.050) (0.026)
Futures -0.007˚˚ -0.007˚
(0.014) (0.063)
Forwards -0.006˚˚ -0.004
(0.036) (0.233)
N 1,557 881 864 866 852 866 842
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Next, we run regressions that include several insurer characteristics as control vari-
ables in addition to the derivatives usage dummy. We report the respective estimates
in Table 6.9.
In all regressions, we include the variables Leverage, Debt maturity, and Solvency.
Columns (1)-(4) show results employing the inverse z-score as our dependent variable.
In (1) and (4), we include the derivatives usage dummy variable and find that it enters
the regressions with a highly significant negative sign. Next, we also employ two al-
ternative variables that capture an insurer’s usage of financial derivatives. In (2), we
include the derivatives intensity, which describes the number of different derivative
types used in an insurer’s risk management. However, this test is not successful as
this variable is not significant in any of the two regressions. Complementing this find-
ing, the insurers’ net gains and losses on derivative positions are also not significantly
correlated with the insurers’ average default risk. Also note that an insurer’s solvency
is always significantly positively correlated with the default risk of insurers. Finally,
including an insurer’s stock return volatility as an independent variable in regression
model (8) does not change our conclusions.
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Table 6.9: GMM-sys regressions of default risk on derivative usage and control variables.
This table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly estimates of three systemic risk measures for a sample of international insurers on key indicators of systemic
relevance and various control variables. All panel regressions are estimated with insurer- and quarter-fixed effects and with robust standard errors. The estimated model is
INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t “ αi ` µt ` β1 ˆ INVERSE Z-SCOREi,t´1 ` β2 ˆ DERIVATIVESi,t´1 ` Θˆ CONTROLSi,t´1 ` εi,t
The dependent variable in Panel A is the inverse z-score based on balance sheet data and Panel B employs the alternative specification of the inverse z-score. DERIVATIVESi,t
is a dummy variable that is one when insurer i uses derivatives contracts (options, swaps, futures, forwards) in quarter t. CONTROLSi,t are various firm-specific control
variables winsorized at the 5% level. αi and µt are insurer fixed- and quarter fixed effects. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 171 U.S. insurers over the
time period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014. P-values are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Inverse z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inverse z-scoret´1 0.289˚˚˚ 0.387˚˚˚ 0.571˚˚˚ 0.382˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Derivatives -0.004˚˚˚ -0.004˚˚˚
(0.008) (0.010)
Leverage pˆ10´3q 0.462 -0.816 -2.740˚˚ -0.009
(0.416) (0.314) (0.010) (0.989)
Debt maturity -0.016˚˚ 0.005 0.022˚˚ -0.004
(0.037) (0.638) (0.011) (0.631)
Solvency pˆ10´3q 4.240˚˚˚ 2.530˚˚˚ 1.830˚˚˚ 4.480˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Derivatives intensity pˆ10´3q -0.180
(0.772)
Gains/Losses pˆ10´3q -0.001
(0.563)
Volatility -0.214˚˚˚
(0.000)
Quarter fixed effects x x x x
Insurer fixed effects x x x x
N 2,567 1,542 778 2,010
6.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 184
6.4.6 Systemic risk and derivative usage
The results so far emphasize the stabilizing role of using financial derivatives on the
default risk of insurers in case derivatives are primarily used for hedging and not for
risk-taking. In this part of our analysis, we try to answer the related question whether
the effect of derivatives usage on default risk also translates to the systemic risk of
insurers.
The bailout of AIG during the financial crisis has spurred numerous discussions on
the potential threat the insurance sector poses to financial stability. Complementing
the Financial Stability Board’s list of globally systemically important banks, the IAIS
recently published a list of nine global systemically important insurers (GSII) that are
subject to increased monitoring by regulators.98 To identify systemic relevance, they
employ several indicators such as an insurer’s size, leverage, or interconnectedness
with the rest of the financial system. They argue that non-traditional and non-insurance
activities could cause an insurer to become systemically relevant to the rest of the fi-
nancial system. While several authors analyze this question by relating common sys-
temic risk measures to an insurer’s leverage, funding constraints, or its interconnect-
edness (see, e.g., Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel, 2014, 2015, Bierth et al., 2015, Chen et al.,
2014, Cummins and Weiss, 2014), the interplay between an insurer’s derivatives use
and its systemic risk has not been analyzed yet.
Consequently, we perform further panel regressions involving two common sys-
temic risk measures proposed in the literature. As explanatory variables, we employ
our derivatives usage dummy variables.99
In our study, we use quarterly estimates of the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES)
and SRISK. The MES is defined by Acharya et al. (2010) as the negative average return
98The GSIIs are Allianz SE, American International Group, Inc., Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., Aviva
plc, Axa S.A., MetLife, Inc., Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd., Prudential Financial
Inc. and Prudential plc.
99The systemic risk measures that we employ share the property that both are based on economic theory
and capture different aspects of systemic risk. Since the recent financial crisis, several other measures
of systemic risk have been proposed in the literature. Further examples for such measures apart from
those used in this study are due to De Jonghe (2010), Huang et al. (2012), Schwaab et al. (2011),
Hautsch et al. (2015), Hovakimian et al. (2012) and White et al. (2015).
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on an individual insurer’s stock on the days the S&P 500 index experienced its 5%
worst outcomes and measures an individual insurer’s exposure to systemic risk.100 The
second systemic risk measure is SRISK, which is the quarterly estimate of the Systemic
Risk Index as proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2015).101
Table 6.10 shows the results of panel regressions of MES on our variables describing
an insurer’s derivatives usage.
Column (1) reports the regressions in which we test the isolated impact of deriva-
tives usage on MES. The coefficient enters the regression with a positive sign and is
significant at the 5% level. Thus, derivatives usage is associated with a higher exposure
of the insurer to tail events in the financial market and potential systemic risks. This
result underlines in part the conjecture proposed by regulators that engaging in deriva-
tives trading may bear additional risk for an otherwise unexposed insurance company.
In the second regression, we find the complementing result that using derivatives for
hedging significantly reduces the MES and thus an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk
in the financial sector. Turning to the four derivatives classes in (3)-(7), we can observe
a positive and significant influence of the use of future contracts. In column (8), we
show the results for the regression that includes the interaction of derivatives usage
and hedging purpose to test whether the use of derivatives for risk-taking increases an
insurer’s systemic risk exposure. Again, we find the coefficient for derivatives usage
to be statistically significant and positive, meaning that the use of derivatives for non-
hedging purposes significantly increases an insurer’s vulnerability to tail risks in the
financial sector.
In the following Table 6.11, we illustrate the results using SRISK as a proxy for
an insurer’s contribution (rather than its exposure) to systemic risk as our dependent
variable.
100The return on the S&P 500 is a proxy for the return on the market portfolio in our analysis.
101For an insurer i at time t, the SRISK measure is given by S RIS Ki,t “ k pDebti,tq ´ p1 ´
kq p1 ´ LRMES i,tq Equityi,t, where k is a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the in-
surer’s book value of debt, LRMES i,t is the long run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as
1 ´ expp´18 ¨ MES q, MES is the estimated Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the in-
surer’s market value of equity.
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The results from models (1) and (2) show that derivatives usage exerts an increas-
ing, and the use of derivatives for hedging exerts a decreasing effect on an insurer’s
SRISK. Both results, however, are not statistically significant at the 10% level. The
four derivative usage dummies used in the regressions in columns (3)-(6) all have a
positive and statistically significant sign. SRISK has larger values for insurers that use
the different derivatives and thus, the insurer has a larger capital shortfall and contri-
bution to systemic instability. When all four variables are used together in model (7),
only the use of forwards remains a significant driver of an insurer’s contribution to
systemic risk. Interacting our variables Derivatives and Hedging does not yield any
new insights and it appears as if the overall usage of derivatives by an insurer does not
increase its contribution to systemic risk.102
102This finding is in line with the results of Chen et al. (2014), Cummins and Weiss (2014), who view
insurers as “victims” rather than “perpetrators” of systemic risk.
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Table 6.10: GMM-sys regressions of MES on derivative usage variables.
The table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly values of the MES for a sample of U.S. insurers on lagged indicators of derivative usage. All panel regressions are
estimated using the (one-step) GMM-sys estimator in Blundell and Bond (1998) (with double-lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments) and include insurer-
and quarter-fixed effects. The estimated model is
MESi,t “ αi ` µt ` β1 ˆ MESi,t´1 ` β2 ˆ DERIVATIVESi,t´1 ` εi,t.
The dependent variable is the MES as in Acharya et al. (2010). DERIVATIVESi,t is a dummy variable that is one when insurer i uses derivatives contracts (options, swaps,
futures, forwards) in quarter t. αi and µt are insurer fixed- and quarter fixed effects. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 171 U.S. insurers over the time
period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014. P-values are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,* denote
coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MESt´1 0.059˚˚˚ 0.102˚˚˚ 0.103˚˚˚ 0.111˚˚˚ 0.111˚˚˚ 0.108˚˚˚ 0.110˚˚˚ 0.102˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Derivatives 0.005˚˚ 0.028˚˚˚
(0.020) (0.000)
Hedging -0.009˚˚ -0.003
(0.029) (0.829)
Options 0.001 -0.002
(0.639) (0.498)
Swaps -0.001 -0.002
(0.584) (0.412)
Futures 0.004˚˚ 0.006˚˚
(0.042) (0.027)
Forwards (ˆ10´3q -0.214 -0.002
(0.934) (0.522)
Derivatives ˆ Hedge -0.006
(0.663)
N 4,213 2,337 2,303 2,311 2,291 2,312 2,255 2,337
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Table 6.11: GMM-sys regressions of SRISK on derivative usage variables.
The table shows the results of panel regressions of quarterly values of the SRISK for a sample of U.S. insurers on lagged indicators of derivative usage. All panel regressions
are estimated using the (one-step) GMM-sys estimator in Blundell and Bond (1998) (with double-lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments) and include insurer-
and quarter-fixed effects. The estimated model is
SRISKi,t “ αi ` µt ` β1 ˆ SRISKi,t´1 ` β2 ˆ DERIVATIVESi,t´1 ` εi,t.
The dependent variable is the SRISK as in Brownlees and Engle (2015). DERIVATIVESi,t is a dummy variable that is one when insurer i uses derivatives contracts (options,
swaps, futures, forwards) in quarter t. αi and µt are insurer fixed- and quarter fixed effects. The sample includes insurer-quarter observations of 171 U.S. insurers over the
time period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2014. P-values are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix. ***,**,*
denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SRISKt´1 0.875˚˚˚ 0.871˚˚˚ 0.851˚˚˚ 0.864˚˚˚ 0.848˚˚˚ 0.826˚˚˚ 0.814˚˚˚ 0.870˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Derivatives 115.2 997.5
(0.546) (0.281)
Hedging -71.8 1,603.0
(0.932) (0.292)
Options 1,431.1˚˚˚ 655.5˚
(0.000) (0.070)
Swaps 738.9˚˚ 388.1
(0.032) (0.266)
Futures 1,206.0˚˚˚ 535.4
(0.000) (0.105)
Forwards 1,640.6˚˚˚ 1,308.9˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.000)
Derivatives ˆ Hedge -1,671.5
(0.336)
N 2,647 1,577 1,556 1,551 1,531 1,552 1,515 1,577
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6.4.7 Which insurers use derivatives?
The results from our regression analyses so far show that the use of derivatives may
have a differential effect on the default risk and also on the exposure and contribu-
tion of insurers to systemic risk. Therefore, the question arises which insurers engage
in derivative activities and also, why they use such tools.103 To get an overview of
the characteristics of derivative users, we run additional logistic regressions with the
derivatives usage dummies as binary dependent variables. The results from our regres-
sions of the derivative dummy on insurer characteristics are shown in Table 6.12.
Our first result is that derivatives usage is more likely for larger insurers, a result
which is in line with our intuition. Insurers with higher leverage ratios, however, seem
to be less likely to use derivatives, since the coefficient enters the regressions with a
negative sign. Market-to-book ratios or solvency proxies do not seem to play a major
role in explaining an insurer’s decision to use derivatives. When we include all of the
four variables together, instead of using each one of them separately, we find that in-
surer size is the only factor to explain the derivatives usage dummy. These results also
hold true, when we employ quarter dummies to account for unobserved time effects.
Table 6.13 and 6.14 present the results of logistic regressions using the option and
swap usage dummies as dependent variables.
Qualitatively, the results from Table 6.12 also remain true for the option and swap
dummies with a minor exception. In the regressions including the leverage ratio, we
do not find any significant influence of this variable in the decision to use options.
Surprisingly, the size of an insurer does not explain the decision to disclose swap usage
when all of the variables are included and thus, the sample size is reduced. However,
we conclude that the sheer size of an insurance firm determines its decision to employ
financial derivatives.
103For example, highly levered insurers may be inclined to lengthen the duration of their liabilities
through derivatives usage.
6
.4
.
EM
PIR
ICA
L
R
ESU
LTS
190
Table 6.12: Logistic regression of derivative usage on insurer characteristics.
This table shows the results of logistic regressions of derivative usage indicators on insurer characteristics. The estimated model is:
DERIVATIVESit “ α` β1 ˆ INSURER CHARACTERISTICSit´1 ` εt,
where DERIVATIVESit is a dummy variable that is one if an insurer uses derivatives in a given quarter and zero otherwise. INSURER CHARACTERISTICSit´1 include
an insurer’s size, leverage, market-to-book ratio and solvency. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix. P-values are reported in
parentheses and calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Regressions in column (1) - (4) include only one variable while (5) uses all four characteristics. Columns (6) - (10) show results from regressions using quarter dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Size 1.057˚˚˚ 0.938˚˚˚ 1.073˚˚˚ 0.943˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage -0.933˚˚˚ -0.031 -0.918˚˚˚ -0.025
(0.006) (0.861) (0.007) (0.892)
Market-to-book ratio -0.472 -0.555 -0.498 -0.665
(0.105) (0.129) (0.196) (0.167)
Solvency -0.157 0.463˚ -0.142 0.448˚
(0.164) (0.072) (0.204) (0.088)
Constant -23.160˚˚˚ 0.776˚˚˚ 0.997˚˚˚ 0.510˚˚ -20.210˚˚˚ -23.500˚˚˚ 0.821˚˚ 1.095˚ 0.306 -19.870˚˚˚
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003) (0.000) (0.042) (0.070) (0.397) (0.004)
Quarter dummies x x x x x
N 6,019 3,600 3,042 3,593 2,108 6,019 3,600 3,042 3,593 2,108
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Table 6.13: Logistic regression of option usage on insurer characteristics.
This table shows the results of logistic regressions of derivative usage indicators on insurer characteristics. The estimated model is:
OPTIONit “ α` β1 ˆ INSURER CHARACTERISTICSit´1 ` εt,
where OPTIONit is a dummy variable that is one if an insurer uses options in a given quarter and zero otherwise. INSURER CHARACTERISTICSit´1 include an insurer’s
size, leverage, market-to-book ratio and solvency. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses
and calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Regressions in
column (1) - (4) include only one variable while (5) uses all four characteristics. Columns (6) - (10) show results from regressions using quarter dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Size 0.423˚˚˚ 0.552˚˚ 0.425˚˚˚ 0.555˚˚
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.015)
Leverage -0.347 0.236 -0.350 0.246
(0.297) (0.392) (0.283) (0.387)
Market-to-book ratio -0.435 -0.845 -0.519 -1.005
(0.270) (0.159) (0.338) (0.199)
Solvency -0.086 0.290 -0.078 0.254
(0.660) (0.376) (0.692) (0.430)
Constant -9.062˚˚˚ 0.986˚˚˚ 1.205˚˚ 0.975˚˚˚ -11.190˚˚ -8.944˚˚˚ 0.879˚ 1.448˚ 1.043˚ -10.870˚˚
(0.002) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.032) (0.002) (0.072) (0.073) (0.051) (0.041)
Quarter dummies x x x x x
N 3,411 2,202 1,880 2,195 1,385 3,411 2,202 1,880 2,195 1,385
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Table 6.14: Logistic regression of swap usage on insurer characteristics.
This table shows the results of logistic regressions of swap usage indicators on insurer characteristics. The estimated model is:
SWAPit “ α` β1 ˆ INSURER CHARACTERISTICSit´1 ` εt,
where SWAPit is a dummy variable that is one if an insurer uses swaps in a given quarter and zero otherwise. INSURER CHARACTERISTICSit´1 include an insurer’s
size, leverage, market-to-book ratio and solvency. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Table E.2 in the Appendix. P-values are reported in parentheses
and calculated using clustered standard errors on the firm level. ***,**,* denote coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Regressions in
column (1) - (4) include only one variable while (5) uses all four characteristics. Columns (6) - (10) show results from regressions using quarter dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Size 0.275˚˚ 0.103 0.286˚˚ 0.107
(0.012) (0.542) (0.013) (0.533)
Leverage -0.399˚ -0.229 -0.429˚ -0.201
(0.081) (0.425) (0.078) (0.473)
Market-to-book ratio 0.053 0.143 -0.090 -0.114
(0.897) (0.766) (0.869) (0.860)
Solvency -0.252 -0.422 -0.294 -0.500
(0.218) (0.197) (0.171) (0.179)
Constant -5.024˚˚ 1.557˚˚˚ 1.185˚˚ 1.600˚˚˚ -1.112 -5.423˚˚ 1.779˚˚˚ 1.402˚ 1.725˚˚˚ -0.463
(0.045) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.788) (0.040) (0.006) (0.082) (0.007) (0.916)
Quarter dummies x x x x x
N 3,417 2,188 1,895 2,181 1,387 3,417 2,188 1,895 2,181 1,387
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6.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the relation between the default risk of 171 U.S. insurance
companies and their derivatives usage in the time period from 1999 to 2014. We hand-
collect data on our sample insurers’ derivatives usage by evaluating their respective
10-K filings and relate this information to the insurers’ inverse z-score as a proxy
of their idiosyncratic default risk. We then match users and non-users of derivatives
using propensity score matching and thus alleviate in part the problematic endogeneous
nature of an insurer’s decision to use financial derivatives. Finally, we estimate panel
regressions of the proxies of the insurers’ default and systemic risk on various variables
that capture their engagement in derivatives markets.
As our main empirical result, we find that insurers that employ financial derivatives
have a significantly lower risk of defaulting than matched non-using insurers. We also
find that the decreasing effect of derivatives usage on default risk is reversed in case
insurers use derivatives for risk-taking and non-hedging purposes. Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, this adverse effect of using derivatives for non-hedging purposes on default
risk also translates to an insurer’s exposure to tail risk in the financial system. Conse-
quently, insurers that employ derivatives for risk-taking appear to be more vulnerable
to turmoil in financial markets. However, we do not find any evidence in favor of a
destabilizing effect of an insurer’s derivatives usage on the stability of the financial
system itself.
Our results complement current views by insurance regulators that derivatives usage
for trading negatively affects an insurer’s financial health and might ultimately lead
to financial instability. However, our findings also underline the risk-reducing and
thereby stabilizing effect of using derivatives for hedging purposes.
In future work, one could think about extracting more detailed information on the
insurers’ derivatives usage from their 10-K filings. One could also think about using
the notional values of the insurers’ derivatives positions. Both approaches, however,
do not come without caveats as the information given in the insurers’ 10-K filings is
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quite fuzzy and inconsistent across insurers.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
Dynamic pair-copulas
This appendix presents the dynamic pair-copulas used in the construction of our
dynamic R-vine copula model. The dynamization of the standard elliptical and
Archimedean copulas is based on Patton (2006), who incorporates time variation by
estimating appropriate dynamic processes for the evolution of the copula parameters.
We discuss the most important properties and show the (log) likelihoods for statistical
inference.
Normal copula
The bivariate normal copula, CN , is given by
CNpu1,t, u2,t; ρtq “ Φρt
`
Φ
´1pu1,tq,Φ´1pu2,tq
˘
, (A.1)
whereΦρt andΦ´1 denote the bivariate Gaussian distribution function with correlation
parameter ρt and the univariate Gaussian quantile function, respectively, and u1,t, u2,t P
r0, 1s, t “ 1, ...,T . The correlation parameter, ρt, follows the dynamic
ρt “ ˜Λ
˜
c ` bρt´1 ` a 110
10ÿ
i“1
Φ
´1pu1,t´iqΦ´1pu2,t´iq
¸
, (A.2)
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where ˜Λpxq ” p1 ´ e´xqp1 ` e´xq´1 ensures that ρt P r´1, 1s at all times. The normal
copula allows for equal degrees of positive and negative dependence and is independent
in the tails, i.e., the asymptotic probabilities
λL “ lim
ξÑ0
Pr rU1 ď ξ|U2 ď ξs “ lim
ξÑ0
CNpξ, ξq
ξ
,
λU “ lim
ξÑ1
Pr rU1 ě ξ|U2 ě ξs “ lim
ξÑ1
1 ´ 2ξ `CNpξ, ξq
1 ´ ξ
(A.3)
are equal to zero. With xi,t “ Φ´1pui,tq for i “ 1, 2 and T denoting the sample size, the
log likelihood, L, is given by
L “
Tÿ
t“1
1
2
«
x21,t ` x22,t ´ logp1 ´ ρ2t q ´
x21,t ´ 2ρtx1,tx2,t ` x22,t
1 ´ ρ2t
ﬀ
. (A.4)
t -copula
The bivariate t copula, Ct, is given by
Ctpu1,t, u2,t; ν, ρtq “ tν,ρtpt´1ν pu1,tq, t´1ν pu2,tqq, (A.5)
where tν,ρt and t´1ν denote the bivariate distribution and univariate quantile function of a
(standard) Student’s t distribution with degrees of freedom parameter ν and correlation
ρt, and u1,t, u2,t P r0, 1s, t “ 1, ...,T . The correlation parameter, ρt, follows the dynamic
ρt “ ˜Λ
˜
c ` bρt´1 ` a 110
10ÿ
i“1
t´1ν pu1,t´iqt´1ν pu2,t´iq
¸
, (A.6)
where ˜Λpxq ” p1´ e´xqp1` e´xq´1 ensures that ρt P r´1, 1s at all times. The t copula
allows for equal degrees of positive and negative dependence and is asymptotically
dependent in the tails, with the coefficients of lower and upper tail dependence, λL,t
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and λU,t, being equal and given by
λL,t “ λU,t “ 2tν`1
˜
´
?
ν` 1a1 ´ ρta
1 ` ρt
¸
. (A.7)
With xi,t “ t´1ν pui,tq for i “ 1, 2, ν j “ 12pν ` jq for j “ 0, 1, 2, and T denoting the
sample size, the log likelihood, L, is given by
L “
Tÿ
t“1
log
«
Γpν2qΓpν0qa
1 ´ ρ2t Γpν1q2
˜
1 ` x
2
1,t ´ 2ρtx1,tx2,t ` x22,t
νp1 ´ ρ2t q
¸´ν2
¨
˜«
1 ` x
2
1,t
ν
ﬀ«
1 ` x
2
2,t
ν
ﬀ¸ν1ﬀ
.
(A.8)
Clayton and rotated Clayton copula
The bivariate Clayton copula, CC, is given by
CCpu1,t, u2,t; θtq “
´
u
´θt
1,t ` u´θt2,t ´ 1
¯´ 1
θt
, (A.9)
where θt P r´1,8qzt0u and u1,t, u2,t P r0, 1s, t “ 1, ...,T . The Clayton copula is an
asymmetric copula and implies greater dependence for joint negative events than for
joint positive events. While being asymptotically independent in the upper tail, its
lower tail dependence coefficient, λL,t, can be calculated according to
λL,t “ 2´ 1θt (A.10)
Since the parameter of the Clayton copula, θt, has little economic interpretation, Patton
(2006) suggests using the tail dependence coefficients as the forcing variable for the
time dynamics equation. Using (A.10), we assume that θt evolves according to
λL,t “ Λ
˜
c ` bλL,t´1 ` a 110
10ÿ
i“1
|u1,t´i ´ u2,t´i|
¸
,
θt “ ´ logp2qlogpλL,tq
(A.11)
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where Λpxq ” p1 ` e´xq´1 ensures that λL,t P r0, 1s at all times. With T denoting the
sample size, the log likelihood of the dynamic Clayton copula, L, is given by
L “
Tÿ
t“1
log p1 ` θtq ´ p1 ` θtq log pu1,tu2,tq ´
`
2 ` θ´1t
˘
log
´
u
´θt
1,t ` u´θt2,t ´ 1
¯
.
(A.12)
The rotated Clayton copula, CrC, is defined via CrCpu1,t, u2,t; θtq “ CCp1 ´ u1,t, 1 ´
u2,t; θtq, where λL,t “ 0 and λU,t “ 2´ 1θt . The time evolution equation and the log
likelihood for the rotated version of the dynamic Clayton copula can be derived using
(A.11) and (A.12).
Gumbel and rotated Gumbel copula
The bivariate Gumbel copula, CG, is given by
CGpu1,t, u2,t; θtq “ exp
´
´ “p´ logpu1,tqqθt ` p´ logpu2,tqqθt‰ 1θt ¯ , (A.13)
where θt P r1,8q and u1, u2 P r0, 1s, t “ 1, ...,T . The Gumbel copula is an asym-
metric copula and implies greater dependence for joint positive events than for joint
negative events. While being asymptotically independent in the lower tail, its upper
tail dependence coefficient, λU,t, can be calculated according to
λU,t “ 2 ´ 2 1θt . (A.14)
Since the parameter of the Gumbel copula, θt, has little economic interpretation, Patton
(2006) suggests using the tail dependence coefficients as the forcing variable for the
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time dynamics equation. Using (A.14), we assume that θt evolves according to
λU,t “ Λ
˜
c ` bλU,t´1 ` a 110
10ÿ
i“1
|u1,t´i ´ u2,t´i|
¸
,
θt “ logp2qlogp2 ´ λU,tq
(A.15)
where Λpxq ” p1 ` e´xq´1 ensures that λU,t P r0, 1s at all times. With x ji,t “
p´ logpui,tqqθt´ j for i “ 1, 2; j “ 0, 1, and T denoting the sample size, the log likeli-
hood of the dynamic Gumbel copula, L, is given by
L “
Tÿ
t“1
log
˜
x11,tx
1
2,t
u1,tu2,t
¸
´ `x01,t ` x02,t˘ 1θt
` log
´`
x01,t ` x02,t
˘ 2
θt
´2 ` pθt ´ 1q
`
x01,t ` x02,t
˘ 1
θt
´2
¯
.
(A.16)
The rotated Gumbel copula, CrG, is defined via CrGpu1,t, u2,t; θtq “ CGp1 ´ u1,t, 1 ´
u2,t; θtq, where λU,t “ 0 and λL,t “ 2 ´ 2 1θt . The time evolution equation and the log
likelihood for the rotated version of the dynamic Gumbel copula can be derived using
(A.15) and (A.16).
Joe and rotated Joe copula
The bivariate Joe copula, CJ, is given by
CJpu1,t, u2,t; θtq “ 1 ´
`p1 ´ u1,tqθt ` p1 ´ u2,tqθt ´ p1 ´ u1,tqθtp1 ´ u2,tqθt˘ 1θt , (A.17)
where θt P r1,8q and u1,t, u2,t P r0, 1s, t “ 1, ...,T . The Joe copula is an asymmetric
copula and implies greater dependence for joint positive events than for joint nega-
tive events. While being asymptotically independent in the lower tail, its upper tail
dependence coefficient, λU,t, can be calculated according to
λU,t “ 2 ´ 2 1θt . (A.18)
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Since the parameter of the Joe copula, θt, has little economic interpretation, Patton
(2006) suggests using the tail dependence coefficients as the forcing variable for the
time dynamics equation. Using (A.18), we assume that θt evolves according to
λU,t “ Λ
˜
c ` bλU,t´1 ` a 110
10ÿ
i“1
|u1,t´i ´ u2,t´i|
¸
θt “ logp2qlogp2 ´ λU,tq ,
(A.19)
whereΛpxq ” p1`e´xq´1 ensures that λU,t P r0, 1s at all times. With x ji,t “ p1´ui,tqθt´ j
for i “ 1, 2; j “ 0, 1, and T denoting the sample size, the log likelihood of the dynamic
Joe copula, L, is given by
L “
Tÿ
t“1
log
”`
x01,t ` x02,t ´ x01,tx02,t
˘ 1
θt
´2
x11,tx
1
2,t
`
θt ´ 1 ` x01,t ` x02,t ´ x01,tx02,t
˘ı
. (A.20)
The rotated Joe copula, CrJ, is defined via CrJpu1,t, u2,t; θtq “ CJp1 ´ u1,t, 1 ´ u2,t; θtq,
where λU,t “ 0 and λL,t “ 2 ´ 2 1θt . The time evolution equation and the log likelihood
for the rotated version of the dynamic Joe copula can be derived using (A.19) and
(A.20).
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Table A.1: Sample of S&P 500 companies.
The table lists a total of 209 companies included in the S&P 500 stock market index as reported by Thomson Reuters Datastream between January 2008 and December 2013.
Starting with an initial sample of all constituents of the S&P 500 index, we exclude firms with missing/incomplete stock price data and further restrict the sample to firms
with traded credit default swaps (CDS). The stock price and CDS spread data of the remaining 209 companies are retrieved from Datastream and used to document linear
and non-linear dependences between stock returns, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities. The six companies printed in bold type are included in our Value-at-Risk (VaR)
study and are used to forecast liquidity- and credit-adjusted VaR.
3M Company Abbott Laboratories ACE Limited Aetna Inc Air Products & Chemicals Inc
Allegheny Technologies Inc Allergan Inc Allstate Corp Ameren Corp American Electric Power
American Express Co American International Group, Inc. Amerisource Bergen Corp Anadarko Petroleum Corp Apache Corporation
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co Assurant Inc Automatic Data Processing AutoZone Inc AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
Avery Dennison Corp Avon Products Baker Hughes Inc Ball Corp Bank of America Corp
Baxter International Inc. BB&T Corporation Becton Dickinson Bemis Company Best Buy Co. Inc.
BorgWarner Boston Properties Boston Scientific Bristol-Myers Squibb Cameron International Corp.
Campbell Soup Capital One Financial Cardinal Health Inc. Caterpillar Inc. CBS Corp.
CenterPoint Energy CenturyLink Inc Chesapeake Energy Chevron Corp. The Clorox Company
CMS Energy Coca-Cola Enterprises Computer Sciences Corp. ConAgra Foods Inc. ConocoPhillips
Constellation Brands Corning Inc. CVS Caremark Corp. D. R. Horton Danaher Corp.
Darden Restaurants DaVita Inc. Devon Energy Corp. DirecTV Dover Corp.
Dow Chemical Dr Pepper Snapple Group DTE Energy Co. Eastman Chemical Eaton Corp.
Edison Int’l EMC Corp. Emerson Electric Ensco plc Entergy Corp.
EOG Resources Equifax Inc. Exelon Corp. Exxon Mobil Corp. FedEx Corporation
Fluor Corp. FMC Technologies Inc. Freeport-McMoran Cp & Gld Gannett Co. Gap (The)
General Mills Genworth Financial Inc. Halliburton Co. Harris Corporation Hartford Financial Svc.Gp.
Hasbro Inc. HCP Inc. Health Care REIT, Inc. Hess Corporation Hewlett-Packard
Honeywell Int’l Inc. Hospira Inc. Host Hotels & Resorts Humana Inc. Illinois Tool Works
International Bus. Machines International Game Technology Interpublic Group Iron Mountain Incorporated Jabil Circuit
Johnson & Johnson Johnson Controls Joy Global Inc. JPMorgan Chase & Co. KeyCorp
Kimberly-Clark Kimco Realty Kohl’s Corp. Leggett & Platt Lennar Corp.
Lilly (Eli) & Co. Lincoln National Lockheed Martin Corp. Lowe’s Cos. Marathon Oil Corp.
Marriott Int’l. Marsh & McLennan Masco Corp. Mattel Inc. McDonald’s Corp.
McKesson Corp. MeadWestvaco Corporation Medtronic Inc. Merck & Co. MetLife Inc.
Molson Coors Brewing Company The Mosaic Company Murphy Oil Mylan Inc. Newell Rubbermaid Co.
Newmont Mining Corp. NIKE Inc. Noble Energy Inc Norfolk Southern Corp. Northrop Grumman Corp.
NRG Energy Nucor Corp. Occidental Petroleum Omnicom Group ONEOK
P G & E Corp. Pentair Ltd. Pepco Holdings Inc. PepsiCo Inc. PerkinElmer
Pfizer Inc. Pioneer Natural Resources Pitney-Bowes PNC Financial Services PPG Industries
Principal Financial Group Progressive Corp. Prologis Prudential Financial Pulte Homes Inc.
PVH Corp. Quest Diagnostics Raytheon Co. Republic Services Inc Reynolds American Inc.
Rockwell Automation Inc. Safeway Inc. SCANA Corp Schlumberger Ltd. Seagate Technology
Sealed Air Corp. Sempra Energy Sherwin-Williams Simon Property Group Inc SLM Corporation
Snap-On Inc. Southwest Airlines Stanley Black & Decker Starwood Hotels & Resorts Sysco Corp.
Target Corp. Tenet Healthcare Corp. Tesoro Petroleum Co. Texas Instruments Textron Inc.
The Hershey Company The Travelers Companies Inc. Time Warner Inc. TJX Companies Inc. Torchmark Corp.
Transocean Tyson Foods Tyco International U.S. Bancorp Union Pacific
United Health Group Inc. United Parcel Service United Technologies Unum Group V.F. Corp.
Valero Energy Vornado Realty Trust Wal-Mart Stores The Walt Disney Company WellPoint Inc.
Wells Fargo Western Digital Whirlpool Corp. Williams Cos. Windstream Communication
Wisconsin Energy Corporation Xerox Corp. Yum! Brands Inc Zimmer Holdings
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Table A.2: Summary statistics for level data of firms included in the Value-at-Risk study.
The table reports descriptive statistics on the time-series distribution of daily mid prices, bid-ask spreads, default intensities, and default probablities (at a monthly horizon)
for the six firms investigated in our Value-at-Risk (VaR) study. The six firms include 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard, Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and
Wal-Mart Stores. The summary statistics refer to the in- and out-of-sample time periods in the VaR study, which cover the period from January 2010 to November 2011
resulting in 499 daily observations. Mid prices and bid-ask spreads are denominated in US dollar, where the latter are calculated as the difference between ask and bid quotes.
Default intensities are extracted from CDS spreads according to the procedure discussed in Section 2.3 and have a horizon of one year. Default probabilities are derived from
the intensities using the formula in (2.15) and thus have a horizon of one month.
Percentiles Moments
Min 1st 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Exc. Kurt. AC(1)
Panel A: Mid prices
3M Company 70.93 73.586 76.855 81 84.72 89.615 95.388 96.9258 97.97 85.3225 5.739 0.1499 -0.7167 0.9749
American Express 36.79 37.709 38.384 41.465 44.17 46.94 51.258 52.3412 53.59 44.4242 3.8702 0.2353 -0.7618 0.9729
Hewlett-Packard 22.2 22.6486 24.439 36.4125 42.1 47.075 53.069 53.8702 54.52 41.0519 8.4451 -0.6218 -0.3825 0.992
Tenet Healthcare 14.36 16 16.72 18.12 21.52 25.46 28.168 30.0424 30.52 21.978 4.006 0.2134 -1.2524 0.9814
Textron 14.88 15.259 16.719 18.91 21.42 23.49 27.171 27.9612 28.5 21.4874 3.1636 0.2213 -0.6451 0.9827
Wal-Mart Stores 48 48.5668 50.274 52.105 53.6 54.625 56.73 58.1308 59.32 53.4569 1.9611 -0.0272 0.2277 0.9583
Panel B: Bid-ask spreads
3M Company 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.11 1.12 0.0329 0.0537 16.7505 334.9984 0.0784
American Express 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.1002 0.18 0.0228 0.018 3.8209 24.1701 0.2213
Hewlett-Packard 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.0195 0.0135 3.7733 25.9914 0.2291
Tenet Healthcare 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 7.76 0.0615 0.3456 22.2102 492.1938 -0.0033
Textron 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 7.6 0.0319 0.3396 22.2527 493.4575 -0.0036
Wal-Mart Stores 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.0502 0.34 0.0195 0.0207 10.466 145.0211 0.1117
Panel C: Default intensities
3M Company 0.0041 0.0042 0.0044 0.0048 0.0051 0.0055 0.007 0.0074 0.0075 0.0053 0.0007 1.2603 0.9934 0.9845
American Express 0.0092 0.0098 0.0101 0.0108 0.0121 0.0148 0.0181 0.0206 0.0221 0.013 0.0027 0.976 0.0338 0.9709
Hewlett-Packard 0.0037 0.0037 0.0043 0.0055 0.0061 0.0093 0.0183 0.0212 0.0217 0.0079 0.0042 1.7035 1.9721 0.9876
Tenet Healthcare 0.0584 0.059 0.0613 0.0695 0.078 0.0845 0.1074 0.1167 0.1279 0.0798 0.014 0.8984 0.4018 0.9837
Textron 0.0152 0.0153 0.0167 0.0204 0.0242 0.0325 0.0378 0.0391 0.0406 0.0262 0.0069 0.3656 -1.1715 0.9908
Wal-Mart Stores 0.0048 0.0051 0.0052 0.0061 0.0064 0.0069 0.0079 0.0083 0.0088 0.0065 0.0008 0.3221 -0.1403 0.9788
Panel D: Monthly default probabilities
3M Company 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 1.2602 0.993 0.9845
American Express 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.001 0.0012 0.0015 0.0017 0.0018 0.0011 0.0002 0.9757 0.0328 0.9709
Hewlett-Packard 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 0.0015 0.0018 0.0018 0.0007 0.0004 1.703 1.97 0.9876
Tenet Healthcare 0.0049 0.0049 0.0051 0.0058 0.0065 0.007 0.0089 0.0097 0.0106 0.0066 0.0012 0.8956 0.3957 0.9837
Textron 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0017 0.002 0.0027 0.0031 0.0033 0.0034 0.0022 0.0006 0.365 -1.1719 0.9908
Wal-Mart Stores 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 0.0001 0.3219 -0.1405 0.9788
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Table A.3: Summary statistics for log-differenced data of firms included in the Value-at-Risk study.
The table reports descriptive statistics on the time-series distribution of monthly log-differences of mid prices, bid-ask spreads, and default intensities for the six firms
investigated in our Value-at-Risk (VaR) study. The six firms include 3M Company, American Express, Hewlett-Packard, Tenet Healthcare, Textron, and Wal-Mart Stores.
The summary statistics refer to the in- and out-of-sample time periods in the VaR study, which cover the period from January 2010 to November 2011 resulting in 460 daily
observations. For each day, t, in the sample period, log-differences are calculated using the prices, spreads, and intensities at days t and t´ 30. Bid-ask spreads are calculated
as the difference between ask and bid quotes. Default intensities are extracted from CDS spreads according to the procedure discussed in Section 2.3 and have a horizon of
one year.
Percentiles Moments
Min 1st 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 99th Max Mean St. Dev. Skewness Exc. Kurt. AC(1)
Panel A: Stock returns
3M Company -0.4987 -0.4059 -0.2380 -0.0831 0.0198 0.0884 0.1669 0.2208 0.2902 -0.0042 0.1282 -0.9150 1.2774 0.9525
American Express -0.1108 -0.0898 -0.0667 -0.0250 0.0024 0.0232 0.0545 0.0704 0.0727 -0.0009 0.0367 -0.3641 -0.2060 0.9271
Hewlett-Packard -0.2302 -0.1791 -0.1339 -0.0438 0.0168 0.0639 0.1125 0.1383 0.1528 0.0062 0.0759 -0.4930 -0.3404 0.9298
Tenet Healthcare -0.2214 -0.1975 -0.1191 -0.0386 0.0085 0.0351 0.0778 0.1046 0.1249 -0.0041 0.0599 -0.9563 1.2339 0.9434
Textron -0.4119 -0.3703 -0.2261 -0.0982 -0.0207 0.0339 0.0902 0.1199 0.1400 -0.0389 0.1034 -1.1114 1.5305 0.9521
Wal-Mart Stores -0.3858 -0.3013 -0.2063 -0.0808 -0.0162 0.0392 0.2651 0.4786 0.5059 -0.0109 0.1410 1.3039 3.6138 0.9374
Panel B: Log-differences of bid-ask spreads
3M Company -5.9402 -1.0986 -1.0986 -0.4055 0.0000 0.0000 1.0986 1.2194 6.6333 -0.0316 0.6936 0.6742 28.4284 -0.0005
American Express -2.5257 -1.6094 -1.0986 -0.4055 0.0000 0.4055 0.9163 1.3863 3.2189 -0.0318 0.6301 0.1000 2.7220 0.0278
Hewlett-Packard -2.4849 -1.7918 -1.3863 -0.6931 0.0000 0.4055 1.2661 1.7918 2.8904 -0.0347 0.7884 0.1789 0.5025 0.1207
Tenet Healthcare -3.6199 -1.6860 -1.1066 -0.6931 0.0000 0.4055 1.0986 1.6495 3.1091 -0.0690 0.7414 0.0842 1.4815 0.0662
Textron -1.9459 -1.5694 -1.0986 -0.6931 0.0000 0.4055 1.0986 1.6094 2.6391 -0.0470 0.6397 0.1725 0.6715 -0.0033
Wal-Mart Stores -5.2679 -0.6931 -0.6931 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6931 0.6931 5.2679 -0.0115 0.4942 -0.0074 54.6338 0.0038
Panel C: Log-differences of default intensities
3M Company -0.1282 -0.0833 -0.0422 -0.0150 -0.0016 0.0112 0.0456 0.0986 0.1351 -0.0005 0.0290 0.3665 3.8761 -0.0621
American Express -0.0688 -0.0366 -0.0164 -0.0056 -0.0002 0.0046 0.0144 0.0522 0.1072 -0.0001 0.0142 2.3588 20.5839 -0.2622
Hewlett-Packard -0.0941 -0.0607 -0.0321 -0.0093 -0.0002 0.0101 0.0327 0.0622 0.1199 0.0004 0.0221 0.3707 5.8719 -0.1556
Tenet Healthcare -0.0610 -0.0502 -0.0272 -0.0073 -0.0005 0.0074 0.0239 0.0566 0.1106 -0.0001 0.0177 0.9112 7.3419 -0.2213
Textron -0.2241 -0.0679 -0.0348 -0.0099 -0.0010 0.0090 0.0258 0.0557 0.1690 -0.0015 0.0249 -0.7232 20.8471 -0.0782
Wal-Mart Stores -0.1922 -0.0948 -0.0489 -0.0159 -0.0017 0.0127 0.0508 0.0854 0.4379 -0.0007 0.0375 3.0806 42.2552 -0.0904
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Table A.4: Variable pairs and parametric pair-copulas selected in first R-vine trees.
The table reports the (unconditional) variable pairs and bivariate parametric pair-copulas selected in the first tree of the R-vine copula model for each estimation period included in our Value-at-Risk (VaR) study. The
R-vine copula model is estimated on pseudo-observations of standardized log-differences of mid prices (m), bid-ask spreads (s), and default intensities (h) for six firms from the S&P 500, resulting in 17 variable pairs
and parametric pair-copulas that need to be specified in the first tree. The six firms include 3M Company (MMM), American Express (AXP), Hewlett-Packard (HPQ), Tenet Healthcare (THC), Textron (TXT), and
Wal-Mart Stores (WMT). The candidate copulas include dynamic versions of the standard normal (CN ), t (Ct), (rotated) Clayton (CC and CrC), (rotated) Gumbel (CG and CrG), and (rotated) Joe copula (CJ and CrJ),
where we follow the dynamization approach suggested by Patton (2006) (as outlined in Appendix A). The selection of the variable pairs and the bivariate pair-copulas is based on the sequential method as proposed by
Dißmann et al. (2013), where the former results from some maximum spanning tree algorithm based on Kendall’s tau and the latter is conducted using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as the selection criterion
to be minimized.
01/2010 - 01/2011 02/2010 - 02/2011 03/2010 - 03/2011 04/2010 - 04/2011 05/2010 - 05/2011
Pair Copula Pair Copula Pair Copula Pair Copula Pair Copula
MMM(m) AXP(m) CN MMM(m) MMM(h) CN MMM(m) MMM(h) CrG MMM(m) MMM(s) CN MMM(m) MMM(s) CN
MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(m) AXP(m) CN MMM(m) AXP(m) CN MMM(m) MMM(h) CrG MMM(m) AXP(m) CrG
MMM(s) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(m) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(m) CN MMM(m) AXP(s) CN
MMM(h) AXP(s) CN MMM(s) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(m) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN
AXP(s) AXP(h) CN AXP(s) AXP(h) CN MMM(s) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(s) MMM(h) CN
AXP(s) WMT(s) CrJ AXP(s) WMT(s) CC AXP(s) WMT(s) CrJ MMM(m) HPQ(m) CG MMM(s) THC(m) Ct
HPQ(m) THC(m) CrJ HPQ(m) THC(m) CN HPQ(m) THC(m) CN AXP(s) WMT(s) CrJ AXP(s) WMT(s) CN
HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrG HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrG HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrG HPQ(m) THC(m) CN HPQ(m) THC(m) CG
HPQ(s) THC(s) CrJ HPQ(s) THC(s) CN HPQ(s) THC(s) CN HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrJ HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrJ
HPQ(s) THC(h) CG HPQ(s) THC(h) CrJ HPQ(h) THC(m) CJ HPQ(s) THC(s) CrG HPQ(s) THC(s) CrG
HPQ(h) THC(m) CN HPQ(h) THC(m) CJ THC(s) TXT(s) CN HPQ(h) THC(m) CrC HPQ(h) THC(m) CG
THC(s) TXT(s) CrG THC(s) TXT(s) CrG THC(s) WMT(h) CrG THC(s) THC(h) CrG THC(s) THC(h) CrG
THC(s) WMT(h) CrJ THC(s) WMT(h) CrG THC(h) TXT(m) CG THC(s) TXT(s) CrC THC(s) TXT(s) CrG
TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(s) CrG TXT(m) TXT(s) CN TXT(m) TXT(s) CN
TXT(s) TXT(h) Ct TXT(s) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct
WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct
WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct
06/2010 - 06/2011 07/2010 - 07/2011 08/2010 - 08/2011 09/2010 - 09/2011 10/2010 - 10/2011
Pair Copula Pair Copula Pair Copula Pair Copula Pair Copula
MMM(m) AXP(m) CrG MMM(m) AXP(m) CrJ MMM(m) AXP(m) CrJ MMM(m) AXP(m) CrG MMM(m) AXP(s) CN
MMM(m) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(s) CN MMM(m) AXP(s) CN MMM(s) MMM(h) CrG
MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(m) AXP(h) CN MMM(s) AXP(s) CN
MMM(s) MMM(h) CG MMM(s) MMM(h) CN MMM(m) HPQ(m) CG MMM(s) MMM(h) CrG MMM(h) AXP(m) CN
MMM(s) AXP(s) CN MMM(s) AXP(m) CrG MMM(s) MMM(h) CrG MMM(s) AXP(s) CN AXP(m) AXP(h) CN
MMM(s) THC(m) CN AXP(s) WMT(s) CN MMM(s) AXP(s) CN AXP(s) WMT(s) CrG AXP(s) WMT(s) CN
AXP(s) WMT(s) CN HPQ(m) THC(m) CrJ AXP(s) WMT(s) CN HPQ(m) THC(s) CrG HPQ(m) TXT(m) CrJ
HPQ(m) THC(m) CrJ HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrG HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrG HPQ(s) TXT(s) CJ HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CN
HPQ(s) HPQ(h) CrG HPQ(h) THC(m) CN HPQ(s) TXT(s) Ct HPQ(h) THC(m) CrG HPQ(s) TXT(s) CG
HPQ(s) THC(s) CrJ THC(m) THC(s) CrJ HPQ(h) THC(m) CrG HPQ(h) THC(h) CrG HPQ(h) THC(m) CG
HPQ(h) THC(m) CN THC(s) THC(h) CN THC(m) THC(s) CrJ THC(m) THC(s) CrJ THC(m) THC(s) CrG
THC(s) THC(h) CrJ THC(s) TXT(s) CN THC(s) THC(h) CrJ THC(s) WMT(h) CG THC(s) THC(h) CrG
THC(s) TXT(s) CrG THC(s) WMT(h) CN THC(s) WMT(h) CN TXT(m) TXT(s) Ct TXT(m) TXT(s) CrG
TXT(m) TXT(s) CrG TXT(m) TXT(s) Ct TXT(m) TXT(s) CG TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct
TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(m) TXT(h) CG TXT(m) TXT(h) Ct TXT(s) WMT(s) CN TXT(s) WMT(s) CrG
WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) Ct WMT(m) WMT(s) CrG
WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct WMT(m) WMT(h) CrG WMT(s) WMT(h) CrG WMT(m) WMT(h) Ct
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Table B.1: Sample insurance companies.
The appendix lists all international insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The sample
is constructed by first selecting all international insurers from the country and dead-firm lists of Thomson
Reuters Financial Datastream. The list is then corrected for all companies for which stock price and
balance sheet data are not available from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Worldscope. The
names of the companies are retrieved from the Worldscopedatabase (item WC06001).
ALEA GROUP HOLDINGS AXA ASIA PACIFIC ERGO PREVIDENZA
CHAUCER HOLDINGS PLC AXA LEBENSVERSICH ERGO-VERSICHERUNG
21ST CENTURY INS AXA KONZERN AG ERIE FAMILY LIFE INS
ACE LIMITED AXA PORTUGAL SEGUROS ERIE INDEMNITY
AEGON N.V. AXA VERSICHERUNG AG ETHNIKI GREEK INS
AFFIN-ACF HOLDINGS AXIS CAPITAL HLDG EULER HERMES
AFLAC INCORPORATED BALOISE HOLDING AG EVEREST RE GROUP
AFRICAN LIFE BENFIELD GROUP LTD FAIRFAX FIN’L HLDGS
AGEAS SA BRIT INSURANCE HOLD FBD HOLDINGS PLC
ASSURANCES GENERALES CAPITAL ALLIANCE FBL FINANCIAL GROUP
AIOI INSURANCE CASH.LIFE AG FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES
ALFA CORPORATION CATHAY FINANCIAL FINAXA SA
ALLEANZA ASSICUR. CATLIN GROUP LTD FIRST FIRE & MARINE
ALLEGHANY CORP CATTOLICA ASS FONDIARIA - SAI SPA
ALLIANZ SE CESKA POJISTOVNA A.S FOYER S.A.
ALLIANZ LEBENSVERS. CHALLENGER FIN’L SVC FPIC INSURANCE GROUP
ALLSTATE CORPORATION CHESNARA PLC FRIENDS PROVIDENT
ALM BRAND AS CHINA LIFE INSURANCE FUBON FINANCIAL
ALTERRA CAPITAL CHINA TAIPING INSU FUJI FIRE& MARINE INS
AMBAC FINANCIAL CHUBB CORP (THE) GENERALI (SCHWEIZ)
AMERICAN NATIONAL CINCINNATI FINL CORP GENERALI DEUTSCH
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CLAL INSURANCE ENT GENERALI HOLDING VIE
AMERICAN EQUITY INV CNA FINANCIAL CORP GENWORTH FIN’L, INC.
AMERICAN FIN’L GROUP CNA SURETY CORP GLOBAL INDEMNITY
AMERICAN INT’L GROUP CNO FINANCIAL GRUPO NACIONAL
AMERUS GROUP CO CNP ASSURANCES GRUPO PROFUTURO
AMLIN PLC CODAN A/S GREAT EASTERN HLDGS
AMP LIMITED GROUPE COFACE GREAT WEST LIFECO
ANN & LIFE RE HLDGS COMMERCE GROUP, INC. GRUPO CATALANA
AON PLC MILANO ASSICURAZIONI GREAT AMERICAN FIN’L
ARAB INSURANCE GROUP COX INSURANCE HANNOVER RUECK SE
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP DAI-ICHI LIFE INSU HANOVER INSURANCE
ARGONAUT GROUP, INC. DAIDO LIFE INSURANCE HAREL INSUR INVEST
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER DBV WINTERTHUR HARLEYSVILLE GROUP
ASIA FINANCIAL HLDGS DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP HARTFORD FINL SRVC
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLD DELTA LLOYD LEBENS HCC INS HOLDINGS
ASSICUR GENERALI SPA DONGBU INSURANCE CO. HELVETIA HOLDING
ASSURANT INC DEUTSCHE AERZTEVERS HILB, ROGAL & HOBBS
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD E-L FINANCIAL CORP. HILLTOP HOL
AVIVA PLC EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS HISCOX PLC
AXA SA ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HORACE MANN EDUCATRS
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Table B.1: Sample insurance companies (continued).
HYUNDAI M & F INS. OLD REPUBLIC INTL SWISS RE
INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE PARTNERRE LTD. TAIWAN LIFE INSURANC
INFINITY PROP & CAS PENN TREATY AMERICAN TAIYO LIFE INSURANCE
ING GROEP N.V. PERMANENT TSB GROUP TOKIO MARINE
INSURANCE AUSTRALIA PHILADELPHIA CORP TONG YANG LIFE INS
INTACT FINANCIAL PHOENIX COMPANIES TOPDANMARK A/S
IPC HOLDINGS, LTD. PHOENIX HOLDINGS TORCHMARK CORP
JARDINE LLOYD PICC PROPERTY TORO ASSICURAZIONI
JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP PING AN INSURANCE TOWER LTD
JOHN HANCOCK FIN SVC PLAT UNDERWRITERS TRANSATLANTIC HLDGS
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS PMA CAPITAL CORP TRAVELERS COS
KEMPER POHJOLA-YHTYMA OYJ TRAVELERS PROPERTY
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL POWER CORP OF CANADA TRYG A/S
KOELNISCHE RUECKVER. POWER FINANCIAL CORP UICI
KOREAN REINSURANCE PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA UNIPOL GRUPPO FIN
LANDAMERICA FINL GRP PRESIDENTIAL LIFE UNIQA INSUR
LEGAL & GEN’L GRP PRINCIPAL FINL GROUP UNITED FIRE
LIBERTY GROUP LTD PROASSURANCE CORP PROVIDENT COMPANIES
LIBERTY HOLDINGS PROGRESSIVE CORP WAADT VERSICHERUNGEN
LIG INSURANCE CO LTD PROMINA GROUP VESTA INSURANCE GRP
LINCOLN NAT’L CORP PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP VIENNA INSURANCE
LOEWS CORPORATION PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE VITTORIA ASSICURAZIO
MAA GROUP PRUDENTIAL PLC W R BERKLEY CORP.
MANULIFE FINANCIAL PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL WELLINGTON
MAPFRE SA QBE INSURANCE GROUP WESCO FINANCIAL CORP
MARKEL CORP RIUNIONE ADRIATICA WHITE MOUNTAIN INSUR
MARSH & MCLENNAN CO. REINSURANCE GROUP WILLIS GROUP
MBIA INC RENAISSANCERE HLDGS WUERTTEMBERGISCHE LE
MEDIOLANUM RHEINLAND HOLDING XL GROUP PLC
MENORAH MIVTACHIM RLI CORP ZENITH NATIONAL
MERCURY GENERAL CORP RSA INSURANCE GROUP ZURICH INSURANCE
METLIFE INC SAFECO CORPORATION
MIDLAND COMPANY SAFETY INSURANCE GP
MIGDAL INSURAN & FIN SAMPO OYJ
MIIX GROUP, INC SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE
MNI HOLDINGS BHD SOUTH AFRICAN NAT’L
MONTPELIER RE HLDGS SCHWEIZERISCHE NAT
MONY GROUP INC. SCOR SE
MS& AD INSURANCE SCOTTISH RE GROUP
MUENCHENER SELECTIVE INSURANCE
NATIONAL WESTERN SHIN KONG FINANCIAL
NATIONWIDE FIN’L SKANDIA FORSAKRINGS
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC SOMPO JAPAN INSURANC
NIPPONKOA INS SAINT JAMES’S PLACE
NISSAY DOWA GEN STANCORP FINANCIAL
NISSHIN FIRE/MAR INS STATE AUTO FINANCIAL
NUERNBERGER BET.-AG STOREBRAND ASA
ODYSSEY RE SUL AMERICA SEGUROS
OHIO CASUALTY CORP SUN LIFE FINANCIAL
OLD MUTUAL PLC SWISS LIFE HOLDING
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Variable definitions and data sources
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Table B.2: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empirical
study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope
databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015),
measured as the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial sec-
tor index conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR
of the sector index conditional on the median state of the insurer.
Datastream, own
calc.
MES Quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by Acharya et al.
(2010) as the average return on an individual insurer’s stock on the days
the World Datastream Bank index experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
Datastream, own
calc.
SRISK Average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by
Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2015). The SRISK es-
timate for insurer i at time t is given by S RIS Ki,t “ k pDebti,tq ´ p1 ´
kq p1 ´ LRMES i,tq Equityi,t where k is a regulatory capital ratio (set
to 8%), Debti,t is the insurer’s book value of debt, LRMES i,t is the
long run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1´ expp´18 ¨ MES q,
MES is the estimated Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the
insurer’s market value of equity.
Datastream,
Worldscope
(WC03351,
WC08001), own.
calc.
Insurer characteristics
Beta Beta of the capital asset pricing model measuring the market sensitivity
of a firm and a local market index of the insurer’s country.
Worldscope
(WC09802).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope
(WC03251,
WC03255).
Foreign sales International sales divided by net revenues (times 100) Worldscope
(WC08731).
Investment success Ratio of insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope
(WC01001,
WC01006), own
calc.
Interconnectedness PCAS measure as defined in Billio et al. (2012). PCAS is constructed
using a decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the insurers’
daily, standardized stock returns.
Datastream, own
calc.
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of
equity, divided by market value of equity.
Worldscope
(WC02999,
WC03501,
WC08001), own
calc.
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves to
earned premiums.
Worldscope
(WC15549).
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Table B.2: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables
that are used in the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters
Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Insurer characteristics
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common eq-
uity.
Worldscope
(WC07210,
WC03501).
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope
(WC01001).
Non-Policyholder Liabili-
ties
Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total insurance reserves. Worldscope
(WC03351,
WC03030).
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope
(WC01249,
WC02999).
Other income Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income. Worldscope
(WC01262).
Performance Quarterly buy-and-hold return on an insurer’s stock. Datastream, own
calc.
Return on Assets Return of the insurer on it’s total assets after taxes (in %). Worldscope
(WC08326).
Return on Equity An insurer’s earnings per share during the last 12 months over the pro-
rated book value per share times 100 (in %).
Worldscope
(WC08372).
Total assets Natural logarithm of a insurer’s total assets. Worldscope
(WC02999).
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database
(World Bank).
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database
(World Bank)
Stock market turnover Total value of shares traded in a given country divided by the average
market capitalization.
WDI database
(World Bank).
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Table C.1: Sample banks.
The table shows the names of the 148 international banks used in our study. Banks were selected by their respective total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006 and
availability of stock price data from Datastream.
ABN AMRO HOLDING N.V. DANSKE BANK AS NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION
ALLIANCE & LEICESTER PLC DBS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD NATIXIS
ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC DEPFA BANK PLC NIKKO CORDIAL CORPORATION
ALPHA BANK SA DEUTSCHE BANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT NISHI-NIPPON CITY BANK LIMITED (THE)
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC. DEUTSCHE BOERSE AG NOMURA HOLDINGS INCORPORATED
ANGLO IRISH BANK CORPORATION PLC DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG NORDEA BANK AB
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED DEXIA SA NORTHERN ROCK PLC
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA SA DNB ASA NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION
BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES, S.A. ECOBANK NIGERIA PLC OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED
BANCO DO BRASIL SA ERSTE GROUP BANK AG PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP INCORPORATED
BANCO ESPANOL DE CREDITO, S.A. ESPIRITO SANTO FINANCIAL GROUP S.A. RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL AG
BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO SA EUROBANK ERGASIAS SA REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION
BANCO POPOLARE FIFTH THIRD BANCORP RESONA HOLDINGS INC
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL FIRSTRAND LIMITED ROYAL BANK OF CANADA
BANCO SABADELL GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC (THE)
BANCO SANTANDER SA HANA FINANCIAL GROUP SAN PAOLO IMI SPA
BANK AUSTRIA CREDITANSTALT AG HANG SENG BANK LIMITED SBERBANK ROSSII OAO
BANK HAPOALIM B.M. HBOS PLC SCHWEIZERISCHE NATIONALBANK
BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL B.M. HSBC HOLDINGS PLC SHANGHAI PUDONG DEVELOPMENT BANK
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION HUA XIA BANK COMPANY LTD SHINHAN FINANCIAL GROUP COMPANY LIMITED
BANK OF CHINA LIMITED HYPO REAL ESTATE HOLDING SHINSEI BANK LIMITED
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS CO LTD HYPOTHEKENBANK FRANKFURT AG SHIZUOKA BANK LTD (THE)
BANK OF IRELAND ICAP PLC SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN
BANK OF MONTREAL ICICI BANK LIMITED SLM CORPORATION
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LTD SOCIETE GENERALE
BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (THE) INDUSTRIAL BANK CO LTD SOVEREIGN BANCORP INCORPORATED
BANK OF YOKOHAMA LIMITED (THE) INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA ST. GEORGE BANK LIMITED
BANQUE NATIONALE DE BELGIQUE INTESA SANPAOLO SPA STANDARD BANK GROUP LIMITED
BARCLAYS AFRICA GROUP LTD JAPAN SECURITIES FINANCE CO LTD STANDARD CHARTERED PLC
BARCLAYS PLC JOYO BANK LIMITED (THE) STATE BANK OF INDIA
BAYERISCHE HYPO- UND VEREINSBANK AG JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. STATE STREET CORPORATION
BB & T CORPORATION KAUPTHING BANK HF SUMITOMO MITSUI FINANCIAL GROUP INC
BNP PARIBAS SA KB FINANCIAL GROUP INCORPORATION SUMITOMO TRUST AND BANKING COMPANY LIMITED (THE)
BRADFORD & BINGLEY PLC KBC GROUP NV SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE KEYCORP SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN AB
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION KOREA EXCHANGE BANK SWEDBANK AB
CAPITALIA SPA LANDESBANK BERLIN HOLDING AG TAISHIN FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED
CHIBA BANK LTD (THE) LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC TAIWAN COOPERATIVE BANK
CHINA CITIC BANK CORPORATION LIMITED M & T BANK CORPORATION TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (THE)
CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK CORP MACQUARIE GROUP LIMITED TURKIYE IS BANKASI A.S.
CHINA MERCHANTS BANK CO LTD MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD U.S. BANCORP
CHINA MINSHENG BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORPORATION UBI BANCA
CITIGROUP INC. MEGA FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED UBS AG
COMERICA INCORPORATED MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP INCORPORATED UNICREDIT SPA
COMMERZBANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT MIZUHO FINANCIAL GROUP INC UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LIMITED
CREDIT AGRICOLE SA MORGAN STANLEY WACHOVIA CORPORATION
CREDIT INDUSTRIEL ET COMMERCIAL SA NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
DAIWA SECURITIES GROUP INCORPORATED NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE, S.A. WOORI FINANCE HOLDINGS
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Table C.2: Sample insurers.
The table shows the names of the 98 international insurers used in our study. Insurers were selected by
their respective total assets at the end of the fiscal year 2006 and availability of stock price data from
Datastream.
ACE LIMITED LOEWS CORPORATION
AEGON N.V. MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
AFLAC INCORPORATED MAPFRE SA
AGEAS SA MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC.
AIOI INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED MBIA INC.
ALLEANZA ASSICURAZIONI S.P.A. MEDIOLANUM S.P.A
ALLIANZ LEBENSVERSICHERUNG-AG METLIFE, INC.
ALLIANZ SE MS & AD INSURANCE GROUP HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED
ALLSTATE CORPORATION (THE) MUENCHENER RUCKVERSICHERUNGS-GESELLSCHAFT AG
AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. NATIONWIDE FINANCIAL SERVICES INC
AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. NIPPONKOA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. NUERNBERGER BETEILIGUNGS-AG
AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OLD MUTUAL PLC
AMP LIMITED PERMANENT TSB GROUP HOLDINGS PLC
AON PLC PHOENIX COMPANIES INC
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI SPA PING AN INSURANCE (GROUP) COMPANY OF CHINA LTD
ASSURANCES GENERALES DE FRANCE (AGF) SA POWER CORPORATION OF CANADA
ASSURANT, INC. POWER FINANCIAL CORP
AVIVA PLC PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA SPA
AXA ASIA PACIFIC HOLDINGS LIMITED PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP, INCORPORATED
AXA KONZERN AG PROGRESSIVE CORPORATION (THE)
AXA LEBENSVERSICHERUNG AG PROTECTIVE LIFE CORPORATION
AXA SA PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
BALOISE HOLDING AG PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INCORPORATED
CATHAY FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED PRUDENTIAL PLC
CATTOLICA ASSICURAZIONI S.C.A.R.L. QBE INSURANCE GROUP LIMITED
CHALLENGER FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP LTD REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
CHINA LIFE INSURANCE CO LTD RSA INSURANCE GROUP PLC
CHUBB CORPORATION (THE) SAMPO OYJ
CNA FINANCIAL CORPORATION SANLAM LIMITED
CNO FINANCIAL GROUP, INCORPORATION SCOR SE
CNP ASSURANCES SHIN KONG FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED
DBV-WINTERTHUR HOLDING AG SOMPO JAPAN INSURANCE INC
ERGO VERSICHERUNGSGRUPPE AG ST. JAMES’S PLACE PLC
FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED STOREBRAND ASA
FUBON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED SUN LIFE FINANCIAL INCORPORATED
GENERALI DEUTSCHLAND HOLDING AG SWISS LIFE HOLDING AG
GENWORTH FINANCIAL, INC. SWISS RE LTD
GREAT EASTERN HOLDINGS LTD TOKIO MARINE HOLDINGS INCORPORATED
GREAT-WEST LIFECO INC TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC. (THE)
HANNOVER RUECK SE UNIPOL GRUPPO FINANZIARIO SPA
HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. (THE) UNIPOLSAI ASSICURAZIONI SPA
HELVETIA HOLDING AG UNIQA INSURANCE GROUP AG
INDUSTRIAL ALLIANCE INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INCORPORATED UNUM GROUP
ING GROEP N.V. VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC WHITE MOUNTAINS INSURANCE GROUP LTD
LIBERTY GROUP LIMITED WURTTEMBERGISCHE LEBENSVERSICHERUNG AG
LIBERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED XL GROUP PLC
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORPORATION ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP LIMITED
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Table C.1: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents data sources, definitions and expected signs in our regression analyses for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empirical study.
The expected sign of each independent variable on the systemic risk of a bank or insurer is shown in the last column with a “+” indicating an expected increasing (and a “-”
a decreasing) impact on systemic risk. The bank and insurer controls were taken from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source Hypotheses Expected sign
Panel A: Systemic risk measures
∆CoVaR Unconditional ∆CoVaR as defined by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015), measured as
the difference of the Value-at-risk (VaR) of a financial
sector index conditional on the distress of a particular
insurer and the VaR of the sector index conditional
on the median state of the firm.
Datastream, own calc.
MES Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined by
Acharya et al. (2010) as the negative average re-
turn on an individual firm’s stock on the days
the MSCI World index experienced its 5% worst
outcomes.
Datastream, own calc.
Panel B: Main independent variables
Interconnectedness PCAS measure as defined in Billio et al. (2012).
PCAS is constructed using a decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of the firms’ daily, stan-
dardized stock returns.
Datastream, own calc. More exposure to other banks and insurers. +
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book
value of common equity.
Worldscope (WC07210,
WC03501)
Greater charter value incentivizes bank managers to
keep their bank’s capital ratio and to limit their
risk-taking (see Keeley, 1990 and Fahlenbrach et al.
(2012)).
-
Total assets Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Worldscope (WC02999) Too-big-to-fail vs. more diversification. +/-
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus
market value of equity, divided by market value of
equity.
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Disciplining effect of leverage vs. greater vulnera-
bility during financial crises (see Adrian and Shin,
2010).
+/-
Performance Annual buy-and-hold stock returns computed from
the first and last trading day in the year 2006.
Datastream, own calc. Firms that performed well in the past will continue to
perform well over time VS. institutions that took on
too many risks in the past could also stick to their cul-
ture of risk-taking (see Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) and
increase their exposure and contribution to systemic
risk.
+/-
Return on assets Return of the firm on it’s total assets after taxes (in
%).
Worldscope (WC08326). Higher profits can shield banks from the adverse ef-
fects of a financial crisis
-
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) di-
vided by total debt.
Worldscope (WC03251,
WC03255).
A less fragile funding structure of a bank makes it less
vulnerable to sudden shortages in liquidity during a
crisis (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
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Table C.1: Variable definitions and data sources (continued).
Variable name Definition Data source Hypotheses Expected sign
Panel C: Bank characteristics
Deposits Total deposits divided by total liabilities. Worldscope (WC03019,
WC03351).
Banks with more deposit financing are more stable in
times of crises.
-
Loan loss provisions Natural logarithm of expenses set aside as an al-
lowance for uncollectable or troubled loans.
Worldscope (WC01271). A larger buffer against troubled loans should serve as
a stabilizing factor reducing a bank’s total risk.
-
Loans Ratio of total loans to total assets. Worldscope (WC02271,
WC02999).
A higher loans-to-assets ratio of a bank could indicate
a business model that focuses on lending rather than
more risky activities.
-
Tier-1-capital Ratio of a bank’s Tier-1-Capital to total assets. Worldscope (WC18228,
WC02999).
Higher regulatory bank capital acts as a buffer against
losses and should stabilize both an individual bank
and the financial sector.
-
Non-interest income Non-interest income divided by total interest income. Worldscope (WC01021,
WC01016).
Higher values of non-interest income relative to to-
tal interest income could be indicative of a busi-
ness model that concentrates more on non-deposit
taking activities (like, e.g., investment banking) and
thus more risk-taking (see, e.g., Brunnermeier et al.,
2012).
+
Panel D: Insurer characteristics
Investment success Ratio of insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope (WC01001,
WC01006), own calc.
Insurers become more intertwined with financial mar-
kets through asset management.
+
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insur-
ance reserves to earned premiums.
Worldscope (WC15549). High loss ratio indicates bad quality of the insurance
portfolio and increases default risk.
+
Non-Policyholder Liabilities Total on balance sheet liabilities divided by total in-
surance reserves.
Worldscope (WC03351,
WC03030).
Non-core insurance activities increase the risk to suf-
fer from other sources in the financial market (see
IAIS, 2013).
+
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999).
Poor management reflects the total risk of the insur-
ance company.
+
Other income Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating
income.
Worldscope (WC01262). Non-core insurance activities increase the risk to suf-
fer from other sources in the financial market (see
IAIS, 2013).
+
Fixed income Natural logarithm of fixed income. Worldscope (WC01262). Engagement in other asset classes than fixed income
could suffer more profoundly from plummeting asset
prices.
-
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Table D.1: Sample non-life insurance companies.
The table lists all international non-life insurance companies that are used in the empirical study. The sample is constructed by
first selecting all international non-life insurance companies from the dead- and active-firm list in Thomson Reuters Worldscope.
Further, the list is adjusted for all companies for which stock price and balance sheet data are not available from Thomson Reuters
Financial Datastream and Worldscope. The names of the companies are retrieved from the Worldscope database (item WC06001).
21ST CENTURY INSURANCE GROUP CHUBB CORP
ABBEY PROTECTION PLC CIE D’ASSURANCES ET DE REASSURAN. ASTREE
ABU DHABI NATIONAL TAKAFUL CO PSC CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION
ABU DHABI NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY CLAL INSURANCE ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS LIMITED
ACE LIMITED CNA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
ACE ARABIA COOPERATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY COMMERCE GROUP INC
ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED MILANO ASSICURAZIONI S.P.A.
ADMIRAL GROUP PLC COSMOS INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LTD.
ADVENT CAPITAL (HOLDINGS) PLC COX INSURANCE HOLDINGS PLC
AGF BRASIL SEGUROS S.A. CROATIA LLOYD D.D.
AGROTIKI INSURANCE S.A. CUSTODIAN & ALLIED INSURANCE PLC
AIOI INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED DELTA INSURANCE COMPANY
AKSIGORTA ANONIM SIRKETI DEVES INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED (THE)
AL AHLIA INSURANCE COMPANY BSC DHIPAYA INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED
AL AIN AHLIA INSURANCE CO PSC DHOFAR INSURANCE COMPANY
AL ALAMIYA FOR COOPERATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY DIRECT LINE INSURANCE GROUP PLC
AL BARAKAH TAKAFUL PLC DOHA INSURANCE
AL BUHAIRA NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY DONEGAL GROUP INC.
AL DHAFRA INSURANCE COMPANY P.S.C. DONGBU INSURANCE CO., LTD.
AL MANARA INSURANCE CO PSC DUBAI INSURANCE COMPANY
AL SAGR NATIONAL INSURANCE CO PSC DUBAI ISLAMIC INSURANCE & REINSURANCE
AL WATHBA NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY DUBAI NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
AL-AHLEIA INSURANCE CO SAK E-L FINANCIAL CORPORATION LIMITED
AL RAJHI FOR COOPERATIVE INSURANCE EFU GENERAL INSURANCE LTD
ALFA CORPORATION EGI FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC.
AL KHALEEJ TAKAFUL GROUP QSC EMC INSURANCE GROUP INC.
ALLEGHANY CORPORATION EMIRATES INSURANCE COMPANY P.S.C
ALLIANZ SE ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HOLDINGS LTD.
ALLIANZ SAUDI FRANSI COOPERATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY ENSTAR GROUP LIMITED
ALLIED COOPERATIVE INSURANCE GROUP ESURE GROUP PLC
ALLIED WORLD ASSURANCE COMPANY HOLDINGS, LTD EULER HERMES GROUP SA
ALLSTATE CORP EUROHERC OSIGURANJE D D
ALM BRAND AS EVEREST RE GROUP, LTD.
ALTERRA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LIMITED FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED
AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. FBD HOLDINGS PLC
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. FEDERATED NATIONAL HOLDING CO
AMLIN PLC FIRST ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
AMTRUST FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. FIRST FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO., LTD.
ANADOLU ANONIM TURK SIGORTA SIRKETI FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED (THE)
ARAB ORIENT INSURANCE CO. LTD FIRST MERCURY FINANCIAL CORPORATION
ARAB UNION INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE FIRST TAKAFUL INSURANCE COMPANY KCSC
ARABIA INSURANCE COOPERATIVE COMPANY FLAGSTONE REINSURANCE HOLDINGS SA
ARABIAN SCANDINAVIAN INSURANCE COMPANY UNIPOLSAI ASSICURAZIONI SPA
ARABIAN SHIELD COOPERATIVE INSURANCE FOYER S.A.
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP LTD. AL FUJAIRAH NATIONAL INSURANCE CO P.S.C.
ARGONAUT GROUP INCORPORATED FUJI FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
ARGO GROUP INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED GABLE HOLDINGS INC
ASKARI GENERAL INSURANCE CO. GENERALI HOLDING VIENNA AG
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLDINGS LTD GENERAL DE SEGUROS SA
ASURANSI BINTANG TBK PT GJENSIDIGE FORSIKRING ASA
ASURANSI BINA DANA ARTA TBK PT GLOBAL INDEMNITY PLC
ASURANSI BINTANG TBK PT GOSHAWK INSURANCE HOLDINGS PLC
ASURANSI DAYIN MITRA TBK PT GREENLIGHT CAPITAL RE, LIMITED.
ASURANSI HARTA AMAN PRATAMA TBK PT GRUPO CATALANA OCCIDENTE SA
PT ASURANSI JASA TANIA TBK GULF INSURANCE CO KSC
ASURANSI MULTI ARTHA GUNA TBK PT HABIB INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
ASURANSI RAMAYANA TBK PT HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP INC
ATLAS FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INCORPORATION HANWHA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
ATLAS INSURANCE CO., LTD. HARDY UNDERWRITING BERMUDA LIMITED
ATRIUM UNDERWRITING PLC HARLEYSVILLE GROUP INC.
AVIVA SIGORTA AS HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP INC
AXA COOPERATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY HCC INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC
AXA VERSICHERUNG AG HCI GROUP INC
AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD HEUNGKUK FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO LTD
BAHRAIN KUWAIT INSURANCE COMPANY BSC HIGHWAY INSURANCE GROUP PLC
BAHRAIN NATIONAL HOLDING COMPANY HILLTOP HOLDINGS INC
BALDWIN & LYONS INCORPORATED HISCOX PLC
BANGKOK INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED HOLYLAND INSURANCE
BANGKOK UNION INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED HORACE MANN EDUCATORS CORPORATION
BEAZLEY PLC HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. INDARA INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED
BIDV INSURANCE CORPORATION INDEQUITY GROUP LIMITED
BURUJ COOPERATIVE INSURANCE CO INFINITY PROPERTY & CASUALTY CORPORATION
CALLIDEN GROUP LIMITED INGOSSTRAKH OSAO
CATLIN GROUP LTD INSPLANET AB
CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED INSURANCE AUSTRALIA GROUP LIMITED
CENTURY INSURANCE CO LTD INTACT FINANCIAL CORPORATION
CHARAN INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED IGI INSURANCE LTD
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Table D.1: Sample non-life insurance companies (continued).
ISLAMIC ARAB INSURANCE COMPANY QUANTA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD
JADRANSKO OSIGURANJE D.D. RANDALL AND QUILTER INVESTMENT HOLDINGS PLC
JAMES RIVER GROUP, INC. RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGS LTD.
JERUSALEM INSURANCE COMPANY REPUBLIC COMPANIES GROUP, INC.
JORDAN EMIRATES INSURANCE PSC RLI CORP.
JUBILEE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD RSA INSURANCE GROUP PLC
KEMPER CORPORATION RTW, INC.
KILN PLC SABB TAKAFUL
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC SAFECO CORPORATION
KSK GROUP BHD SAFETY INSURANCE GROUP, INC.
KUWAIT INSURANCE CO SAK SAFETY INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED (THE)
LANCASHIRE HOLDINGS LTD SAMPO OYJ
LIG INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
LINKAGE ASSURANCE PLC SANTAM LIMITED
LOEWS CORPORATION SALAMA COOPERATIVE INSURANCE CO
LOTTE NON-LIFE INSURANCE CO LTD SAUDI UNITED COOPERATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
LPI CAPITAL BERHAD SCHWEIZERISCHE NATIONAL VERSICHERUNGS GESELLSCHAFT AG
MAIDEN HOLDINGS, LIMITED SEABRIGHT HOLDINGS, INCORPORATION
MAPFRE PERU CIA DE SEGUROS Y REASEGUROS SECREX SEGUROS DE CREDITO Y GARANTIAS SA
MARKEL CORPORATION SELECTIVE INSURANCE GROUP, INCORPORATED
MEADOWBROOK INSURANCE GROUP INCORPORATED SHAHEEN INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
MERCER INSURANCE GROUP.INC. SHC INSURANCE PTE LIMITED
MERCHANTS GROUP, INC. SHINKONG INSURANCE CO LTD
MERCURY GENERAL CORPORATION SAMAGGI INSURANCE PCL
MERITZ FINANCIAL GROUP INC SILVER STAR INSURANCE CO. LTD.
METHAQ TAKAFUL INSURANCE COMPANY STE TUN D’ASSURANCES ET DE REASSURANCES
MIDDLESEA INSURANCE P.L.C. SOLIDARITY SAUDI TAKAFUL
MIN XIN HOLDINGS LTD. SOMPO JAPAN NIPPONKOA INSURANCE INC
MOHANDES INSURANCE COMPANY SPECIALTY UNDERWRITERS ALLIANCE, INC.
MONTPELIER RE HOLDINGS LTD SRI AYUDHYA CAPITAL PCL
MPHB CAPITAL BHD STANDARD ALLIANCE INSURANCE PLC
MS&AD INSURANCE GROUP HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORP
MUANG THAI INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED SYN MUN KONG INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED
MUSCAT NATIONAL HOLDINGS COMPANY SAOG TAIWAN FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
MUTUAL & FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD DAR AL TAKAFUL PJSC
NAM SENG INSURANCE PUBLIC CO LIMITED TAKAFUL INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
NATIONAL ATLANTIC HOLDINGS CORPORATION TALANX AG
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY THAI INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED (THE)
NATIONAL INTERSTATE CORPORATION THAI SETAKIJ INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED (THE)
NAVAKIJ INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED (THE) THAIVIVAT INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED
NAVIGATORS GROUP INC ARAB ASSURERS INSURANCE CO PSC
NIGER INSURANCE PLC THE ISLAMIC INSURANCE COMPANY
NIPPONKOA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED THE MEDITERRANEAN & GULF INS CO - JORDAN
NISSAY DOWA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED TOKIO MARINE HOLDINGS INCORPORATED
NISSHIN FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED (THE) TOPDANMARK A/S
SOMPO JAPAN NIPPONKOA HOLDINGS INC TORO ASSICURAZIONI CIA ANOMIA D’ASSICU.
NORTH POINTE HOLDINGS CORPORATION TOWER GROUP INTERNATIONAL LTD
NOVAE GROUP PLC TRADE UNION COOPERATIVE INSURANCE CO
OHIO CASUALTY CORPORATION TRANSATLANTIC HOLDINGS, INC.
OMAN INSURANCE COMPANY TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC
OMAN UNITED INSURANCE CO. SAOG TRYG A/S
ONEBEACON INSURANCE GROUP LTD TOWARZYSTWO UBEZPIECZE EUROPA SA
OPTIMUM GENERAL INC UNION GENERALE DU NORD
ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY PSC UNICO AMERICAN CORPORATION
PACIFIC & ORIENT BERHAD UNION INSURANCE COMPANY P.S.C.
PENN MILLERS HOLDING CORPORATION UNION INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
THE PEOPLE S INSURANCE CO (GROUP) OF CHINA LTD UNIPOL GRUPPO FINANZIARIO SPA
PETROVIETNAM INSURANCE JOINT STOCK CORP UNISON FORSIKRING ASA
PHILADELPHIA CONSOLIDATED HOLDINGS CORPORATION UNITED COOPERATIVE ASSURANCE (UCA)
PHILADELPHIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY CO
PHOENIX METROLIFE EMPORIKI UNITED INSURANCE CO PSC
PICC PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY LTD UNITED OVERSEAS INSURANCE LIMITED
PETROLIMEX INSURANCE CORP UNIVERSAL INSURANCE HOLDINGS, INC
PLATINUM UNDERWRITERS HOLDINGS LIMITED VALIDUS HOLDINGS, LIMITED
PMA CAPITAL CORPORATION VAUDOISE ASSURANCES HOLDING
PORTO SEGURO SA VITTORIA ASSICURAZIONI SPA
PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA SPA W. R. BERKLEY CORP
PREMIER INSURANCE LIMITED SAUDI INDIAN COMPANY FOR CO- OPERATIVE INSURANCE
PROASSURANCE CORPORATION WATANIYA INSURANCE COMPANY
PROCENTURY CORPORATION WESCO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
PROGRESSIVE CORP WESTAIM CORPORATION (THE)
POWSZECHNY ZAKLAD UBEZPIECZEN SA WETHAQ TAKAFUL INSURANCE CO KCSC
QATAR GENERAL INSURANCE & REINSURANCE WHITE MOUNTAINS INSURANCE GROUP LTD
QATAR INSURANCE WUERTTEMBERGISCHE UND BADISCHE VERS.AG
QATAR ISLAMIC INSURANCE COMPANY ZUR SHAMIR HOLDINGS LTD
QBE INSURANCE GROUP LIMITED ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP LIMITED
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Table D.2: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empirical study. The insurer characteristics are
retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and Thomson Worldscope databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Inverse z-score One divided by z-score. Z-score is the sum of an insurer’s equity ratio and return on assets, divided by the standard deviation
of an insurer’s return on assets from the previous five years.
own calc.
Capital surplus Natural logarithm of capital surplus. Capital surplus represents the amount received in excess of par value from the sale of
common stock.
Worldscope (WC03481), own calc.
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251,
WC03255).
Equity ratio Ratio of an insurer’s equity to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999).
Leverage Sum of earned and unearned premiums divided by capital surplus. Worldscope (WC03010, WC01002,
WC03351), own calc.
Long-term solvency Total long-term insurance reserves divided by total liabilities. Worldscope
(WC03030,WC03351), own
calc.
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves to earned premiums. Worldscope (WC15549).
Operating expenses Ratio of operating expenses to total assets. Worldscope (WC01249,
WC02999).
Premium growth One year annual growth rate in booked premiums. Worldscope (WC01004).
Return on Assets Return of the insurer on its total assets after taxes (in %). Worldscope (WC08326).
Size Natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets. Worldscope (WC02999).
Solvency Net income divided by the sum of short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt. Worldscope
(WC07250,WC03051), own
calc.
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database (World Bank).
Inflation Natural logarithm of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database (World Bank).
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Table E.1: Sample U.S. insurers.
The appendix lists all insurers that are included in the empirical study. The sample is constructed by
first selecting all firms with (TIC/CUSIP) SIC-codes 6311, 6321, and 6331 from the Compustat/CRSP
databases. The list is then corrected for all insurance companies for which no 10-K filings could be
found in the Morningstar Document Research database for the time period Q1 1999 until Q3 2014.
All insurers in the CRSP/Compustat and Morningstar Document Research databases are matched using
their TIC and CUSIP-Codes and we manually double-check those insurance companies that have non-
matching names.
21ST CENTURY INS GROUP ENSTAR GROUP LTD
ACA CAPITAL HOLDINGS INC ESSENT GROUP LTD
ACAP CORP EVEREST RE GROUP LTD
ACCEPTANCE INSURANCE COS INC FARM FAMILY HOLDINGS INC
ACE LTD FBL FINANCIAL GROUP INC-CL A
AETNA INC FEDERATED NATIONAL HLDG CO
AFFIRMATIVE INS HOLDINGS INC FIDELITY & GUARANTY LIFE
AFLAC INC FIRST ACCEPTANCE CORP
ALFA CORP FIRST MERCURY FINANCIAL CORP
ALLEGHANY CORP FORTUNE FINANCIAL INC
ALLIED WORLD ASSURANCE CO AG FRONTIER INSURANCE GROUP INC
ALLSTATE CORP GAINSCO INC
ALTERRA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD GLOBAL INDEMNITY PLC
AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC GREAT AMERN FINL RESOURCES
AMCOMP INC GREENLIGHT CAPITAL RE LTD
AMER COUNTRY HOLDINGS INC HALLMARK FINANCIAL SERVICES
AMERICAN EQTY INVT LIFE HLDG HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP INC
AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORP OH HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES
AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP INC HCC INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC
AMERICAN GENERAL CORP HCI GROUP INC
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE CORP HEALTHMARKETINC UICI
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP HIGHLANDS INSURANCE GRP INC
AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE HILLTOP HOLDINGS INC
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CAPITAL HORACE MANN EDUCATORS CORP
AMERICAN RE CORP HSB GROUP INC
AMERISAFE INC INDEPENDENCE HOLDING CO
AMWEST INSURANCE GROUP INC INFINITY PROPERTY & CAS CORP
ANNUITY AND LIFE RE HOLDINGS JAMES RIVER GROUP INC
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP LTD JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLDINGS LTD KANSAS CITY LIFE INS CO
ASSURANT INC KEMPER CORP
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD KINGSWAY FINANCIAL SVCS INC
ATHENE USA CORP KMG AMERICA CORP
AXA FINANCIAL INC LANDAMERICA FINANCIAL GP
AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP
BERKLEY (W R) CORP MAIDEN HOLDINGS LTD
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY MAJESTIC CAPITAL LTD
BLANCH E W HOLDINGS INC MARKEL CORP
BPO MANAGEMENT SERVICES/PA MBIA INC
BRISTOL WEST HOLDINGS INC MEADOWBROOK INS GROUP INC
CAREMARK ULYSSES HOLDING CORP MERCER INSURANCE GROUP INC
CASTLEPOINT HOLDINGS LTD MERCHANTS GROUP INC
CHUBB CORP MERCURY GENERAL CORP
CITIZENS INC METLIFE INC
CNA FINANCIAL CORP MGIC INVESTMENT CORP/WI
CNA SURETY CORP MIIX GROUP INC
CNO FINANCIAL GROUP INC MONTPELIER RE HOLDINGS
COMMERCE GROUP INC/MA MONY GROUP INC
CONSECO INC MUTUAL RISK MANAGEMENT LTD
DARWIN PROFESSIONAL UNDWRTS NYMAGIC INC
DELPHI FINANCIAL GROUP INC NATIONAL ATLANTIC HOLDINGS
DIRECT GENERAL CORP NATIONAL INTERSTATE CORP
DONEGAL GROUP INC NATIONAL SEC GROUP INC
EASTERN INSURANCE HLDGS INC NATIONAL WESTERN LIFE -CL A
EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS INC NATIONWIDE FINL SVCS -CL A
ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HOLDINGS NORTH POINTE HOLDINGS CORP
ENHANCE FINANCIAL SVCS GRP ODYSSEY RE HOLDINGS CORP
ENSTAR GROUP INC OLD REPUBLIC INTL CORP
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ONEBEACON INSURANCE GROUP
PARTNERRE LTD
PAULA FINANCIAL/DE
PENN-AMERICA GROUP INC
PENN TREATY AMERN CORP
PHOENIX COMPANIES INC
PLATINUM UNDERWRITERS HLDG
PMI GROUP INC
PRESERVER GROUP INC
PRIMERICA INC
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GRP INC
PROASSURANCE CORP
PROCENTURY CORP
PROGRESSIVE CORP-OHIO
PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC
QUANTA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD
RADIAN GROUP INC
RAM HOLDINGS LTD
REINSURANCE GROUP AMER INC
RELIANCE GROUP HOLDINGS
RELIASTAR FINANCIAL CORP
RENAISSANCERE HOLDINGS LTD
REPUBLIC COMPANIES GROUP
RLI CORP
RTW INC
SAFECO CORP
SAFETY INSURANCE GROUP INC
SCOTTISH RE GROUP LTD
SCPIE HOLDINGS INC
SEABRIGHT HOLDINGS INC
SOUTHWESTERN LIFE HLDGS INC
SPECIALTY UNDERWRITERS
STANCORP FINANCIAL GROUP INC
SUN LIFE FINANCIAL INC
SYMETRA FINANCIAL CORP
SYNCORA HOLDINGS LTD
TORCHMARK CORP
TOWER GROUP INTL LTD
TRANSATLANTIC HOLDINGS INC
TRAVELERS COS INC
TRAVELERS CORP
TRIPLE-S MANAGEMENT CORP
UNICO AMERICAN CORP
UNITED AMERICA INDEMNITY Ltd
UNITED FIRE GROUP INC
UNIVERSAL AMERICAN CORP
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE HLDGS
UNUM GROUP
US HEALTH GROUP INC
VALIDUS HOLDINGS LTD
VESTA INSURANCE GROUP INC
VOYA INSURANCE & ANNUITY CO
WHITE MTNS INS GROUP LTD
XL GROUP PLC
ZENITH NATIONAL INSURANCE CP
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Table E.2: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in the empirical study. Variables describing an insurer’s
use of financial derivatives are constructed using information from the respective insurer’s 10-K filings retrieved from the Morningstar Document Research database. The
insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Compustat and CRSP databases.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
Inverse z-score One divided by z-score. Z-score is the average stock return divided by the respective stock return volatility. CRSP, own calc.
MES Quarterly Marginal Expected Shortfall defined in Acharya et al. (2010) as the average return on an individual insurer’s
stock on the days the S&P 500 index experienced its 5% worst outcomes.
CRSP, own calc.
SRISK Average quarterly estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle
(2015). The SRISK estimate for insurer i at time t is given by S RIS Ki,t “ k
`
Debti,t
˘
´ p1 ´
kq
`
1´ LRMES i,t
˘
Equityi,t , where k is a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the insurer’s book value of
debt, LRMES i,t is the long-run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 ´ expp´18 ¨ MES q, MES is the estimated
Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the insurer’s market value of equity.
CRSP, Compustat, own. calc.
Insurer derivatives usage variables
Derivative-user Dummy variable with value 1 if an insurer uses derivatives, and 0 otherwise. Morningstar.
Hedging Dummy variable with value 1 if an insurer predominantly uses derivatives to hedge risks, and 0 otherwise. Morningstar.
Derivatives intensity The number of different types of derivatives used by an insurer (ranges from 0 to 4). Morningstar.
Swaps Dummy variable with value 1 if an insurer uses swaps, and 0 otherwise. Morningstar.
Options Dummy variable with value 1 if an insurer uses options, and 0 otherwise. Morningstar.
Forwards Dummy variable with value 1 if an insurer uses forwards, and 0 otherwise. Morningstar.
Futures Dummy variable with value 1 if an insurer uses futures, and 0 otherwise. Morningstar.
Gains/Losses Fair value gains/losses on an insurer’s derivatives positions. Morningstar.
Insurer-specific control variables
Capital surplus Natural logarithm of insurer’s capital surplus. Compustat.
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Compustat, own calc.
Leverage Total debt divided by total size Compustat, own calc.
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Compustat, own calc.
ROA Return on assets. Compustat, own calc.
Total Liabilities Natural logarithm of an insurer’s liabilities. Compustat.
Size Natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets. Compustat.
Solvency Capital surplus divided by total assets. Compustat, own calc.
Volatility Standard deviation of an insurer’s stock returns. CRSP, own calc.
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